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Abstract 
 
Human error and other human related factors have long been identified as the 
main cause of accidents at sea. Inadequate design has been suggested as a 
significant reason triggering human actions. In this research, human factors in ship 
design and operation were investigated using several approaches: a literature 
review, empirical studies and a theoretical approach. The methods include: content 
analysis, exploratory survey, explanatory research and on-board measurements, 
combined with observations and questionnaires. A theoretical evaluation of the 
human factor construct is made and a model for integrating human factors into 
design is introduced. The work in this thesis can be classified into six themes:  
 
RT1:  Overview of the existing knowledge of human factors in ship design and 
operation  
RT2: Overview of the implementation of human factor principles in ship design 
and operation  
RT3: Overview of the relationships between human factors and other variables of 
interest 
RT4: Overview of the standards and criteria and their relevance 
RT5: Overview of the crew’s wellbeing and performance  
RT6: Overview of human factors theoretical construct in ship design and 
operation. 
 
Two offshore supply vessels operating in the Norwegian Sea were chosen as the 
objects of the study; therefore generalisation of the findings is limited. The main 
contributions of the thesis are: 
 
C1: To present a comprehensive list of documents related to human factors that 
includes the topics covered  
C2: To develop qualitative and quantitative methods, and an on-board evaluation 
that can be used to distinguish factors related to vessels from those related to 
humans 
C3: To present an example of how different methods were used to evaluate the 
implementation of human factors on the sampled vessels, including a 
presentation of results that may contribute to the existing body of knowledge  
C4: To present feedback on the existing standards and criteria based on on-board 
measurements, and which shows their relevance when implemented on two 
offshore supply vessels operating in the Norwegian Sea 
C5: To present a model showing the significant variables and their relationships 
to seafarers’ wellbeing and performance on two offshore supply vessels 
during their operation in the Norwegian Sea 
C6: To present theoretical feedback on the human factor construct in ship design 
and operation as represented by the sample  
C7: To propose a preliminary model of how human factors could be integrated in 
offshore supply vessel design and operation 
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Preface 
 
This thesis is submitted to the Norwegian University of Science and Technology 
(NTNU) for partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Philosophiae 
Doctor (PhD). It is constructed based on published and submitted journal papers. 
The project started in July 2008 and ended in July 2012. It was fully financed by the 
Department of Marine Technology, NTNU where the doctoral works were 
undertaken. The supervisor was Prof. Bjørn Egil Asbjørnslett. 
 
The research can be divided into two phases. In the first two years, courses were 
undertaken, and literature studies and theoretical research were conducted. Three 
preliminary articles were produced: 
 
1. A Content Analysis of Human Factors in the Design of Marine Systems; 
published and presented in the International Conference on Ship & Offshore 
Technology (ICSOT), Surabaya, 11-12 Nov 2010. 
2. A Proposed Model to Account for Human Factors in Safety-critical Systems; 
published and presented in the European Safety and Reliability (ESREL) 
Conference, Rhodes, 9-11 Sept 2010. 
3. Survivability of Ships at Sea: A Human Factors Perspective; published and 
presented in ERGOShip Conference, Gothenburg, 4-16 Sept 2011. 
Those articles were improved and later published in journals: 
 
4. A Content Analysis of Human Factors in Ship Design; published in the 
International Journal of Maritime Engineering (RINA Transactions Part A3, 
Vol 156, Jul – Sep 2014) 
5. Survivability of Ships at Sea: A Proposed Model to Account for Human 
Factors in a Safety-critical System; published in the International Journal of 
Maritime Engineering (RINA Transactions Part A2, Vol 156, Apr – Jun 2014) 
In the third year, field surveys were performed on board offshore supply vessels 
(OSV) operating in the Norwegian Sea. The candidate was given access to two OSVs 
with different designs. The first survey was conducted in October 2010 on OSV A. 
The second survey was conducted in February 2011 on OSV B. Results of the 
observations made on these preliminary visits were reported as an article: 
 
6. Offshore Supply Vessel Design and Operation: A Human Factors 
Exploration; published and presented in the European Safety & Reliability 
(ESREL) Conference, Troyes, 18-22 Sep 2011. 
This article was improved and published in a journal: 
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7. Exploratory Surveys of Human Factors on Offshore Supply Vessels in the 
Norwegian Sea, Naval Engineers Journal, Vol 125, issue 2, June 2013. 
Follow-up surveys were conducted to confirm findings from the preliminary 
observations. Questionnaires regarding the implementation and evaluation of the 
human factors principles on OSVs were developed and distributed among all 
seafarers on both OSVs. The results are presented in an article: 
 
8. Human Factors on Offshore Supply Vessels in the Norwegian Sea – An 
Explanatory Survey (accepted in the International Journal of Maritime 
Engineering, RINA Transactions, in Press) 
Using the same questionnaires, the construct of human factors in ships design is 
analysed by means of factor analysis. The outcome is presented in a technical note: 
 
9. Human Factors in Ship Design and Operation: A Preliminary Survey of the 
Theoretical Construct (accepted in the International Journal of Maritime 
Engineering, RINA Transactions, in Press) 
Physical measurements were performed and daily diaries were administered on 
both OSVs to check the validity of the existing criteria. The surveys were conducted 
in July 2011 to represent summer conditions and in October 2011 to represent 
winter conditions. Two reports were written: 
 
10. Human Factors Evaluation in Ship Design: A Case Study on Offshore Supply 
Vessels in the Norwegian Sea, Part I: Theoretical Background and Technical 
Constructs 
11. Human Factors Evaluation in Ship Design: A Case Study on Offshore Supply 
Vessels in the Norwegian Sea, Part II: Multivariate Analyses and Structural 
Modelling 
Both papers have been accepted in the Naval Engineers Journal (in Press). 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
 
In the beginning … darkness was over the surface of the deep… 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.1. Problem Outline 
This work was prompted by the number of fatal accidents in developing countries, 
where safety is in a different realm; characterised by overcrowded, overloaded and 
inadequate vessels with low operating standards, low safety awareness and 
ineffective regulatory systems (Lawson & Weisbrod, 2005; Spouge, 1991). It was 
realised that many problems in the field of maritime technology were related to 
humans. Research showed that most accidents at sea were caused by human 
errors (Baker & McCafferty, 2005; McCafferty & Baker, 2006). Despite this, it 
seemed that “human factors”1,2 were barely a consideration when designing a ship. 
There was a gap between existing knowledge of ship design and needs in reality. It 
is true that safety-related issues were implemented, for instance by designing 
escape routes, installing firefighting equipment, putting safety signs, installing 
safety-related equipment, implementing safety procedures and performing safety 
training, but, whether consideration of human factors was integrated across the 
entire ship design needs to be investigated further. 
 
This thesis involves several themes. First, it will discuss the “human factors” 
present in ship design and how this is included in existing documents such as rules, 
standards and guidelines. Secondly, it will investigate how human factors and 
aspects of human factors are taken into account in ship design. In this thesis the 
term “ship design” is limited to the object of the study: relatively newly built, 
offshore supply vessels operating in the Norwegian Sea. Thirdly, the thesis will 
examine whether the sampled supply vessels can be distinguished from the human 
factor perspective, and if a consideration of human factors has had an effect on the 
possibility of an accident. Fourth, the thesis will evaluate the effectiveness of the 
existing standards and criteria of human factors on offshore supply vessels during 
                                                        
1 The term “human factors” refers to: “the scientific discipline concerned with the 
understanding of interactions among humans and other elements of a system,… “ (International 
Ergonomics Association, 2012). 
2 According to Merriam-Webster.com (2014) online dictionary the term “human factors” is a 
noun plural but singular in construction. Therefore, unless quoted from other sources and/or 
describe otherwise, the term “human factors” is treated as a singular noun in this thesis.
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their operation. Fifth, the seafarers’ well-being and performance will be studied in 
relation to offshore supply vessel design and other operational-related variables. 
Finally, the thesis will evaluate the theoretical construct of human factors in ship 
design by taking two offshore supply vessels as examples.  
1.2. Research Context 
The study was supported by the Department of Marine Technology, Norwegian 
University of Science and Technology (NTNU). It was purely academic and 
independent. This condition gave the researcher the flexibility to develop the 
research in accordance with the findings, however, it also put the researcher into a 
relatively limited situation when, for example, accessing the necessary information 
and collecting relevant data. It took more than two years from the formal 
beginning of the study to conduct the first field survey.  
 
Research within the area of human factors is unique. It deals with people and their 
complexity where uncertainty is high and variance is wide. The object of the study 
is usually difficult to measure, particularly from the engineering perspective. It is 
also personal, subjective and prone to bias, and consequently, it is sensitive to 
controversy especially when referring to a particular body, organisation, company, 
shipbuilder or manufacturer, even to the colour of the flag. Anonymity is thus kept 
to the highest level possible. The methods implemented in this thesis encompass 
both approaches, from the engineering perspective as well as from the social 
sciences. 
 
 “Human factors” is a very broad topic with many branches. On every branch there 
is a separate, independent discipline, such as habitability, bridge design, vibration, 
noise and safety. This research is trying to present the human factors as a holistic 
entity. In consequence, the coverage is limited, in that it cannot explore any topic 
extensively. This research considers how ship design inherently accounts for 
human factors. The message is mainly addressed to naval architects, marine 
engineers, ship designers, ship builders, classification societies and all other 
parties involved in the design stage; especially when the design basis is specified 
until the ship is launched. It is not about health, safety and the environment (HSE), 
or human resource management (HRM), nor is it about human psychology or 
human reliability. 
1.3. Research Questions 
The purpose of the research was to discover whether “human factors” was 
sufficiently addressed in ship design, how it was implemented and how it affected 
the personnel on board. Several detailed questions were asked, such as: how did 
ship design affect human factors evaluation, did human factors have significant 
effects on operator conditions and incidents on board, which factors influenced 
operator wellbeing and performance at sea, what were the underlying factors of 
Introduction 
 
3 
 
human factors in ship design, and how can human factors issues be addressed so 
that they could be effectively implemented in ship design and operation? 
1.4. Research Design 
 
Figure 1 Framework of the thesis, studies, papers and contributions 
 
The research was a kind of adventure. It was begun with one intention,  to examine 
whether “human factors” were considered in ship design, and how. Different 
methods were used research to answer the questions. The first question asked: 
“Are human factors considered in ship design?” There was no simple answer to 
that particular question, and so the question was restated: “How are human factors 
and different aspects of human factors taken into account in ship design?” A 
literature study was performed as the first response to the enquiry, by reviewing 
the rules, regulations, standards, codes, recommended practice and guidelines 
used as a reference when designing and constructing a ship (see CP1 and P1 in 
Figure 1. The study at the same time also discussed the “human factors” found in 
ship design. The second response to the enquiry was to do a survey using a 
questionnaire developed to measure human factors implementations in ship 
design. The target respondents were seafarers in the oil and gas industry in the 
North Sea. This effort failed on the first attempt. A company provided 
communication access via email to five supply vessels operating along the 
Norwegian Continental Shelf. Questionnaires were sent to every officer on board. 
Not a single response was received.  
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It was not until the researcher came on board, met the seafarers in person, talked 
to them and observed them in their natural working environment that the research 
could continue. The results of these visits were reported in CP2 which was later 
improved to P2.  
 
The initial questionnaires were then modified according to the findings and 
distributed in person on board the vessel. The results of the survey are presented 
in P3. An exploratory theoretical evaluation was performed to examine the 
underlying factors of human factors (presented in P6) using the same data 
collected from the questionnaires.  
 
When following up the literature study, some of the criteria and standards were 
evaluated by means of on-board measurements combined with observations and 
daily diaries. Results of the field study are presented in P4. At the same time, the 
operators’ performance and wellbeing were also examined. Significant influencing 
factors were identified and a human factors model for offshore supply vessel 
operation was developed by applying multivariate analyses and structural 
modelling where several variables of interest were analysed (P5).  
 
Short descriptions of each paper, its relevance and contribution(s), are presented 
in the following section. 
1.5. Papers, Relevance and Contributions 
As many as six different studies reported in six papers are compiled in this thesis 
(Figure 1). Some study results were presented in conferences before they were 
improved and published in journals. Each journal article is presented as a separate 
appendix in the thesis. 
 
The title of the first paper (P1) is “A Content Analysis of Human Factors in Ships 
Design.” It was published in the International Journal of Maritime Engineering, 
RINA Transactions Part A3, Vol 156, Jul – Sep 2014. This paper covers most of the 
documents, rules, regulations and guidance addressing human factors in ship 
design. The paper acted as the basic reference for the continued research. The 
benefits of this paper are two-fold; for the users and for the regulatory bodies. It 
provides a comprehensive list of documents related to human factors which are 
beneficial for ship owners, designers and shipbuilders when addressing human 
factors in their design (C1). For classification societies and other related 
organisations this paper serves as a directory that can be used to review the 
existing topics within human factors that have been covered by the documents 
(C2). 
 
The title of the second paper (P2) is: “Exploratory Surveys of Human Factors on 
Offshore Supply Vessels in the Norwegian Sea.” It was published in Naval 
Engineers Journal, Vol 125, issue 2, June 2013. This paper provides qualitative 
evidence of how human factors principles were implemented on offshore supply 
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vessels (OSVs) in the Norwegian Sea. It shows the ability of the industry to address 
human factors to date, based on observations and interviews. This paper 
established a foundation for further surveys. The contributions of the paper are 
identified. For the crews on offshore supply vessels, this paper serves as an 
opportunity to express their opinions and their assessment of the vessel’s design, 
and to give formal feedback (C3). For the particular ship owners, designers and 
shipbuilders, this paper could be used as a source of input for improvements. It 
presents information regarding issues that have been addressed effectively, and 
issues that need to be improved (C4). 
 
The third paper (P3) “Human Factors on Offshore Supply Vessels in the Norwegian 
Sea – An Explanatory Survey” has been accepted in The International Journal of 
Maritime Engineering, RINA Transactions (in Press). This paper provides 
quantitative evidence of how human factors implementation was assessed by the 
crews on two OSVs in the Norwegian Sea based on their subjective perceptions and 
experience, including the different dimensions of human factors: habitability, 
workability, controllability and maintainability. It confirms the findings of the 
qualitative study. This paper provides feedback to the particular ship owners and 
ship designers about how their product was quantitatively assessed by the users, 
as well as how it was related to incidences on board (C5). The paper also provides 
a method that can be used to systematically measure and to evaluate different 
aspects of human factors (C6).  
 
The fourth paper (P4) “Human Factors Evaluation in Ship Design: A Case Study on 
Offshore Supply Vessels in the Norwegian Sea, Part I: Theoretical Background and 
Technical Constructs” has been accepted for publication in the Naval Engineers 
Journal (in Press). This paper plays an important role in the thesis. It demonstrates 
the relevance of the existing human factors criteria compared to on-board 
measurements, combined with observations and user evaluations of two OSVs in 
the Norwegian Sea. It provides authentic feedback regarding the existing human 
factors standards and criteria (C7) when they were implemented on the sampled 
vessels. This paper also provides a contribution of methods (C8) that could be 
replicated on other vessels for further validation. For the ship owners, designers, 
and ship operators, this paper could be used as guidance regarding how to 
perceive and how to address the existing human factors criteria on OSVs (C9). 
 
The fifth paper (P5) “Human Factors Evaluation in Ship Design: A Case Study on 
Offshore Supply Vessels in the Norwegian Sea, Part II: Multivariate Analyses and 
Structural Modelling” has been accepted for publication in the Naval Engineers 
Journal (in Press). This paper introduces a method that is commonly used in social 
sciences to explain the effect of a number of independent variables on a certain 
dependent variable. It provides numerical evidence of how the variables are 
interconnected. A valid human factors model in offshore supply vessels operation 
in the Norwegian Sea related to the design is presented as a contribution of the 
study (C10). It shows factors influencing seafarers’ wellbeing and performance 
during operation in the Norwegian Sea and it shows how variables relevant to 
Introduction 
 
6 
 
human factors are interrelated. The model could be used as a reference to upgrade 
vessel design in order to obtain the most effective results,  to ensure safety and to 
improve performance from the human factor perspective. 
 
The title of the sixth paper (P6) is “Human Factors in Ship Design and Operation: A 
Preliminary Survey of the Theoretical Construct.” The paper has been accepted in 
The International Journal of Maritime Engineering, RINA Transactions (in Press). 
This paper confirms some of the theoretical elements of the human factors 
dimensions in ship design and operation. It gives feedback on the human factors 
theoretical construct (C11). At the same time, the paper could be used as a strategy 
to integrate human factors in offshore supply vessel design and operation (C12). 
 
The papers published in this thesis were entirely written by the candidate. The 
supervisor supported the candidate with proper access and adequate resources, 
gave his professional judgment throughout the process, guided the candidate in 
the right direction and assisted the candidate in improving the works. All the 
research work, including literature study, research plan, data collection, data 
processing, data analysis and synthesis, were mostly performed by the candidate. 
Mr Frode Gran (NTNU) helped the candidate to prepare the instrument used in this 
study to measure noise and motion, Mr Geir Spachmo (MARINTEK) helped the 
candidate process the motion data and Prof. Dr Christian A Klöckner (NTNU) 
helped the candidate build the model in P5 using the structural equation model 
(SEM) in MPlus.  
1.6. Thesis Structure 
The rest of the thesis is structured as follows:  
 
x Chapter 2: State of the Art covers recent publications regarding the topics 
discussed in this thesis.  
x Chapter 3: Research Design and Results consists of the research questions, 
the purpose or the objective(s) of the research, methods used to answer the 
enquiries and the scope of works. This chapter also presents a summary of 
the results of the studies in relation to answering the research questions. 
x Chapter 4: Discussion of the results in relation to the research questions, 
including strengths and weaknesses of the studies, and further elaboration 
of some of the issues 
x Chapter 5: Contributions presents the contributions of the thesis in general 
Chapter 6: Conclusions presents the conclusions of the research, 
recommendations and suggests future works. 
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Chapter 2: State of the Art 
 
“Let there be light!” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Working and living as a seafarer is not easy. It is a high risk occupation with long 
hours and monotonous living and working conditions, in addition to the harsh 
situations that the seafarers have to cope with in their job. One statement quoted 
in the International Labour Organisation (ILO)’s book dramatically describes the 
outcome (Alderton, 2004): 
 
2.1. Accidents and Human Errors 
The frequency of maritime accidents in the world is declining, however, studies 
show that human error remains the dominant factor (80%-85%) in maritime 
accidents (Baker et al., 2005; McCafferty et al., 2006). Approximately 50% of 
maritime accidents are initiated by human error, while another 30% are due to the 
failure of humans to avoid accident. This 30% portion reflects the conditions that 
should have been countered by humans and were not adequately addressed 
(Baker & Seah, 2004).  
 
A study to analyse accidents involving high-speed craft (HSC) and conventional 
ocean-going vessels shows that the HSC accidents are mainly related to bridge 
personnel and operations where the human element is the key causal factor 
identified (Antão & Guedes Soares, 2008). In ocean-going commercial vessels, it is 
navigational equipment and procedures that cause more accidents. Accidents 
involving HSC comprises the 50% initiated by human error and accidents involving 
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ocean-going vessels the 30% proportion of the conditions described by Baker et al. 
(2004).   
 
Reason (1990) defines error as: “a generic term to encompass all those occasions 
in which a planned sequence of mental or physical activities fails to achieve its 
intended outcome, and when these failures cannot be attributed to the 
intervention of some chance agency”. A series of planned actions may fail to 
achieve their desired outcome because the actions did not go as planned or 
because the plan itself was inadequate. Reason (1990) further describes: “slips and 
lapses are errors which result from failure in the execution and/or storage stage of 
an action sequence, regardless of whether or not the plan which guided them was 
adequate to achieve its objective.” 
 
Human error can be defined as ”not intended by the actor; not desired by a set of 
rules or an external observer; or that led the task or system outside its acceptable 
limits” (Senders, Moray, & North Atlanctic Treaty Organisation, 1991). 
 
The human error problem can be viewed in two ways: the human approach and 
the system approach (Reason, 2000). The human approach points at the errors of 
individuals, blaming them for forgetfulness, inattention or moral weakness. The 
system approach focuses on the conditions under which individuals work and tries 
to build defences to avert errors or mitigate their effects.  
 
In this thesis human error is defined as an error made by a human who does not 
intend to make the mistake, however, the focus of this thesis will be on the 
conditions where, and in which, humans work and perform their duties.  
 
The International Maritime Organisation (IMO) report on casualty statistics from 
2006 to 2011 shows that the number of casualties of ship per year continues to 
decline, by approximately 27% per annum (International Maritime Organization, 
2012a). Most of the losses are centred on South China and the South East Asia 
region (Seafarers International Research Centre, 2012). This is not surprising, as 
already described in Section 1.1 in this thesis. Spouge (1991) and Lawson and 
Weisbrod (2005) reported that the conditions of sea transportation in developing 
countries were terrible, characterised by the use of substandard vessels, minimum 
maintenance and low safety awareness. Another figure from 2000 to 2014 
supports the finding that most shipping accidents with high numbers of fatalities 
worldwide, took place in developing countries (Statista, 2014). Only two out of 
twenty four shipping accidents in the last fourteen years took place in Europe, the 
Express Samina (September 2000 in Greece) and Costa Concordia (January 2012, in 
Italy). Two other major accidents that occurred in Europe took place before 2000: 
the capsizing of the Herald of Free Enterprise (at least 188 casualties) (Kristiansen, 
2005) and MV Estonia (852 casualties) (The Joint Accident Investigation 
Commission of Estonia, 1997). Those accidents happened in 1987 and in 1994 
respectively. 
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2.2. Design and Human Factors 
In contrast to the fact that human error and human related factors were still the 
dominant types of accidents at sea, the human element seems to be neglected in 
ship design. The human element here is defined as “the people operating the ship” 
(Lloyd's Register, 2008). There have been quite a few critiques of this particular 
situation.  
 
Reason (1990) demonstrated that rather than being the main instigator of an 
accident, operators tend to be the inheritors of systems defects created by poor 
design, incorrect installation, faulty maintenance and bad management decisions. 
Their part is usually that of adding the final garnish to a lethal brew whose 
ingredients have already been long in cooking. Reason (2000) added that the 
human condition cannot be changed, but the conditions under which humans work 
can be changed. 
 
One of the most emphasised messages was quoted (Miller, 1999; Miller & 
McSweeney, 2000):  
 
“YOU CANNOT OVERCOME HUMAN ERRORS INDUCED BY POOR 
DESIGN OF THE WORKPLACE WITH MORE TRAINING, MORE 
MANUALS OR WRITTEN PROCEDURES, EXHORTATIONS TO WORK 
MORE SAFELY, OR THREATS OF PUNITIVE ACTIONS FOR JOB 
ACCIDENTS.”  
 
Another frustration was raised by Graveson (2002) who noted that it was hard to 
believe that the human element that had been identified as a key factor in marine 
incidents was not taken seriously in ship design. 
2.3. Human Factors in Ship Design 
Several definitions related to human factors in ship design are given in this section, 
including those for the human element, human engineering, human factors, 
ergonomics and human-centred design.  
 
First, the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) defines the “human element” 
as (International Maritime Organization, 2004): 
 
“… a complex multi-dimensional issue that affects maritime safety, security 
and marine environmental protection. It involves the entire spectrum of 
human activities performed by ship’s crews, shore-base management, 
regulatory bodies, recognized organizations, shipyards, legislators, and other 
relevant parties, all of whom need to co-operate to address human element 
issues effectively.” 
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The Department of Defence differentiates between “human engineering” and 
“human factors”. The term “human engineering” is defined as (Department of 
Defense, 1999): 
 
“…the application of knowledge about human capabilities and limitations to 
system or equipment design and development to achieve efficient, effective, 
and safe system performance at minimum cost and manpower, skill, and 
training demands. Human engineering assures that the system or equipment 
design, required human tasks, and work environment are compatible with 
the sensory, perceptual, mental, and physical attributes of the personnel 
who will operate, maintain, control and support it”. 
 
The term “human factors” is defined as (Department of Defense, 1999): 
 
“… a body of scientific facts about human characteristics. The term covers all 
biomedical and psychosocial considerations; it includes, but is not limited to, 
principles and applications in the areas of human engineering, personnel 
selection, training, life support, job performance aids, and human 
performance evaluation.” 
 
“Human factors” is a relatively novel concept in the field of naval architecture and 
marine engineering. As a term, “human factors” was popular in America, while the 
term “ergonomics” was used in Europe. As described by the International 
Ergonomics Association (IEA) the terms “human factors” and “ergonomics” can be 
used  interchangeably (International Ergonomics Association, 2012): 
 
“Ergonomics (or human factors) is the scientific discipline concerned with 
the understanding of interactions among humans and other elements of a 
system, and the profession that applies theory, principles, data, and other 
methods to design in order to optimize human well-being and overall system 
performance.” 
 
Kristiansen (2005) made a distinction between the concept of ergonomics and 
human factors. Ergonomics emphasises the design of displays, controls and the 
workplace, where anthropometry and human physical capacity with respect to 
sensing and control ability are taken into consideration. Human factors on the 
other hand is assessed in the light of psychological factors, and the mental capacity 
to process information, motivation and interaction with colleagues are taken into 
consideration. 
 
In the basic textbook for naval architects and marine engineers (Calhoun & 
Stevens, 2003), “human factors” is described as a comprehensive term that 
involves all biomedical and psychosocial considerations applying to a human in the 
system. It is concerned with every consideration of the human in the system. In 
contrast, “human factors engineering” (HFE) is one of many aspects of design that 
are addressed within human factors. HFE involves issues of layout, equipment 
design, and workplace environment. It also addresses human-machine interface, 
including displays and controls. HFE in ship design also includes techniques to 
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define the role of the human, simulation and modelling of crew workload, 
advanced man-machine interfaces, and ship design methods and data.  
 
CETENA (The Italian Ship Research Company) defines “ergonomics” as the study of 
human performance and its application to the design of technological systems. The 
goal of this activity is to enhance productivity, safety, convenience and quality of 
life. Topics include models and theories of human performance, design and 
analytical methodology, human-computer interface issues, environmental and 
work design, and physical and mental workload assessment. Human factors 
engineering requires input from disciplines ranging from psychology and 
environmental medicine to statistics (Human Factors and Ergonomics Society, 
2009). 
 
Human-centred design (HCD) is a relatively new concept in ship design. It focuses 
on making systems usable by exploiting the knowledge and operational experience 
of the various users so as to mitigate the risks from mismatches between the 
operators and the systems they operate (Lloyd's Register, 2008). HCD is the 
process of systematically applying human factors and ergonomics knowledge and 
techniques to minimise human error, enhance effectiveness and efficiency, 
improve human working conditions, and counteract the possible adverse effects of 
use on the health, safety and performance of the mariner (Squire, 2007). A 
European Union (EU) funded research called the CyClaDes project (Crew-centred 
Design and Operation of ships and ship systems) was launched to promote human 
element in shipping through design and operational lifecycle (Cyclades 
Framework, 2015). 
 
Lloyd’s Register (LR) defines “human factors” as concerned with the task people 
perform and the environment they do it in – fitting the job to the person. The topic 
of human factors is divided into several considerations (Lloyd's Register, 2008): 
habitability, maintainability, workability, controllability, manoeuvrability, 
survivability, occupational health and safety (OHS) and system safety.  
 
This thesis adopts the general definition of “human factors” provided by 
International Ergonomics Association (2012) and adjusts the term to be used in 
ship design. “Human factors” in ship design is thus defined as a scientific discipline 
concerned with understanding interactions among humans and other elements on 
a ship and the work that applies theory, principles, data, and other methods to 
design the ship in order to optimise safety and performance, as well as the comfort, 
of personnel. More specifically, this thesis follows the framework provided by 
Lloyd’s Register (2008, 2009) that divides human factors into eight aspects or 
dimensions. This is the most comprehensive and complete scope of human factors 
in ship design.  
 
Habitability is defined as the qualities which specify whether a ship is suitable to 
live in, including proper accommodation to sleep and rest, facilities to store and 
prepare food and to dine, washing, bathroom and toilet facilities, and recreational 
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facilities to relax and to socialise. Workability involves the qualities and conditions 
which facilitate the seafarer in working on and operating the vessel properly, 
comprising appropriate and dependable equipment, tools, signage, sufficient 
access, competent users/colleagues, and required information, including system 
and procedures, and communication facilities. Controllability is defined as the 
qualities that allow the operator to perceive the state of the equipment, systems 
and interfaces and to control the ship or the equipment with proper response, 
good reliability and sufficient feedback. Included in the controllability dimension 
are design of the ship control centre, engine control console, switches, displays, 
alarms/warnings and automation. Maintainability involves the qualities and 
conditions which facilitate the crew to undertake proper maintenance of the ship, 
which includes feasible access, good information, proper diagnostics and 
schematics, required tools, equipment, spare parts and provisions, and also 
available storage and procedures. Manoeuvrability is defined as the ability of the 
ship to be manoeuvred as demanded and to behave as expected in any weather or 
sea conditions as intended. This includes the hull shape, the available propulsion 
system, steering system, conning system and a crew that is trained to manoeuvre 
the vessel. Survivability is defined as the qualities that allow the crews to prevent 
hazards from developing further and to survive themselves, along with the vessel 
and the cargo. Included in survivability are escape routes (ship layout), firefighting 
facilities, damage control facilities and lifesaving facilities. Occupational health and 
safety comprises the conditions and qualities that allow the crews to work safely 
and keep them healthy, including effect of work, working environment, living 
conditions, OHS policy, procedures, personal protective equipment (PPE) and diet. 
System safety embraces the risks of any possible scenario that might threaten the 
integrity of the ship, including personnel and cargo. System safety involves hazard 
identification, the potential for human error, equipment error, external hazard, and 
risk analysis and management.  
2.4. Rules and Regulations 
Ships are designed and constructed according to certain criteria, rules and 
regulations, codes, standards and guidance. There are three different sources from 
which these criteria can be obtained and applied as the acceptability of a vessel: 
classification society rules, regulatory requirements and ship-owners 
requirements (Ashe & Lantz, 2003). Usually ship-owners will refer to rules and 
requirements published by a classification society and government statutory 
requirements.  
 
Classification societies serve public interest by promoting the safety of life, 
property, and natural environment, primarily by developing and standards for the 
design, construction and maintenance of marine facilities. On the one hand, the 
classification societies have realised that they should better address the human 
element. On the other hand, maritime safety organisations have made a greater 
contribution to addressing the human element in maritime casualties and 
accidents (Card, Baker, McSweeney, McCafferty, Moore, & Khandpur, 2006).  
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Since most ships may sail internationally, it is necessary to accommodate various 
standards issued by different countries and authorities. An international standard 
was developed, ratified and implemented through the International Maritime 
Organisation (Ashe et al., 2003). The IMO is an international forum under the 
United Nations (UN) which has no power of enforcement or initiative but develops 
conventions, protocols, codes and recommendations. The four most referred to 
conventions issued by IMO are the International Convention for Safety of Life at 
Sea (SOLAS), the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from 
Ships (MARPOL), the International Convention of Load Lines (ICLL) and the 
International Convention of Tonnage Measurement of Ships (Tonnage). SOLAS was 
adopted on 20th January 1914 after the sinking of the Titanic in 1912. The first 
ICLL was adopted in 1930 (International Maritime Organization, 2012b), and 
MARPOL was adopted on 2nd November 1973. Seafarers working and living 
conditions are regulated by another UN agency: the International Labour 
Organisation (ILO). Although the problems experienced by people working and 
living at sea have long been recognised, it was not until 2006 that the Maritime 
Labour Convention (MLC) was formally established (International Labour 
Conference, 2006). The convention was enforced on 20 August 2013. 
 
Several documents are listed  in the maritime industry as guidance with which to 
address human factors in design, categorised as structure, hull form, machinery, 
general arrangement and human-machine interface (Ross, 2009a). The tables 
provide good information for naval architects and marine engineers about where 
to look up information regarding human factors in ship design. Further 
investigation of how human factors were considered in ship design as reflected in 
the existing standards, rules, regulations, codes and guidance was conducted in the 
early stage of this research (Rumawas & Asbjørnslett, 2010, 2014). 
 
In the Asia-Pacific Heads of Maritime Safety Agencies Forum, Commander Bryan R. 
Edmond, chief of the Human Element and Ship Division, USCG presented a paper 
about the current state of international considerations of human factors (Edmond, 
2005). It was acknowledged as a considerable effort by nations, international 
rulemaking bodies, classification societies and others, to address human factors to 
reduce the risk of maritime accidents, pollution and security incidents, however, it 
was also admitted that the effectiveness of those efforts was difficult to gauge. 
 
The maritime industry has taken another step by developing a methodology 
integrating a risk-based approach in the design and approval processes for ships 
and ship system (Skjong, 2009b). Unfortunately, human factors is not covered 
specifically in the scope (Skjong, 2009a). The limitation of the risk-based approach 
was soon recognised. An attempt to facilitate the missing link was made, 
specifically for ship collision and grounding scenarios (Montewka, Goerlandt, 
Innes-Jones, Owen, Hifi, & Porthin, 2012). Ship motion, noise and vibration were 
seen as the design factors that influence human performance. The Bayesian Belief 
Networks (BBN) was applied in concert with three other theories, the Dynamic 
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Adaptability Model, Cognitive Control Model and Malleable Attentional Resources 
Theory. 
 
It seems that “human factors” is developing rapidly in the maritime industry. In the 
last two years, ABS has published several new rules and guides related to human 
factors (American Bureau of Shipping, 2015). Publication #201 the Guide for 
Ergonomic Notations and #209 Guidance Notes on Noise and Vibration Control for 
Inhabited Spaces are of interest and considered relevant to this thesis. 
 
Lloyd’s Register also published several new documents related to the human-
centred approach for ship designers and manufacturers (Lloyd's Register, 2015). 
The contents of most of the documents are somewhat similar to the previous 
publications (Lloyd's Register, 2008, 2009). These new titles are the improved 
versions of the existing Lloyd’s Register's documents which were referred to in 
this thesis. 
2.5. Evaluation of Human Factors Principles on Ships 
A number of studies were performed by a number of researchers in the maritime 
industry to evaluate the implementation of human factors principles in ship 
design. Some relevant findings are presented and summarised according to 
different dimensions of human factors in the following sections. 
2.5.1. Habitability 
Habitability and accommodation facilities were evaluated on naval ships 
(Hardwick, 2000; Strong, 2000). The findings suggest improvements such as a 
drive toward cabin-based accommodations, increased sleeping space and personal 
storage, improved ambient conditions and the provision of other facilities.  
 
A North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) human performance assessment was 
developed in the form of a questionnaire and used on seven frigates and 
destroyers in the NATO Standing Naval Forces Atlantic fleet for two weeks, 
involving 1026 participants and 16,000 completions (Colwell, 2000). Empirical 
models relating to ship motions, sleep, fatigue, motion sickness and task 
performance were developed (Colwell, 2009). A method for calculating motion 
sickness with habituation for a changing motion environment was proposed.  
Another method was also proposed to calculate task duration effects from ship 
motions experienced while sleeping (or trying to sleep) prior to being on watch, 
and from motion sickness symptoms experienced while on watch. The final aim 
was to find the relationship between tasks not completed and motion sickness. 
 
The well-being of seafarers was discussed from a vessel design perspective (Ellis, 
2009), including noise, light levels, the view from the ‘window’, aesthetics, 
confinement and other indirect factors such as social support, social networks and 
restoration. The research indicated the negative effects of noise exposure during 
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rest periods which may lead to increase fatigue. Several inexpensive solutions to 
increase the wellbeing of seafarers were proposed, such as fitting ‘daylight’ bulbs 
rather than neon strip lights and decorating accommodation facilities with 
aesthetically pleasing colours. Altough artificial light could not fully substitute 
natural sunlight, high intensity lighting proved to be effective to stimulate 
seafarers, to improve human performance by increasing alertness (Vagias, 2010). 
Ship motion 
Ship motions was identified as one of the significant factors interfering in crew’s 
sleep besides noise and toilet visit (P. Matsagas & Miller, 2006). Ship motion was 
evident to reduce sleep and to disrupt sleep quality. Ship motion was measured, 
and a ride comfort index (RCI) was developed to show the passenger’s evaluation 
of ride quality on car ferries in Japan (Arima & Tamura, 2006; Arima, Tamura, & 
Yoshihira, 2006; Tamura & Arima, 2006). The research shows that lateral and 
vertical motions are good predictors of ride comfort and motion sickness on board 
high-speed craft as well as displacement-type ships. 
 
Another study measuring ship motion was conducted on an offshore oil production 
and storage vessel. The relationships between the motion and the crew 
performance on board were analysed (Haward, Lewis, & Griffin, 2009). Daily 
diaries were used to measure difficulties with tasks, effort level, motion sickness, 
health symptoms, fatigue and sleep. It was revealed that crew difficulties increase 
when vessel motions increase. 
 
A comprehensive literature survey regarding the effects of motion at sea on crew 
performance was made (Stevens & Parsons, 2002). Their report covered historical 
information regarding motion sickness, symptomatology, susceptibility and 
physiological causes of motion sickness and theories explaining motion sickness. 
Implications for performance were also discussed, together with operability 
criteria. Some approaches to prevent and mitigate adverse effects of ship motion 
on crew were suggested (Stevens and Parsons 2002, after Bittner and Guignard 
1985). The approach was divided into five different areas: (1) ship design and 
system engineering, (2) human factors engineering, (3) enhancing natural human 
resistance to motion effects, (4) modifying adverse physiological reactions to 
motion, and (5) operation solutions. Areas (1) and (2) are within the scope and the 
interest of this research. Some of the methods to mitigate the adverse effects of 
ship motion included in area (1) were hull design, ship arrangement, motion 
attenuation devices and vibration isolation, damping treatments, and the 
arrangement and design of crew space. Some methods included in area (2) were 
the location and orientation of crew stations, work and task design, display control 
design and placement, optimisation of ship environmental factors and individual 
anti-vibration devices. 
 
The Office of Naval Research supported a project called “Ship–Human Integration 
Performance System (SHIPS)” and investigated how well the existing standards for 
ship motion address human performance issue (P Matsagas, McCaulay, & 
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Papoulias, 2009). Their preliminary analysis showed that there was a gap between 
the existing standards and human performance. Furthermore, they claimed that 
there were no standards or guidance covering sleep disturbances, sopite syndrome 
and motion induced fatigue to date. 
 
The assessment of the seakeeping performance of a vessel in a specified area is a 
common procedure that includes the prediction of transfer functions for different 
speed and headings for each response (Sarioz & Narli, 2005). Combining transfer 
functions with a spectral formulation of a particular sea area will give predicted 
motion characteristics of the vessel in different sea states for each speed and 
heading combination. The habitability of a vessel can thus be estimated. Sarioz and 
Narli (2005) pointed out that there were no universally agreed criteria for 
comparing the seakeeping performance of alternative designs. The habitability of a 
vessel depends strongly on the limiting acceleration level selected. 
 
A European Commission (EC) project was launched to develop an approach to 
incorporate human factors into the risk-based design of ships (FAROS, 2013). One 
of the goals was to identify the relationship between ship design features and crew 
performance. One report presents an on-going study that was performed to 
determine the effect of ship motion, vibration and noise on the crew’s performance 
and well-being (Kivimaa, Rantanen, Nyman, Owen, Garner, & Davies, 2014). So far, 
they have interviewed eleven mariners and revealed a high adaptation of mariners 
to ship motions. Another notable finding was that ship motions may cause fatigue 
or interrupt operation, but vibration and noise were described as seldom 
disturbing performance on watch. 
Noise 
Another EC project called SILENV (Ships oriented Innovative soLutions to rEduce 
Noise and Vibrations) was launched to study noise and vibration on board ships, as 
well as noise pollution in the environment of ports and noise radiated in water 
(SILENV, 2012). One of the studies within the SILENV project was an evaluation of 
the Comfort Class notation where criteria from classification societies (GL, DNV 
and BV) were checked against noise and vibration field measurements (Cotta & 
Tincani, 2011). They concluded: “…it is probably not strictly necessary for a new 
ship to have a comfort class…” Another study evaluated the criteria for noise 
annoyance on ships (Badino, Borelli, Gaggero, Rizzuto, & Schenone, 2011). This 
report implies that the existing criteria for noise on ships does not correlate with 
the comfort or annoyance caused by the noise. Alternative methods were proposed 
where noise spectra, low frequency pulsation and sound reverberation can be 
included. 
Seafarer fatigue 
Seafarer fatigue at sea was extensively studied by means of various methods 
including a review of literature, a questionnaire survey, physiological assays 
(salivary cortisol check), instrument recordings of sleep, ship motion and noise, 
self-report diaries and other kinds of assessments (Smith, Allen, & Wadsworth, 
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2006). In total, 1856 seafarers including workers on offshore oil installations 
participated in the study. Evidence demonstrated that seafarer shifts and working 
patterns were conducive to fatigue. Excessive working hours seemed to be 
common in the seafaring industry. The effect of working as a seafarer may be felt in 
terms of health and psychosocial outcomes. The link between fatigue and shipping 
accidents became apparent. Fatigue was persistently related to poor sleep quality, 
negative environmental factors, high job demands and high stress. Human fatigue 
was evaluated with the usage of Bayesian Networks (Ventikos, Lykos, & Vagias, 
2012). The research showed that the quality of sleep and other factors such as the 
non-disturbance of circadian rhythms as important aspects for safe and efficient 
operations. 
 
According to another study (Houtman, Miedema, Jettinghoff, Starren, Gort, Wulder, 
& Wubbolts, 2005), which was also cited by Smith, Allen, et al. (2006), the 
measures that were considered most necessary and effective to reduce fatigue 
were proper implementation of the International Safety Management (ISM) Code, 
optimising the organisation of work on board vessels, lengthening rest periods and 
reducing administrative tasks on board vessels.  
2.5.2. Workability and Controllability 
A four year study was conducted, where fifteen passenger and cargo ships were 
visited and observed, and forty bridge officers were interviewed (Lützhöft, 2005). 
It was found that many ostensibly technically integrated maritime systems were 
neither well integrated from a human cooperative point of view, nor from a 
technical point of view. Seafarers must be able to cope with problems by 
outsmarting the system, performing integration work, and sometimes by 
compromise. Similar surveys were conducted to assess the engine control room 
(ECR) design on various merchant vessels in Sweden (Andersson & Lützhöft, 2007; 
Grundevik, Lundh, & Wagner, 2009). The results showed many deficiencies in 
engine rooms (ER) that did not comply with ergonomics principles or even the 
OHS requirements. 
Human-machine interaction 
Poorly-designed controls have the potential to puzzle the operator, decrease 
operator awareness and cause fatal accidents (Ross, 2009b). The grounding of the 
Royal Majesty was one example of imperfect automation implemented on the 
bridge which ended in an accident (National Transportation Safety Board, 1997). 
The global positioning system (GPS) receiver antenna cable connection had 
separated causing the GPS to switch to dead-reckoning mode, and the autopilot 
was not programmed to detect such a deficiency and was not corrected for the 
effects of wind, current or sea. Being ‘confident’ with the equipment on board, the 
crews did not keep a proper lookout. The vessel grounded on a shoal near 
Nantucket, Massachusetts. The CyClaDes project pointed out that there was a lack 
of regulatory framework for crew-centered design, and therefore made an attempt 
to fill in the gap (Cyclades Framework, 2015). 
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2.6. Elimination of the Human Element 
There is a current project to develop ships without skippers (Dragland, 2014) 
under the European Union project MUNIN (Marine Unmanned Navigation through 
Intelligence in Network). One of the goals is to avoid human error by eliminating 
the humans on board. At the same time, fewer people in Europe were interested in 
working at sea. Slower sailing speeds have become favourable for economic 
reasons, and this is considered a burden by sailors. 
 
The idea of unmanned craft is not a novel concept at sea. The United States 
Warfare Centre has been working on similar projects in decades, however, it has 
been implied that eliminating the human element did not necessarily mean 
reducing the human factors challenges at all (Masakowski, 2009).  
2.7. Conclusion 
This chapter presented the state of the art, including a brief description of recent 
developments regarding human factors in ship design, where accidents were taken 
as the background. It can be seen that much has been accomplished within the 
field. The substance of human factors in ship design was discussed, definitions 
were presented, and the way that different topics of human factors were addressed 
and researched were also described. Some connections were identified between 
variables such as seafarer performance, fatigue and well-being, noise, ship motion 
and vibration. A number of standards and other documents related to human 
factors in ship design were described. It was noted that some questions and 
scepticism remains. Two issues worth noting include the question of how effective 
the efforts to address human factors in ship design have been, including methods 
of measurement, and how to take into account the relationships between human-
related ship design features and crew performance. These two remaining 
questions will be discussed, answered and confirmed in the following chapters. 
Various methods will be applied to examine the status of human factors 
implementation in ship design and operation, and relationships between variables 
of interest are investigated and quantified. 
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Chapter 3: Research Design and Results 
 
So God created mankind in his own image,… 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This chapter presents the research design that follows the sequence of the 
research questions (RQ) raised in the thesis. First, it describes the motivation and 
the rationale for each research question, and the research method is explained 
under the corresponding study which answers the question. Finally, the results of 
the study are presented. 
3.1. Introduction 
This thesis was designed based on the system approach (Reason, 2000) which puts 
the focus on the conditions in which people work instead of blaming  individuals 
for the errors they make. In the system approach, error is treated as a consequence 
rather than a cause. In accordance with the context in which the research was 
performed, this thesis focuses on the ship, at sea, the conditions in which the 
seafarers work.  
 
Based on this background, research questions are raised and described in the 
following section. 
3.2. Research Questions 
It was reported that most accidents at sea are caused by human error or human-
related factors, and that poor design was identified as a significant causal factor. 
The first research question in this thesis (RQ1) is thus as follows.  
3.2.1. How are human factors and different aspects of human factors taken 
into account in ship design? 
There are several ways to answer this question. The first method is to check the 
existing rules, regulations and standards available as references for designing a 
ship through a literature study. The second method is to review the product itself, 
the ship, by means of a field survey where the researcher observes and examines 
the ship, and interrogates the users. Another method would be to interrogate the 
designers and those who were involved in the process of designing and 
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constructing the vessel. The latter approach is not covered in this study due to 
limited access. 
 
In this thesis RQ1 was investigated sequentially using a literature study, qualitative 
study and quantitative study. These approaches are described in the following 
studies; Study 1, Study 2 and Study 33. 
Study 1: Literature Study 
A literature study was conducted based on the notion that ships are designed 
according to a certain rules and regulations, and so checking these documents 
would provide information about the intended product:  it would provide facts on 
paper. The study was performed using a content analysis methodology. Content 
analysis is a research technique for making replicable and valid inferences from 
texts, or other meaningful matter, to the context of their use (Krippendorff, 2004). 
The definition of human factors in ship design was documented, then, a coding 
sheet (Table 1) was developed. Due to the novelty and the variety of the topic of 
human factors in ship design, the coding sheet expanded throughout the process of 
data collection. Consequently, the coding process was performed in iterations. 
 
The research content was specified as being documents, standards, rules, 
regulations, recommended practice and guides published by classification societies 
and other relevant international bodies which regulate certain aspects of ship 
design that could affect human performance, health and/or safety on board. Three 
classification societies were taken as the sample: the American Bureau of Shipping 
(ABS), Det Norske Veritas4 (DNV) and Lloyd’s Register (LR). Three other 
organisations are: International Maritime Organisation (IMO), International 
Organisation for Standardization (ISO) and American Society for Testing and 
Materials (ASTM). 
 
Two levels of data exploration were conducted. The titles of the documents were 
checked and identified as to whether they were related to any dimension from the 
human factors framework. The topics covered in each document were examined 
and categorised according to the topics within the human factors framework. 
Tallies were implemented and the results were tabulated. 
Results 
As many as 95 documents were found to be relevant to human factors in ship 
design and operation. Table 2 shows a summary of the results, coded according to 
different aspects of human factors called dimensions. Judging from the number of 
references noted in Table 2, it is sensible to conclude that human factors and 
different aspects of human factors have been comprehensively taken into account 
in ship design.  
 
                                                        
3 The term “study” in this chapter and in the following chapters refers to “journal paper” (Pi) 
as described in Figure 1.
4 Now, it is called DNV GL, after DNV merged with Germanischer Llyod (GL).
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Table 1 Coding sheet 
Dimension Component Aspect / object 
Habitability 
(HAB) 
Accommodation Galleys, mess room 
Recreational spaces 
Cabins 
 Seafarer variation Size 
Shape 
Gender 
 Environmental stressors 
Environmental condition 
Indoor climate 
Comfort 
Noise, sound 
Heat, temperature 
Air velocity, ventilation 
Air quality, smell 
Motion 
Vibration 
Lighting 
Maintainability 
(MAIN) 
Maintenance tasks Layout, access, removal 
routes 
Tools 
Expertise 
Disposal 
Through-life support 
Workability 
(WORK) 
Users 
Tasks 
Equipment & software 
Material & procedures 
Physical & social 
environment 
Accessibility 
Layout 
Space 
Controllability 
(CONT) 
Control centres Bridge 
Engine control room 
Cargo control facilities 
 People-system 
integration 
Man-machine interface 
Communication facilities 
Controls and switches 
Displays, video-display unit 
Alarms 
Automation 
Computer stations 
Manoeuvrability 
(MANV) 
Propulsion system 
Steering system 
Thrusters 
Survivability 
(SURV) 
Firefighting 
Damage control 
Lifesaving facilities 
Occupational Health and Safety 
(OHS) 
Effect to work 
Working environment 
Living conditions 
System safety (SS) Risk consideration 
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Table 2 Summary results of documents involving HF in ship design 
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ABS 17 2 6 1 7 4 1 3 3 9 
DNV 18 0 1 1 6 7 3 3 0 11 
LR 16 0 2 1 2 6 3 6 1 7 
IMO 29 2 2 1 6 8 3 11 4 14 
ISO (TC8)  13 0 7 0 3 2 0 4 0 2 
ASTM 2 2 1 1 2 1 0 1 1 2 
Total 95 6 17 5 25 28 10 29 9 45 
 
The study implied that apart from safety and safety-related topics, the 
implementation of human factors principles in ship design was optional. There is 
no document that can ensure a ship is built following human factors principles 
unless in relation to system safety, survivability and OHS, which issues have been 
regulated since the sinking of the Titanic. Should anybody with to address human 
factors in ship design, there is abundant knowledge to which they can refer, but if 
someone should choose to disregard it, there is no single document that can 
prevent this. 
 
The table shows that “System Safety” was issue most covered by the documents, 
while “Maintainability” was the least covered. A more detailed exploration of each 
topic within each dimension shows that “Habitability” (or “Comfort”) and 
“Controllability” were the most extensively addressed in the body of documents 
(ref. Table A.2. in Appendix A). Issues discussed under “Habitability” were 
predominantly noise, vibration, indoor climate and lighting or illumination 
problems, while “Controllability” predominantly covered alarms, control centres, 
workstations and control, and switches. Some topics were less covered and some 
were not covered at all, such as human reliability, decision making and social 
factors. The literature study also identified significant improvement in the number 
of published documents in the last couple of years (American Bureau of Shipping, 
2015; Lloyd's Register, 2015). 
Study 2: Qualitative Study 
Field surveys were conducted to examine the way that human factors and different 
aspects of human factors were taken into account in recent ship design. The 
surveys were intended to compare the existing knowledge of human factors on 
paper with the reality, the manifestations of the rules, regulations and guides. Two 
types of surveys were prepared: an exploratory survey which was qualitative, and 
an explanatory research which was quantitative. The exploratory survey was also 
performed as a preliminary effort to comprehend the objects of the study in their 
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natural context, in addition to answering RQ1. The qualitative approach that was 
utilised in this study included observations and interviews. Ethnography, a method 
described as “thick description” (Geertz, 1973) was applied to acquire information 
during the surveys.  
 
And offshore supply vessel (OSV) operating in the Norwegian Sea was taken as the 
object of the study. The offshore supply vessel was a perfect candidate for the 
study because this type of vessel embodies one of the most advanced technologies 
in ship design. Many improvements were made throughout the development of the 
ship (Gibson, 2007). An OSV also serves as a good representation of other vessels, 
through its functions as a combination bulk carrier, for general cargo, a container 
vessel and a tanker. It also involves the functions of several multi-purpose working 
vessels including firefighting, oil recovery and as a tug. 
 
Prior to the survey, reports of incidents on offshore vessels and design flaws 
(Hansson, 2003, 2006; Petroleum Safety Authoritiy Norway, 2011; Petroleum 
Safety Authority Norway, 2009) were examined and documented (Rumawas & 
Asbjørnslett, 2011). These reports were used as a reference when conducting the 
surveys on board, to check whether lessons were learnt.  
 
The surveys were undertaken on two different OSV designs (Figure 2)5 in both 
summer and winter. Both vessels were operating in the same area in the 
Norwegian Sea, serving the same offshore platforms, transporting more or less 
similar cargoes to and from the installations. Interviews were conducted with most 
of the crews on board. Some focus discussions were also conducted to review 
issues that were relevant to the crew, such as the number of procedures and forms 
that they have to fill in, and how to reduce and to simplify them.  
 
Table 3 shows a summary of the main class and dimensions of the vessels. OSV A 
follows the traditional design, which represents most supply vessels available on 
the market. The superstructure, including the accommodation and the bridge, is 
located at the bow. She is equipped with two sets of bridge console; one facing 
forward (used during normal sailing operation) and the other facing stern (used 
during loading and unloading operations). 
Main 
engines
Tunnel
thrusters
Azipull
propellers
Cabins
Azipull
propellers
Tunnel
thrusters
Main
engines
OSV A OSV B
 
 
Figure 2 Two different OSV designs 
                                                        
5 These two vessels, OSV A and OSV B were taken as the samples for the exploratory study 
(P2) and also for the other studies (P3, P4, P5 and P6).
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Table 3 Main class and dimensions6 
 OSV A (built in 2008) OSV B (built in 2007) 
Main Class, DNV  
(not all mentioned) 
?1A1, Supply vessel 
COMF-V(3) 
Clean 
E0, DYNPOS-AUTR  
NAUT OSV (A) 
Oil Rec 
?1A1, Supply vessel 
E0, COMF-V(3) 
Clean Design 
E0, DYNPOS-AUTR  
in compliance with NAUT 
OSV 
Oil Rec 
Ice C, Gas Fuelled 
LOA / B mld / draft / 
DWT (approx.) *) 
93.90 m / 21.00 m / 6.6 m / 
5000 mt 
92.20 / 21 m / 7.3 m /  
6000 mt 
*) LOA: length overall; B mld: breadth moulded; DWT: deadweight 
 
OSV B is an alternative design where the superstructure is at the aft, thus she only 
needs one bridge console. OSV B applies a dual fuel system: diesel oil with liquefied 
natural gas (LNG) as an alternative. OSV B is slightly taller than OSV A. The location 
of the main engine and thrusters relative to the accommodation also differs. 
Hypothetically, all these variations in the design could have a considerable effect 
on the human operators on board. Both vessels were relatively newly built and 
among the top of the line in their corresponding fleets. Both vessels were classed 
as ?1A1 supply vessels by DNV and both carry COMF-V(3) class and E0, DYNPOS-
AUTR notations. 
 
The human factors framework based on Lloyd’s Register (2008, 2009) was 
employed as guidance in examining whether the existing ship design complied 
with human factors principles. 
Results 
The results of the exploratory surveys were divided into two parts. The first part 
was to check whether lessons had been learnt in relation to previous incidents or 
                                                        
6 Description of class notation (Det Norske Veritas, 2011):
? Vessel built under the supervision of DNV
1A1:Vessel for which periodical surveys are stipulated in relation to special (main) periodical 
survey intervals of 5 years
COMF-V(3): Vessels with controlled environmental standards (comfort class), V=noise and 
vibration
E0: Vessel with machinery spaces for unattended operation during normal service as well as 
alongside quay
DYNPOS: Vessel with dynamic positioning systems
AUTR: an automatic position keeping system with redundancy in technical design
NAUT: Craft built to a special nautical safety standard given by the Rules 
CLEAN: Basic requirements for controlling and limiting operational emissions and discharge
CLEAN DESIGN: Additional requirements for controlling and limiting operational emissions 
and discharges. In addition, this notation specifies design requirements for protection against 
accidents and for limited their consequences
Oil rec: Vessel for occasional handling, storage and transportation of oil with flash point 
below 60° recovered from a spill of oil in emergency situations
Ice C: Vessel which may operate in light ice conditions
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accidents. The second part was to check the implementation of human factors 
principles compared to the existing framework – used as a checklist and compared 
to previously documented criticism. 
Lessons learnt 
Some improvements were noted in both OSVs, implemented as lessons learnt by 
the industry, involving modifications of the system, developing new procedures 
(North West European Area, 2009), developing new hardware and systems, and 
modification of the existing design, such as converting a ladder into stairs and 
increasing the height of the bulwarks to prevent green water. More examples were 
noted, such as development of a new cargo securing system and an automatic 
hose-securing system to improve safety and performance on deck. A modification 
of autopilot design was implemented on both vessels in parallel with the 
corresponding code, as a response to several accidents related to autopilot. An 
example of the new procedures includes voyage planning where a platform can no 
longer be assigned as the target destination. The vessel should point to a location 
quite a distance from the platform and which is not in line with her route, to avoid 
direct collision in case of something goes wrong. A 500m safety zone was 
stipulated. 
Human factors implementation 
The results of the survey revealed some development compared to the previously 
documented criticisms (ref. Section 2.5), especially in habitability, workability and 
controllability, in addition to safety. Some of the findings are presented in the 
following sections. 
 
Habitability 
Several issues related to the accommodation facilities have been resolved in both 
vessels surveyed. An adequate standard of accommodation facilities were found on 
both OSVs. Every crew member was assigned their own cabin (Figure 3) with 
personal toilet and shower. Cabins are also equipped with a bed, wardrobe, table, 
chairs, television and sound system. Both OSVs were designed with appropriated 
facilities such as the galley (Figure 4), the mess room, the (smoking) lounge, the 
laundry and the gym. Big-screen television sets with satellite connections, leather 
sofas, and personal computers with internet connections were among the standard 
facilities on board. Issues related to lighting and indoor climate such as air 
temperature, relative humidity and air velocity have been addressed satisfactorily 
on both vessels, however, a subset of beds on OSV A lay perpendicular to the 
longitudinal axis of the ship, which was in contradiction to crew expectation 
(Hardwick, 2000). Some issues were identified, such as a considerable rolling 
motion and vibration during hard weather on OSV A. Slamming was found to be 
disturbing due to the splash zone location which was adjacent to a subset of cabins. 
High-pitched noise from the tunnel thrusters was disturbing and interrupted sleep 
on OSV A. On OSV B the pitch motion was found to be troubling in a particular sea 
state, but in general the crews appeared to be satisfied with their vessel. 
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Figure 3 Cabin facilities for the ordinary seamen (non-officers) on OSV A (left) and 
on OSV B (right) 
 
 
 
Figure 4 The galley on one of the OSVs visited has good accommodation facilities 
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Workability 
It was found that both OSVs provided advance workability standards comprising 
the most recent technology, equipment (hardware) and software, development of 
working procedures and proper user training programmes including simulator 
training. Some issues in workability remained, such as inadequate personnel 
access, including the design of ladders and poor layout plans. There are documents 
available regarding design of ladders and access (ABS, 2001; Bureau Veritas, 2014; 
IACS, 2013). The fact that there were several sets of vertical ladders installed on 
one of the OSV indicated that there are rooms for improvement. Some novel 
problems were identified: software compatibility issues, operating system 
problems, expiration date issue, data validity, and overloaded system. Excessive 
communications on the bridge, excessive alarms and irrelevant alarms/warnings 
were also discovered during the survey. 
 
Controllability 
The ship control centres and engine control rooms on the OSVs were fully 
computerised, with a high degree of automation. The way the crews operate the 
vessel has changed significantly. There was no traditional wheel to steer the vessel 
on the bridge and there was no engine telegraph to regulate the engine speed from 
the bridge. Some problems found on both OSVs include: bright lights that cannot 
be dimmed on the bridge, which disturbs visibility at night, and ergonomics issues 
at the workstations. False alarms and broken sensors were also found. 
  
Some critical incidents which could lead to fatal accidents were identified: dynamic 
dynamic positioning (DP) failure on OSV A while loading unloading beside an 
installation, and a blackout on OSV B after loading and unloading was finished and 
the vessel was about to set sail to another destination. An explanation was given by 
the maker to the officer on OSV A who experienced the DP failure incident that he 
was very “lucky” hitting that very small probability of event, it was like winning the 
lottery. On OSV B, LNG apparently had a different characteristic of which the officer 
and the maker did not aware, in that it was less responsive to variation of power 
requirements. A follow up investigation was conducted by contacting the designers 
and the makers of those systems. The maker of OSV A responded: 
 
1. “Regarding the «OSV A» incident you are referring to, this has happend only once 
on the entire «maker XX» equipped fleet. We have found the root cause for this, 
and implemented  a solution for it. This failure will not happened again.” 
2. “Regarding the other other failures you are referring to, like sensor lost etc, this 
are failures that happends not in the DP-system itself, but by DP-connected units. 
…” 
3. “Our experience with failures on DP operation are often the human factor. We have 
examples of DPO's that get alarm for bad DGNSS reception, and still pushes on with 
the operation, and something unwanted happends. We have users that might be 
excellent seamen, but when the position reference system gives a warning or an 
alarm, they don't have experience to understand the effect of it. From our point of 
view, as specialists on our system, it is important to know that the users are 
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specialists on the entire vessel, with some knowledge to all systems. Not deep into 
the systems as we are.” 
It can be inferred from the explanation above that the corresponding DP error was 
a systematic failure (Rausand & Høyland, 2004) and unknown prior to the 
incident. The maker made a strict division between their system (DP) and the rest 
of the system, when the system failed. The maker had considerable expectations of 
the users and did not anticipate random action, given the DP system was not 
working as expected. 
 
Maintainability 
The way maintenance is performed on these supply vessels has changed 
fundamentally, as the crews knew less and less of what was going on behind their 
computer screen or display unit. The crew followed the maintenance programme 
generated by the system, which is not always 100% accurate. Restarting and 
updating systems and data became a routine procedure on board, and climbing 
and crawling remained. There was no “acrobatic activity”, no “outsmarting the 
system” and no “performing integration work” required by the crews in the engine 
rooms. Some issues were found, involving the lack of storage for supplies and 
tools.  
 
Survivability and Occupational Health and Safety (OHS) 
It was found that the crews on both OSVs have strong concerns regarding safety, 
health and security issues. They applied permits to work, checklists, safety 
meetings, toolbox talks and risk assessments. Safety drills were conducted 
regularly. Some of the crews thought that it was too much and they were tired of 
the drills.  
 
Conclusion 
The exploratory survey implied that human factors and different aspects of human 
factors have been comprehensively taken into account on these two offshore 
supply vessels. Lessons have been learnt and much has been accomplished; 
unfortunately not all were successful or perfect. The learning process was still 
ongoing. There was room for improvements. The potential of the ship building 
industry, which was reflected in supply vessel design, to address human factors 
issues in their products was recognised. Some classic problems were discovered, 
such as lack of communication between users and designers, problems of distrust 
and blame-shifting between parties. The exploratory study confirmed that among 
other human factors dimensions, maintainability was found to be the least 
satisfactory and safety-related dimensions were fulfilled without compromise.  
3.2.2. Is there any significant effect of human factors with consideration to 
incidences on board? 
The second research question was raised to verify the relationships between 
accidents (or incidents) and human factor considerations on a ship (RQ2). An 
explanatory research study was prepared to answer RQ2. This study applied 
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inferential statistics to draw conclusions and to provide evidence. The study was 
also performed to answer RQ1 from the quantitative perspective. There were two 
questions that required clarification before RQ2 could be answered: 
 
a. Does ship design have any significant effect on human factors evaluation on 
board? 
b. Does ship design have any significant effect on incidents on board? 
Study 3: Quantitative Study 
The explanatory research was completed using questionnaires (Appendix G) as the 
tool of measurement. The research design is presented in Figure 5. Three variables 
were defined: OSV design, human factors evaluation and incidences. Two different 
scales were developed and used to measure human factors implementation: direct 
evaluation (section A, 26 items) and the Likert-scale (Section D, 65 items). Two 
types of incidents were defined: personnel incidents (Section B, 8 items) and vessel 
incidents (Section C, 8 items). The personnel incidents included motion sickness 
incidents (MSI), fatigue, stumble, hitting an object by accident or being hit by an 
object, slip, fall, motion-induced interrupted (MII), misoperating a switch or a 
control, being confused with a system, failure to follow a system or procedure and 
sleep disturbances/interruption. The vessel incidents comprised loss of power 
(blackout), loss of navigation control, contact, collision, water on deck, loosening 
cargo on deck, falling objects, fire or explosions and cargo spills. 
 
OSV
DESIGN
{A, B}
HUMAN FACTORS 
EVALUATION
Direct Evaluation 
(Section A)
Likert-scale
(Section D)H4n
H7, H8
H1, H2n, H3n
H5, H6 INCIDENTS
Personnel Incidents
(Section B)
Vessel Incidents
(Section C)
 
Figure 5 Research design and hypotheses for explanatory study 
 
Four groups of hypotheses were proposed in relation to the research questions. 
The first group (H1, H2n and H3n) was to verify whether human factors in general 
(H1), and specifically (H2n), were significantly considered on OSVs (RQ1) and to 
determine whether different dimensions of human factors were implemented 
equally (H3n). The second group (H4n) was to determine whether ship design 
could have a significant effect on human factors evaluation (RQa). The third group 
(H5, H6) was to verify the effect of different OSV design on incidents on board 
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(RQb). The fourth group (H7, H8) was to check the relationship between human 
factors and incidents on board (RQ2). In total 42 respondents from both OSV A and 
OSV B completed the questionnaires. Various inferential statistics were used to 
test the hypotheses. Due to a relatively limited number of respondents, analysis 
was performed with caution and assumptions were checked at all times. 
Results 
The explanatory research revealed that the “concept of human factors” is 
quantitatively measurable and its validity can be verified. It was confirmed that 
human factors in general, and different aspects of human factors, were considered 
adequately on offshore supply vessels surveyed in the Norwegian Sea. The level of 
implementation of human factors differed from one aspect to another. The highest 
satisfactory aspect or dimension was OHS (Figure 6). Habitability was very 
satisfactory, workability was satisfactory, and maintainability was the lowest but 
still acceptable (above 3.07). These findings confirmed the results of the literature 
study and exploratory study. 
 
The study indicated that OSV design had the potential to affect human factors 
evaluation on board. There were some differences in the level of accomplishment 
of human factors on OSV A compared to OSV B. The crews on OSV B were more 
satisfied in general than the crews on OSV A, especially with respect to habitability 
and workability (Figure 7).  
 
The results demonstrated that there was no significant variation in the overall 
average number of personnel incidents (Figure 8) or the vessel’s incidents (Figure 
9) across OSVs. Figure 8 shows in detail that there was a considerable difference in 
fatigue as perceived by the crews on OSV A compared to those on OSV B and there 
was a slight variation in the incidence of seasickness  and sleep disturbance, but 
the difference was inconclusive (p<0.10). Figure 9 shows that there was a 
significant difference in specific cases of water on deck and moving (or loosening) 
cargo on deck. The crews on OSV B reported less incidence of “water on deck” and 
“moving cargo on deck”. They also reported a higher frequency of loss of power 
incidents, which confirms the finding from the exploratory study, but the 
difference was statistically insignificant.  
 
Further analyses of the explanatory study revealed that habitability had a positive 
impact on motion sickness incidents (MSI), fatigue and sleep disturbances. The 
better the habitability as assessed by the crew, the lower the frequency of the MSI 
reported. The crews became more fit and reported better sleep. Around 12% to 
14% variance of these incidents can be explained by habitability. It was also 
revealed that maintainability had a significant effect on the probability of fire and 
explosions. The relationship was nevertheless counter-productive, meaning that 
the higher the maintainability the higher the frequency of fire or explosion on 
board. 
                                                        
7 Scale description: 1: very poor, 2: poor, 3: neutral, 4: good, 5: very good
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Figure 6 Human factors Likert-scale 
evaluation result: Mean plot with error 
bar for each dimension  
(Scale description: 1: very poor, 2: poor,  
3: neither, 4: good, 5: very good) 
 
 
Figure 7 Human factors evaluation on 
two different OSV designs  
(Scale description: 1: very poor, 2: poor,  
3: neither, 4: good, 5: very good) 
  
 
Figure 8 Mean frequencies of personal 
incidents perceived by the crew  
(Scale description: 1: very often,  
2: quite often, 3: sometimes, 4: seldom,  
5: never) 
 
Figure 9 Mean frequencies of vessel 
related incidents perceived by the crew  
(Scale description: 1: very often,  
2: quite often, 3: sometimes, 4: seldom,  
5: never) 
 
3.2.3. Are the existing standards for human factors in ship design effective? 
Classification societies provide additional notations such as Habitability (HAB) 
(ABS, 2001), Comfort Class (COMF) (Det Norske Veritas, 2009) and Crew and 
Embarked Personnel Accommodation Comfort (CEPAC) (Lloyd's Register, 2012) in 
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order for ships to be designed using human factors considerations. IMO published 
a number of codes and guidelines within the area, such as the code on noise levels 
(International Maritime Organisation, 1981), guidelines for engine-room layout, 
design (International Maritime Organization, 1998) and arrangement and 
guidelines on ergonomic criteria for bridge equipment and layout (International 
Maritime Organization, 2000). The third research question was raised to 
determine whether these standards were effective. 
Study 4: Standard and Criteria Evaluation Study 
An evaluation study was prepared to examine the effectiveness of the existing 
human factors standards and criteria on offshore supply vessels in the Norwegian 
Sea (Figure 10). Human factors criteria were documented, including noise, motion 
and slamming, motion-induced interruptions (MII) and motion sickness incidents 
(MSI) including risk levels. On-board measurements were performed on OSV A and 
OSV B during their missions serving offshore platforms that covered noise, motion 
and environmental conditions. The sleeping behaviour, wellbeing and performance 
of the crew were also monitored through the survey. 
 
PERIOD OF THE YEAR
{summer, winter}
LOG BOOK
Recorded weather
condition
Weather
forecast
ENVIRONMENTAL/WEATHER 
CONDITION
Significant wave height
Peak period
SHIP DESIGN
{OSV A, B}
Noise
Motion
WATCH TIME
{day, night}
SEAFARERS PERFORMANCE
Sleeping
behavior
Symptoms
on watch
WORK SHIFT
{long, normal}
Performance
 
Figure 10 Research design for criteria evaluation and multivariate analysis 
 
Information regarding the environmental conditions, such as wave heights and 
wind speed, were provided by the weather forecasts. Wind speed was measured 
during the voyage by an anemometer on the vessel and wave heights were 
observed visually by the officers on the bridge and documented in the logbook. 
Motion was measured by means of an ADIS16364 accelerometer located on the 
cabin floor and recorded throughout the voyage. Noise was measured in the cabin, 
on the bridge, in the engine room, in the engine control room, and several other 
areas on the vessel using a Class 2 sound level meter Bruel & Kjaer Type 2236 in 
accordance with ISO 2923 (ISO, 1996) and ISO 20283-2 (ISO, 2008). A frequency 
weighting was applied. 
Research Design and Results 
 
33 
 
 
The crews were asked to fill in a daily diary (Appendix E) after every watch. The 
diary was developed based on NATO questionnaires (Colwell, 2000) and adjusted 
for offshore supply vessel operation. It measured sleeping/resting condition 
before watch, symptoms experienced on watch, performance on watch and 
problems encountered on watch. The crews on each OSV could be split into three 
groups. Two groups worked alternately in a normal shift arrangement and one 
group worked long shifts.  
Results 
The noise level measurements on both vessels showed that all the criteria set by 
the standards were satisfied, even though the room was noisy. Disturbing noises 
such as slamming, high-pitched noise from the thrusters, a hissing noise from the 
heating, ventilation and air conditioning (HVAC) system and a squeaking noise 
were neither captured nor reflected in the results of measurement. Table 4 
provides a summary of the existing noise criteria compared to the results of 
measurements. Table 5 shows a summary of the motion measurements compared 
to the criteria. Results of motion measurement on both OSVs are presented in 
Figure 11 (roll motion), Figure 12 (vertical acceleration) and Figure 13 (motion-
induced interruptions and motion sickness incidents).  
 
Table 4 Summary of criteria vs. results of noise measurement 
Description DNV COMF-
V(3) 
IMO 
(1981) 
Maximum field measurement 
 
Bridge 60 dB  59.7  
Cabins 60 dB  45.4 dB 
(normal) 
56.7 dB 
(on DP) 
Engine room  110 dB 105.9 dB  
Engine control 
room 
 75 dB 66.7 (normal) 71.2 (with music and 
people chatting) 
 
 
Table 5 Summary of criteria vs. results of motion measurement 
Description NATO 
(2000) 
NORDFORSK 
(1987) 
Maximum field measurement 
Roll 4° 6° 0.54° 
Pitch 1.5°  0.74° 
Vertical 
acceleration 
0.2 g 0.15 g 0.149 g 
Lateral 
acceleration 
0.1 g 0.12 g 0.065g 
MII 1/min  0.14/min 
MSI 20% of crew,  
4 hrs exposure 
50% (calculated after McCauley  et al., 
based on motion data) 
< 5% (based on data collected by the 
daily diaries) 
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Figure 11 Roll motion  
 
 
 
Figure 12 Vertical acceleration 
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Figure 13 MII and MSI 
 
The highest noise level measured in the cabin on OSV A while operating on DP was 
56.7 dB. The conditions inside the cabin were uncomfortable due to a screeching 
noise produced by the bow thrusters. Often this high pitched noise interrupted 
sleep. 
 
The study measured the highest roll motion of 0.54° RMS in winter on OSV A 
(Figure 11). The general criterion for roll is 4° according to NATO (2000) or 6° 
according to NORDFORSK (1987). The highest vertical acceleration was measured 
0.149 g RMS, which occurred in heavy weather, and approximately 14 m wave 
height (Figure 12, thick red line, OSV A, winter). The criteria still allowed “heavy 
manual work” to be performed on the vessel with a vertical acceleration up to 0.15 
g and 4.0° of roll motion (NORDFORSK, 1987). Experience on the vessel showed 
that it was hard for anybody to walk safely on the vessel without bumping into the 
wall or hitting other objects. The idea that “heavy manual work” could take place 
safely in such a condition is inconceivable. It was also discovered that slamming 
criterion 0.03 (NORDFORSK, 1987) was too high, in that it interrupted sleep. A 
stricter limit is required for OSV operation in the Norwegian Sea. 
 
The MII calculation, after Graham (1990), throughout the survey showed a 
maximum of 0.14 MII/min at the highest sea state (Figure 13). The risk level was 
classified as “Probable” to “Possible” (Graham, 1990). As observed on board, when 
the wave height reached 14 m on a 94 m. long vessel, not much can be done except 
to sit tight, or stand still and hold on to something safe to keep balance. The 
existing criteria for MII was not realistic and could not be applied by the crew on 
these vessels.  
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There was a gap between the calculated MSI index based on McCauley, Royal, 
Wylie, O'Hanlon, and Mackie (1976) and the actual MSI reported by the crews 
during the survey. The MSI standard was extremely conservative for the crews 
working on OSVs. The MSI criteria set a standard maximum of 20% crew showing 
motion sickness in a four hour exposure (NATO, 2000). The calculated MSI index 
(after McCauley et al., 1976) during the survey on OSV A in winter was 
predominantly higher than 20% (up to 50%) which means that the ship should not 
be sailing, however, the ship kept sailing and the crews still performed their jobs. 
The actual MSI reported by the crews was lower than 5%. The MSI criteria needs 
to be adjusted. Most of the crews on OSVs have adapted to motion sickness. 
 
Based on this study, it can be concluded that some of the existing human factors 
criteria are cannot be implemented on offshore supply vessels operating in the 
Norwegian Sea. They need to be adjusted.  
3.2.4. What factors strongly influence crew performance at sea? 
It was recognised that crew performance on offshore supply vessels was not solely 
influenced by the habitability or comfort of the ships, but also by a number of other 
factors such as watch schedule, work shift, season and environmental conditions. 
For that reason, RQ4 was asked.  
Study 5: Multivariate Analyses and Structural Modelling 
Multivariate analyses were performed to discover important factors that were 
relevant to the crew’s wellbeing and performance on offshore supply vessels 
operating in the Norwegian Sea. Variables of interest include sleeping conditions, 
symptoms on watch, performance on watch and problems encountered on watch.  
 
The same data collected in the previous study (Study 4) was used in this analysis. 
Various statistical analyses were employed. First, descriptive statistics were 
presented to illustrate the results from the survey, then, inferential statistics were 
applied to reveal the relationships between variables based on the research design 
(Figure 10). The correlations between the data obtained from the weather 
forecasts and the results from the survey, including ship motions (roll, pitch, 
vertical acceleration and transversal acceleration), were analysed. 
 
The relationships between ship motion, sleeping behaviour, sleeping problems, 
and symptoms experienced by the seafarers on watch were also examined. Finally, 
a structural equation model was used to explain the seafarers’ overall performance 
and overall symptoms in connection with other variables of interest. 
Results 
The results showed that the crews on OSV A experienced more sleeping problems 
than those on OSV B. This was due to slamming, motion, vibration and noise issues 
on board. In general, more sleeping problems were reported in winter compared 
to summer. Slamming was given as the most frequent event disturbing sleep on 
OSV A, but was never mentioned on OSV B. The crews on OSV B did not admit to 
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any ship-related sleep problems in the winter. According to the observations 
performed on board, the vessel was quite stable in the winter. In summer the 
crews tended to open the doors in the accommodation which allowed noise to 
enter from outside (the deck and the engine room). This explains why the crews on 
OSV B reported more noise disturbing sleep in the summer. Slamming was 
identified as the most common factor disturbing sleep (13.8%), noise was the 
second (10.6%), and ship motion was the third (9.6%). Temperature or indoor 
climate was consistently reported as a problem on OSV A in summer as well as in 
winter, but not on OSV B. 
 
In general, the crews experienced worse symptoms in winter. They were more 
tired (physically), F(1, 170)=3.931, p<.05, experienced more motion-induced 
interruptions, F(1, 165)=5.620, p<.05 and experienced more stomach awareness, 
F(1, 164)=3.649, p<.10. Sleepiness and tiredness were the worst symptoms 
reported by the crews of both OSVs in both periods of the survey. 
 
The difference in the overall performance on OSV A in summer compared to that in 
winter is worth noting: F(1, 186)=12.844, p<.001. Motoric performance dropped 
the most, while communication, accuracy and number of tasks completed dropped 
significantly. On the other hand, the difference reported by the crew of OSV B in 
summer compared to winter was insignificant.  
 
Slamming (11.7%) and ship motion (11.7%) were also predominantly reported as 
the problems disturbing watches, but not noise (2.7%). There was a highly 
significant difference in ship motion, slamming and vibration across OSVs (p<.01), 
and the differences in noise level and indoor climate were significant (p<.05). 
 
Table 6 shows the correlation between wave height prediction (Hs, from weather 
forecast) and ship motion (on-board measurement). Data was transformed into 
watch group time scales (N=32). The results shows that all correlation indices 
were highly significant. It can be gathered from the survey that 69% variance of 
the vertical accelerations, 59% of pitch, 53% of lateral accelerations and 47% of 
roll motions could be explained by the significant wave height predicted from the 
weather forecast (Table 6).  
 
Table 6 Correlation between wave height prediction and ship motions 
Pearson 
Correlation *) Hs Roll Pitch Y_acc Z_acc 
Hs 1.000 0.683 0.768 0.728 0.829 
Roll 1.000 0.783 0.927 0.892 
Pitch 1.000 0.830 0.922 
Y_acc    1.000 0.913 
Z_acc     1.000 
*) All Sig. (2-tailed) = 0.000; N = 32 
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Table 7 Correlation between ship motion and sleeping behaviour 
 
Ship-related  
sleep problems 
Non-ship related  
sleep problems Sleep quality Sleep amount 
Roll Pearson Correlation 0.427*** -0.105 -0.268*** -0.099 
N 188 188 179 176 
Pitch Pearson Correlation 0.448*** -0.075 -0.241** -0.075 
N 188 188 179 176 
Y_acc Pearson Correlation 0.395*** -0.128# -0.309*** -0.152* 
N 188 188 179 176 
Z_acc Pearson Correlation 0.477*** -0.139# -0.349*** -0.200** 
N 188 188 179 176 
*** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05; # p < .10 
 
Table 7 shows the correlation between ship motion and sleeping behaviour; sleep 
problems, sleep quality and amount of sleep. It was demonstrated that vertical 
acceleration correlated highly significantly with ship-related sleep problems 
(r=0.477, p<.001), sleep quality (r=-0.349, p<.001) and thus amount of sleep (r=-
0.200, p<.01). Table 7 shows that ship-related sleep problems had very significant 
correlations with all ship motion components: roll, pitch, lateral acceleration and 
vertical acceleration and non-ship related sleep problems had insignificant 
correlations (p>0.05). It can be seen that sleep quality had a rather close 
relationship to all ship motion components: roll (p<.001), pitch (p<.01), lateral 
acceleration (p<.001) and vertical acceleration (p<.001), but sleep amount only 
correlates significantly with vertical acceleration (p<.05). It can be inferred from 
these results that vertical acceleration played an important role in sleeping 
behaviour on board. 
 
A structural model was developed using path analysis and the result, as presented 
in Figure 14, answered RQ4. Ship-related sleep problems (motion, noise, vibration, 
slamming and indoor climate) had a very significant effect on sleep quality and 
sleep amount (p<.001). Non-ship related problems had some effect on sleep 
quality and amount of sleep, but to a smaller degree. Amount of sleep was 
important to both overall symptoms (p<.001) and overall performance (p<.05). 
Sleep quality on the other hand marginally influenced overall symptoms (p<.1) but 
not performance (p>.10).  
 
This model shows that pitch motion before watch was meaningful in ship-related 
sleep problems (p<.001), slightly different from the result of the correlation 
analysis (Table 7) but not so different to require discussion at this point. In 
contrast to sleeping behaviour, the roll motion had more impact on seafarers’ 
overall performance when they were on watch (p<.01). Work shift had a significant 
impact on non-ship related sleep problems and overall performance. Crews who 
worked long shifts showed less non-ship related sleep problems and performed 
better than those who worked normal shifts. 
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Figure 14 Path analysis of human factors on offshore supply vessels operating in 
the Norwegian Sea (*** p<.001; ** p<.01; * p<.05; # p<.10; ns not significant) 
 
3.2.5. What are the underlying factors of human factors in offshore supply 
vessel design? 
The subject of human factors in the field of naval architecture and marine 
engineering is evolving. In the beginning most publications focused on safety. 
Afterwards, the focus altered to other aspects: habitability and workability, then 
controllability. The framework referenced in this study did not satisfy the mutually 
exclusive and collectively exhaustive principles, thus a theoretical evaluation 
regarding the concept of human factors in ship design was explored, in this case, 
human factors in offshore supply vessels design and operation. A research 
question was defined for the theoretical exploration (RQ5). 
Study 6: Theoretical Evaluation 
A theoretical evaluation study was conducted to evaluate the theoretical construct 
of human factors in ship design and operation. Questionnaires were developed and 
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used to test the existing framework. This was the same set of questionnaires and 
data that were employed in the explanatory survey (Study 3).  
 
Factor analysis was used to examine the underlying factors of human factors on 
offshore supply vessels. It is a statistical approach used to reveal relationships 
between a number of variables and to look for common factors that can explain 
variations in different measurements, in this case dimensions, which are measured 
by items in the questionnaires. It is common to use factor analysis for data 
reduction or structure detection and to identify the collinearity of variables. The 
analysis was conducted using Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) 
version 14.1 software for Windows. It was realised that the number of the 
respondents was too low for factor analysis, however, assumption testing was 
always performed before the factor analysis was performed. The Kaiser-Meyer-
Olkin (KMO) measure of sampling adequacy is expected to be higher than 0.5 and 
Bartlett’s test of sphericity should be significant (<.05) (SPSS Inc, 2010). This 
evaluation was intended as an introduction and as an encouragement for other 
fellow researchers to use similar methods to establish a firm human factors 
construct in ship design.  
Results 
The theoretical evaluation study presents an analysis of the underlying factors of 
human factors in ship design based on the questionnaires (Appendix G) that were 
distributed on two OSVs (N=42). Factor analysis was applied to human factors 
direct evaluation (26 items). Principal axis factoring (PAF) extraction method was 
applied. The oblimin rotation method with Kaiser normalisation was used. All 26 
items were entered into the analysis; KMO measure and Bartlett’s test of sphericity 
were determined. Some bridging variables indicated by low index loadings 
distributed on several components were identified and excluded. Another iteration 
of factor analysis was conducted without these bridging variables.  
 
Table 8 shows the final output of the pattern matrix on the human factors direct 
evaluation questionnaires, where five components were revealed and named: 
 
1. Controllability; consists of Autopilot, Navigation System and DP System 
2. Workability; consists of System Procedures, General Arrangement, Layout, 
Storage, Equipment, Overall Working Condition, Space and Communication 
3. Habitability; consists of Vibration, Sound, Noise, Motion, ECR, Comfort and 
Accommodation 
4. Cargo facilities; consists of Cargo Deck and Cargo Tanks 
5. Reliability, automation and maintainability. 
Factor analysis was performed on the 65-item human factors Likert-scale. It was 
not suitable for this type of analysis, which involves only 42 responses, and should 
have been omitted. An exploratory experimentation was pursued nonetheless. All 
65 items were entered into the analysis.   
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Table 8 Pattern matrix of human factors direct evaluation questionnaires 
 
Component 
1 2 3 4 5 
Autopilot 0.87     
Navigation system 0.77     
DP system 0.48    0.30 
System procedure  0.77    
General arrangement, layout  0.72  0.33  
Storage  0.67    
Equipment 0.34 0.60    
Overall working conditions  0.57  0.37  
Space  0.51  0.31  
Communication system and equipment  0.36    
Vibration   0.83   
Sound, noise   0.79   
Motion   0.70   
Engine Control Room (ECR) -0.31  0.66  0.36 
Overall comfort   0.44   
Accommodation   0.36   
Cargo deck    0.93  
Cargo tanks    0.71  
Overall reliability     0.78 
Control & maintenance     0.71 
Automation     0.67 
Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring 
Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser normalisation 
     
 
The KMO measure and Bartlett’s test of sphericity criteria were determined and 
were not fulfilled at the first run. Vague items and items with no significant 
loadings were eliminated, then the process was repeated. The principal component 
extraction method was used and eigenvalue criterion of greater than 1. The direct 
oblimin factor rotation method was employed. Table 9 shows the output pattern 
matrix. After several iterations seven robust components were revealed and 
named: 
 
1. Operability, maintenance and reliability 
2. Interfacing complexity 
3. Ship handling, manoeuvrability 
4. Systems and procedures 
5. Deck working condition 
6. Engine room and engine control room (ER/ECR) 
7. Habitability 
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Table 9 Pattern matrix on human factors Likert-scale questionnaires 
 Component 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
It is easy to do maintenance of the vessel 0.91       
It is easy to operate the equipment on board 0.76       
The system on the bridge is quite informative 0.73       
The vessel has a good layout 0.71       
Most systems have good reliability 0.69       
We have too many alarms on board  0.92 0.31     
We have too much automation on board  0.79      
The computer menu system is too 
complicated 
 0.77      
Sometimes the alarm system is confusing  0.71      
It's not easy to manoeuvre the vessel   -0.91     
The vessel has a good manoeuvring capability   -0.85     
The vessel has good & reliable DP system   -0.79     
It is easy to manoeuvre the vessel   -0.74     
Sometimes we cannot rely on the autopilot   -0.65     
There are so many forms & checklists to fill in    0.89    
We have too many procedures to follow    0.77    
Some areas of the vessel are very noisy     -0.82   
The cargo deck is well designed     0.80   
The ECR is designed so it can be monitored 
and operated easily 
     0.81  
The ER can be maintained without any trouble      0.77  
Sometimes I can't sleep well on the vessel       -0.93 
Sometimes we can feel that the vessel is 
moving too much 
      -0.84 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis 
Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser normalisation 
 
During this process it was realised that factor analysis can be used not only to 
examine the theoretical construct of human factors in ship design, but also to 
explain the relationships between parts or components on the supply vessels, 
human factor dimensions, and other related concepts. Bridging variables should 
not be excluded from the process because they can be interpreted in a specific way. 
A model was developed by re-arranging the components obtained from the 
analysis (Figure 15) where several bridging variables were recollected and 
assigned to the model. The model provides information about “who should account 
for what and when”. It seems that the model demonstrates a way of integrating 
human factors into offshore supply vessel design and operation in the Norwegian 
Sea. 
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Figure 15 Inter-connectivity of human factors in offshore supply vessel design and 
operation 
 
At this point, it can be concluded that the primary factors showing the essence of 
the human factors in offshore supply vessel design and operation are: 
 
x Habitability 
x Ship handing and manoeuvrability 
x Controllability 
x Workability 
The model presented in Figure 15 is a preliminary model based on a very small 
sample which needs to be improved and expanded. 
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3.3. Summary 
This chapter presents the overall research design that involves the background of 
the studies, the research questions that were raised, the research methods that 
were used, the objects and the results of the studies. To summarise, five research 
questions were asked and six studies were reported from responses to the 
enquiries. The relationships between the questions and the studies are shown in 
Figure 16.  
 
 
Figure 16 Relationships between research questions and studies 
 
The first research question probed the implementation of human factors principles 
in ship design and operation. Three studies were performed using different 
methods: content analysis, exploratory survey and explanatory research. Explana-
tory research was also used to answer the second research question, verifying the 
correlation between human factors implementation and incidents on board. The 
third research question asked about the effectiveness of the existing human factors 
standards in ship design and the criteria for supply vessel operation in the 
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Norwegian Sea. A field survey with physical measurements and environmental 
monitoring (including noise, motion, wave height and wind speed) combined with 
daily diaries and observations was prepared. The fourth research question dealt 
with a number of variables that had the potential to influence personnel wellbeing 
and performance on board. A multivariate analysis and structural modelling were 
used to answer the inquiry, to find the factors that were significant to seafarer 
wellbeing and performance. The fifth research question asked about the 
underlying factors of human factors in ship design and operation. Factor analysis 
was used in the theoretical evaluation study to resolve this particular issue.  
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Chapter 4: Discussion  
 
Ac proinde haec cognition, ego cogito, ergo sum,.. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The results of the studies show that human factors and different aspects of human 
factors have been extensively taken into account in offshore supply vessel design 
and even more in operation. Lessons were learnt and there was implementation of 
human factors principles. There was a variation in the level of implementation of 
human factors across different dimensions and also across offshore supply vessel 
designs. A relationship between the existing documents, standards and references 
addressing human factors and the level of implementation in reality was 
recognised. Some of the existing standards were evaluated and shown to be 
ineffective in the study. Some factors that considerably influence crews’ 
performance at sea were identified and some underlying factors of human factors 
in ship design were also revealed. This chapter presents discussion based on the 
research questions answered in the previous chapter.  
4.1. Limitations of the Study 
Before discussion is presented and conclusions are drawn, it should be 
remembered again that this research had quite limited data and access. As a 
consequence, generalisation is limited to the population represented in the sample. 
Most of this thesis involves offshore supply vessels around 93 to 94 m LOA, 
relatively newly built, approximately two to three years old. The crews were well-
trained, qualified and competent personnel. The operations took place in the 
Norwegian Sea, serving offshore facilities. Each mission took three to four days on 
average to complete. The positive findings revealed in this thesis may not be found 
in other types of vessels or in other sectors of the maritime industry or in other 
parts of the world. Conversely, the disadvantages discovered here are very likely to 
be found in the rest of the industry. 
 
Some of the findings may be limited for generalisation due to typical 
characteristics of the Nordic population and the Norwegian shipbuilding and 
petroleum industries, which include culture and working environment. Some of 
the research was based on subjective evaluation which was naturally influenced by 
the researcher and the crew’s personal background, and might not apply to others. 
Another researcher is in fact required to confirm the reliability and the validity of 
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the findings of the literature study which applied content analysis as the research 
method and the exploratory study which applied qualitative methods. Limited 
access to the designers, manufacturers and regulators also places this research in a 
rather weak position in not being able to pursue the analysis and not being able to 
present the complete story. Efforts to contact all the relevant parties had been 
made nonetheless. 
 
Some of the models that were constructed in this thesis (Figure 14 and Figure 15) 
may change when the sample of the study is extended: more ships are included 
and more respondents participated in the research. Some variables may influence 
the models: types of vessel, main dimensions, areas of operation, types and length 
of missions. 
4.2. Research Questions and Results of Studies 
There were issues regarding the first question about how human factors and 
different aspects of human factors were taken into account in ship design. This 
involved the existing documents and standards of human factors in ship design, 
which were optional. An interpretation may be that the industry was somewhat 
timid in expressing the message. The criticisms as documented in Section 2.2 to 
some extent remain. The rapid rate of human factors development indicated by the 
number of new rules and guides published in the last couple of years shows that 
something is happening. As revealed in this thesis, the industry has the ability to 
do what could be done, and more. 
 
Second, new technology has developed very rapidly, much faster than the rules 
and the traditional shipbuilding industry. Some advances were made because they 
could be done, not because they were needed, and, sometimes they were 
developed without much consideration for the users. More automated equipment 
has been, and will be, installed on supply vessels, providing fewer roles for crews 
operating ships. Some examples covered in the thesis were the autopilot design, 
the dynamic positioning system and automatic fuel-switching design. These 
advanced technologies have been and will be installed in other vessels. During this 
study two dangerous undetected failures were discovered. These failures served as 
a reminder that new technology contains uncertainties and problems could arise in 
other systems on other ships. It would be beneficial if the study could examine the 
development process of these new technologies from the designer perspective, 
including quality assurance. 
 
Thirdly, there were issues of “abundance” and “complexity” found during the 
surveys on two offshore supply vessels operating in the Norwegian Sea, including 
the alarms, communications, procedures and checklists on board. It was hard to 
understand how a supply vessel operating in the Norwegian Sea should monitor 
and respond to a distress call coming from the Caribbean. It was fortunate that the 
message came when the vessel was sailing and the crew was relatively unoccupied. 
It could disturb the crew if it took place inside the 500m safety zone or even more 
Discussion 
 
49 
 
when they were lying alongside an offshore facility. The effect of the distraction on 
other working vessels in the area such as drilling vessels, anchor handling or tugs 
could be worse. These distress signals are regulated by international codes, 
therefore apply to any ship within reach of the ship and equipped with the system.  
 
The studies showed that the level of implementation of human factors varied from 
one aspect to another. Different aspects of human factors to a certain degree reflect 
specific parts of the ship which also indicate different departments on the ship. 
Controllability is more likely to represent the deck department and maintainability 
to represent the engine department. Habitability obviously represents the 
steward’s department. During the exploratory survey, it was discovered that more 
criticisms were published highlighting the engine room and engine control room. 
The interviews conducted during the survey also revealed more complaints 
addressed by the crews in the engine department. The disappointments voiced by 
marine engineers regarding the engine room and the engine control room are 
plausible. The nature of their job is different from the others. They deal more with 
problems and troubleshooting, alongside routine maintenance activities. 
Uncertainty and the unknowns are dominant in their work. In addition, they 
usually have quite limited working space and their working environment is often 
demanding: exposed to heat/cold, loud noise, exhaust gas, oil, unpleasant smell, 
darkness and heights, however, it was seen during the studies that significant 
improvements in the ER/ECR were under way. Almost all the issues raised had 
already been responded to positively on the vessels surveyed. In addition, a 
number of new ergonomic notations (American Bureau of Shipping, 2013) were 
developed to promote an ergonomically-focused design and construction on 
vessels, specifically with respect to enclosed spaces (ERGO ES) and maintenance 
(ERGO MAINT), as well as topsides (ERGO TOP) and valves (ERGO VALVE). It was 
also discovered in the survey, as described by the crews, that different types of 
vessel may have different characteristics of maintainability. Bigger vessels can 
afford more space to perform maintenance activities, provide more rooms to store 
spare parts and tools, and thus better consideration from the human factors 
perspective. In general, the outcome of the study of how different aspects of human 
factors were taken into account cannot be generalised to other vessels. It may vary 
according to the types of vessels, the size of vessels, the year of construction, the 
builder, etc., although safety is generally considered the highest. 
 
The quantitative survey confirmed that OSV design could be distinguished from 
the human factors perspective. The level of accomplishment of different 
dimensions of human factors evidently influences a particular incident or 
symptom on board. The sample size in this research was rather small (N=42). 
Based on the outcome of the survey so far, it is possible to perform a reliable cost 
and benefit analysis on investments in habitability. The relationship between 
habitability and the frequency of the personnel being seasick or fatigued, and 
experiencing sleep disturbance was found to be significant. An improvement in the 
accommodation could be proposed which would benefit the crews’ wellbeing. An 
interesting discovery showing that the better the maintainability facilities the 
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higher probability of fire/explosion incidents appears anomalous, however, this 
phenomenon is not unexpected. Yerkes-Dodson law explains that the relationship 
between arousal and performance can be described by an inverted U curve (Yerkes 
& Dodson, 1908); where performance increases with arousal to a certain point, 
then decreases with higher levels of stress. Better maintainability in this case 
provides lower arousal, thus lower performance. Naturally, a more accurate result 
would be expected by expanding the sample size. The incident data in this survey 
was obtained via questionnaires which are subjective and sensitive to bias. A more 
accurate source of information can be acquired from the ship records and the 
company databases. 
 
The criteria for the evaluation study performed in this thesis have shown that 
efforts towards human factors can be gauged and their effectiveness can be 
measured. The results showed that some of the criteria were substandard and less 
effective on the offshore supply vessels surveyed operating in the Norwegian Sea. 
Further validation is required before generalisation can be made, , by expanding 
the population of the survey on other types of vessels and on other locations. As 
indicated by the institution that published the criteria (NATO, 2000), they may be 
valid for military purposes. 
 
The nature of human factors standards is apparently different from that of other 
standards in general. Other standards guarantee the conditions or qualities that 
are set in their criteria or notation. For example, a ship that carries Ice Class 
notation must be capable of navigating through ice, however, a ship with a Comfort 
Class notation does not necessarily guarantee the comfort of the personnel on 
board.  
 
The evaluation study compared the calculated motion sickness incidence and 
motion-induced interruption based on their theoretical reference, against the 
subjective evaluation reported by the crews. McCauley et al. (1976) suggested the 
use of vertical acceleration as the basic predictor to explain motion sickness 
incidents. This study indicated that pitch motion was more dominant, explaining 
the MSI of the crews on both vessels. Vertical acceleration nevertheless, was found 
more influential on motion-induced interruption, instead of the lateral 
components, as indicated by the original reference (Graham, 1990). This finding 
seems intriguing, and it is worth investigating further. 
 
The multivariate analyses demonstrated that sleep was very important to the 
crews’ well-being and performance (Figure 14). Sleep was influenced by ship-
related problems, such as slamming, noise and motion. This finding applied to 
typical offshore supply vessels operating in the Norwegian Sea. The survey can be 
extended and applied to other types of vessel and other populations. A different 
model is expected. This method has the potential to answer the enquiry about 
connecting the standards to human performance and fatigue. The multivariate 
analyses measured seafarer performance, including sleeping behaviour, motion 
sickness, motion-induced interruption, symptoms and wellbeing by using the daily 
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diaries. There are other methods however that can provide more accurate, more 
objective and more valid information. For example, physiological assays (salivary 
cortisol test), polysomnography and circadian rhythms measurement can be used 
to measure fatigue. Actiwatch can be used to monitor sleep and a psychomotor 
vigilance task (PVT) can be used to measure performance. Obviously, these 
methods require more expertise and more effort. They are also more expensive 
and some are more time consuming. The development of gadget technologies to 
date makes it possible to use smart watches, sport watches and smart phones to 
monitor heart rate, blood pressure and location on a real-time basis.  
 
For feedback regarding OSV design, it would be ideal to build a human-friendly 
ship that has the potential to encourage good sleep by minimising motion, noise 
and slamming. The survey indicated that OSV B could be specified as a good 
example of human-friendly design in which the accommodation facility is located 
far from the splashing zone and from the tunnel thrusters, therefore resulting in 
less slamming and noise. Her design is to some extent similar to the majority of 
container vessels, bulk carriers and tankers. Naturally, there are some drawbacks 
to deal with. The appearance of OSV B is rather unconventional for a working boat. 
The vessel has slightly less flexibility in serving offshore platforms, and she was 
more expensive than the conventional OSV design because of the full DP3 
capability and the dual fuel system. It would ideal to build an offshore supply 
vessel following OSV B design where the superstructure is located at the aft, with 
one bridge console system, equipped with DP3 capability and using diesel oil as its 
fuel. One engine room compartment is considered sufficient instead of two 
separate independent compartments, such as those on OSV B. They were built for 
fire protection reasons, due to the use of LNG as an alternative fuel. 
 
It was revealed that slamming and ship motions were quite problematic on the 
conventional offshore supply vessel operating in the Norwegian Sea. The problems 
were reported by the crewmembers who were off watch and supposed to sleep, 
and mostly took place during high seas. Obviously, these issues will not be a 
problem in calm to moderate seas, or in short-term operations which take place 
within a single day, where the crews do not need to go to sleep on board. 
Nonetheless, slamming and ship motion can be reduced by modifying the shape of 
the hull. There are quite a few alternatives available in the market such as wave-
piercing hulls, axe bow, inverted bow and X-bow designs. Another problem 
reported by the crew on a conventional supply vessel was the disturbing noises 
coming from the tunnel thruster when the vessel was lying alongside an offshore 
facility. This is a typical problem in offshore supply vessels and other types of 
vessel whose operations to a great extent relies on DP. This issue can be reduced 
by installing a low noise or super silent system if the accommodation facilities 
cannot be moved away from the bow. An effort to reduce the disturbing noise 
created by the cavitation could be implemented by optimising the blade design and 
increasing the size of the thrusters. 
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There was a problem in addressing human factors to naval architects and marine 
engineers. They did not speak the same language with the human factors 
engineers, who on the other hand, tried very hard to convey their message. The 
terms used in human factors engineering are slightly different from those terms 
with which the designers are familiar. Speaking the right language at the right time 
with the right people is important. The model presented in Figure 15 proposes an 
initial model that could be used as a strategy for integrating human factors in OSV 
design. The model was derived from a relatively small number of respondents; 
more respondents are absolutely required before the model can be employed. This 
initial model looks quite promising and realistic nonetheless. It shows the inter-
connectivity of ship parts, elements and systems to different aspects of human 
factors where safety and performance are identified as the ultimate goals. 
Naturally, different types of vessel will have variations regarding the parts and the 
elements that are involved in the model.  
4.3. Validity of the Study 
Regardless of its limitations, there are some conclusions that can be drawn from 
this study. Some conclusions do not need a great quantity of data in order to be 
generalised, such as the output from the literature study and the criteria/standard 
validation. Guidelines and standards apply as a general rule regardless of the 
population. In practice, nobody needs to go through a 14m wave twice to notice 
that it is impossible to conduct “heavy manual work” on a 93m long vessel. 
Obviously, this conclusion applies to smaller vessels, but not necessarily to larger 
ones. A similar phenomenon occurred in noise evaluation. Nobody needs to do 
multiple measurements to realise that the existing method to evaluate noise 
cannot capture specific disturbing noises. The methods applied in this thesis can be 
used on other vessels and in other populations.  
 
The scope of the thesis is very broad. It involves most of the dimensions comprised 
in the human factors theoretical framework. As the consequence, the thesis does 
not focus on any single aspect of the human factors, and therefore, the findings and 
the discussions may seem too brief. Some experts may intend to challenge the 
findings by going deeper and with more detailed analysis and arguments, however, 
the limitation of the thesis should be recognised, as it cannot cover all human 
factors dimensions in detail. Fewer topics could be selected for further 
investigations. 
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Chapter 5: Contributions 
 
but to serve 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This thesis brought together two different traditions, psychology and engineering, 
and served as an intermediary that could link various disciplines such as naval 
architecture and marine engineering, human factors engineering, reliability 
engineering, technical safety and OHS together in one topic of interest: human 
factors in ship design.  
 
This thesis provides authentic methods that can be replicated to evaluate the 
implementation of human factors principles in ship design and operation. As an 
example, a comprehensive picture of how human factors and aspects of human 
factors were addressed and evaluated in offshore supply vessel is presented. It 
shows the strengths and the weaknesses of the implementation to date using a 
multi-traits/multi-methods approach. Methods to evaluate the relationships 
between variables of interest such as the environmental conditions, ship’s parts 
and elements, and the human factors implementations to safety and performance 
are also presented. 
 
This thesis provides some feedback on the existing body of knowledge of human 
factors in ship design and especially on specific standards and criteria. It could 
serve as a background against which to perceive and to interpret some of the 
human factors standards covered: motions, noise and slamming. The thesis could 
also be used as an example of how to associate different ship parts and elements to 
various aspects of human factors in the design in order to reduce incidents, to 
increase safety and performance. For the seafarers, it is expected that this thesis 
could convey their point of view regarding ship design, and later bring some 
improvements.  
 
The detailed contributions of each study have been described in Section 1.5. 
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Chapter 6: Conclusions 
 
It is done. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A series of studies have been conducted to investigate human factors in ship design 
and operation. Various publications were documented and a literature study was 
conducted. A number of criticisms regarding the way ships were designed with a 
lack of human factors consideration in mind were acknowledged. User 
expectations of how a vessel should be designed and constructed were also 
presented. Offshore supply vessels were taken as the real case samples in the 
study. The existing criteria and standards were evaluated. Several models were 
presented to account for human factors. Some conclusions, recommendations, 
future works and concluding remarks are presented in the following sections. 
6.1. Conclusions 
Human factors in ship design and operation is a broad and comprehensive subject 
that involves a number of dimensions: habitability, maintainability, workability, 
controllability, manoeuvrability, survivability and safety.  
 
In general, human factors issues have been comprehensively addressed by various 
documents  which are related to ship design and operation, including publications 
by classification societies such as the American Bureau of Shipping, the Lloyd’s 
Register and Det Norske Veritas, and other international organisations such as the 
International Maritime Organisation, the International Organisation for 
Standardisation and the American Society for Testing Materials, however, most of 
the documents are not compulsory, so there is insufficient regulatory enforcement 
for addressing human factors in ship design. 
 
Survey of offshore supply vessels operating in the Norwegian Sea revealed that the 
human factors considerations vary from one dimension to another. The study 
showed that safety-related dimensions were taken into account without 
compromise. Habitability was considered very satisfactory, workability was 
satisfactory and maintainability was the least satisfactory, but still above the 
acceptable limit. Many lessons have been learnt in relation to human factors 
related incidents on the Norwegian shelf in the past. Significant improvements 
were noted, but there was room for improvement, especially with respect to layout 
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and access, ergonomics, complexity, slamming, motion and noise. Many new 
technologies have been implemented on offshore supply vessels which 
revolutionise the way people operate the vessel. New types of problems came 
along with the new technologies. The crews comprehended less and less of their 
vessel and relied more and more on the maker/manufacturer, especially for 
maintenance and troubleshooting. Communication channels and flows of 
communication expanded significantly in parallel with the advance in technology. 
The ability of the industry to address human factors was recognised. 
 
There was a gap in communication identified between the users and the designers, 
including between the makers or the manufacturers. Some phenomena of distrust 
and blame-shifting were also identified among different makers, shipbuilders and 
users, and need to be noted. 
 
OSV design has the potential to influence human factors evaluation on board 
vessels. For instance, good habitability can reduce seasickness incidents, and 
lessen fatigue and sleep disturbances.  
 
Some of the existing human factors criteria and standards were either insufficient 
or less effective in ensuring safety and comfort on offshore supply vessels 
according to the standard and criteria evaluation study conducted in this thesis. 
The motion criteria were too lenient, including motion-induced interruption and 
slamming.  The existing noise criteria did not cover the disturbing noises on board, 
however, the motion sickness incident calculation was too conservative for the 
seafarer population working on offshore supply vessels in the Norwegian Sea.  
 
A model was developed to show the relationships between variables of interest 
and the crews’ overall performance on two offshore supply vessels. Pitch motion 
has a highly significant impact on inducing ship-related sleep problems (motion, 
noise, vibration and slamming) which in turn have a very significant effect on sleep 
quality and amount of sleep. Adequate sleep is important for the crews to be able 
to perform well on their watch. The overall performance of the crews on watch is 
also influenced by work shifts and rolling motions. 
6.2. Recommendations 
An increase in the level of enforcement of the existing standards, from being 
optional to obligatory, is recommended. Efforts could be made gradually for a 
selected range of topics and for a particular type of vessel on a specific market. It is 
also recommended that standards and criteria be re-examined within a reasonable 
period of time in case an incident occurs related to human factors implementation 
at sea.  
 
Use of the existing criteria of motions (NATO, 2000; NORDFORSK, 1987) is not 
recommended, including the corresponding risk level (Graham, 1990) on offshore 
supply vessels operations in the Norwegian Sea. 
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The standards and criteria evaluation study need to be expanded to cover more 
vessels with different characteristics and dimensions which sail on different seas. 
Revision and improvement of the motion criteria (including the motion-induced 
interruption and motion-sickness incidents), noise criteria and slamming may be 
expected. 
 
It is important for designers to experience sailing, living and working at sea and to 
establish good communication with the crews as their ‘customers’. With the 
current technology, many on-board measurements can be performed instantly and 
recorded for further analysis. It is also important to understand the way people 
behave on board and more importantly the way the crews are used to operating 
the vessel in their natural environment. 
 
It is recommended that offshore supply vessels with the superstructure located at 
the aft be designed and built for the Norwegian Sea. For offshore supply vessels in 
which accommodation facilities are located at the bow, the installation of the super 
silent type of tunnel thrusters, and modification of their hull to minimise slamming 
is recommended.  
 
It is important to manage information on board in a smarter way, to present 
relevant information for a particular vessel at the right time. Unnecessary 
irrelevant and invalid information should be avoided. This includes 
communications and the communication channels. 
 
Human factors considerations should be inserted as one of the criteria in the ship 
design spiral. A human factors engineer or expert should be involved in the 
process of designing a new vessel. User opinions which cover all departments on 
the ship should be taken into consideration. In practice, from the human factors 
perspective, radical design change should be avoided. Step-by-step improvement is 
advised. 
 
Ship designers, naval architects, marine engineers and system developers should 
design and build a product that is user-friendly and takes into account the user’s 
perspective. It is important to address the right issue of human factors at the right 
stage using the right terms with the right people.  
6.3. Future Works 
Some recommendations for future work can be proposed as follows: 
 
Fewer topics should be selected for further human factors investigations such as 
controllability, comfort and the implementation of new technologies. In this way, 
more extensive research can be performed and issues can be resolved from top to 
toe. 
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More accurate methods could be used to improve the explanatory study and the 
evaluation study, for instance by exploring the incident record and by using other 
less subjective measurements, including the latest gadget technology (actiwatches, 
smart watches and smart phones) to ensure validity. 
 
Developing a human factors standard which essentially increases performance and 
comfort, in addition to safety and wellbeing of personnel on board is 
recommended. For example, noise criteria that includes noise spectra evaluation, 
impulse noise, high pitch noise and other potential disturbing noises besides the 
maximum energy level (in dB). 
 
A further validation of motion criteria based on on-board measurements combined 
with observations is required. A theoretical improvement to predict motion 
induced interruption should be performed based on these methods. Some of the 
existing motion criteria developed based on expert judgment and laboratory 
experiments were indicated as unrealistic for offshore supply vessel operations.  
 
A study to determine an adaptation factor to predict motion sickness incident for a 
particular population such as seafarers is proposed. As indicated in the study, the 
existing motion sickness incident is extremely conservative for crews. 
 
A standardised model to assess the level of human factors implementation on ships 
should be developed and implemented. This kind of assessment can help 
shipbuilders to recognise issues that need to be improved related to safety and 
performance. This kind of evaluation can also help to distinguish better ships from 
the human factors perspective. 
 
Development of the hull design on offshore supply vessels to minimise slamming 
and to reduce motion is endorsed. It is also recommended that the existing 
alternative designs such as the wave-piercing, the axe bow, the inverted bow and 
the X-bow, be evaluated from the human factors perspective using field survey and 
on-board measurement. 
 
Last but not least, it will be interesting to extend this study by involving the 
designers, inseminating the ideas.  
6.4. Concluding Remarks 
It was noted that good innovations and improvements could be made, especially if 
the industry has other goals than maximising profit and reducing cost. The 
development of human factors on ships is not an arena for rivalry, but cooperation. 
All the players must agree to some extent not to create confusion for the (future) 
operators. 
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SUMMARY 
 
Research shows that more than 80% of accidents at sea were caused by human related factors. Some experts implied that 
less than adequate design is one significant element that may lead to human errors. There are several ways to discover 
whether a design has considered human factors, i.e., to refer to the design specification, to consult the designers, to 
conduct a direct observation through a site visit or through a model, to interview the users, or to look into the system that 
regulates the design. This paper applied a content analysis methodology to explore how human factors have been 
covered in the design of marine systems. Various documents such as rules, regulations, design guidelines, standards and 
other texts have been analysed. The results indicate that there are extensive references that cover human factors in 
designing ships. They are published with different degrees of enforcement, some are prescriptive and some are 
obligatory but still optional. The topic is developing very rapidly. A more assertive measure is required from the 
regulators to endorse human factors into implementation. 
 
 
NOMENCLATURE 
 
ABS American Bureau of Shipping 
ASTM American Society for Testing and 
 Materials 
BS British Standards 
BV Bureau Veritas 
CEPAC Crew and Embarked Personnel 
 Accommodation Comfort 
COMF Comfort 
DNV  Det Norske Veritas 
ECR Engine control room 
ER Engine room 
GL Germanischer Lloyd 
HAB Habitability 
HF Human factors 
HFES Human Factors and Ergonomics Society 
HVAC Heating, ventilation and air conditioning 
IEA International Ergonomics Association 
IMO International Maritime Organization 
ISO International Organization for  
 Standardization 
LR Lloyd’s Register 
NKK Nippon Kaiji Kyokai 
OHS Occupational health and safety 
RINA Royal Institution of Naval Architects 
SNAME Society of Naval Architects and 
 Marine Engineers 
SOLAS Safety of Life at Sea 
STCW Seafarers’ Training, Certification and  
 Watchkeeping 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
This paper explores how human factors have been 
covered in marine system design. Extensive studies have 
been conducted to better understand the role of human 
factors in maritime accidents by examining available 
maritime casualty databases [1, 2],claiming that human 
error continues to be the dominant factor in maritime 
accidents, contributing to 80-85% of all accidents. 
Whereof, about 50% initiated by human error, while 
another 30% associated with human error. 
 
In contrast to the fact mentioned above, designers seem 
to avoid this so-called human factor. Reason mentions 
that rather than being the instigator of an accident, 
operators tend to be the inheritors of system’s defects 
created by poor design, incorrect installation, faulty 
maintenance and bad management decisions [3]. Squire 
quoted one ship master stating that it is frustrating for the 
personnel to sail a vessel which was designed with no 
crew input and whatsoever [4]. Miller emphasized his 
message in capital letters [5, 6]: 
 
“YOU CANNOT OVERCOME HUMAN ERRORS 
INDUCED BY POOR DESIGN OF THE WORKPLACE 
WITH MORE TRAINING, MORE MANUALS OR 
WRITTEN PROCEDURES, EXHORTATIONS TO 
WORK MORE SAFELY, OR THREATS OF PUNITIVE 
ACTIONS FOR JOB ACCIDENTS.” 
 
 
Graveson mentions similar statement that human factors 
in shipping draws attention but is rarely addressed and is 
not taken seriously [7]. 
 
A question worth asking is: “Is human factors neglected 
in ship design?” 
 
There are several ways to find out if a design is good and 
human-friendly. First, one can do an evaluation through 
the design itself. For instance, a human factors review in 
ship design was conducted by means of a 3D computer 
model [8]. Several onboard surveys were conducted to 
evaluate engine control rooms and bridge design with 
regard to human factors [9, 10, 11, 12]. Second, one can 
do interviews with the designers [13]. Third, one can 
study the rules and regulations for designing the systems. 
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Naval architects, marine engineers, and offshore 
engineers should refer to codes, rules, regulations and 
guidelines when designing their products. Some of these 
referrals are compulsory and some are voluntary. To be 
approved by any classification society, the design 
obviously must follow the rules and regulations 
published by the corresponding society, for instance 
ABS, BV, DNV, GL, LR or NKK. Ross identifies which 
standards and regulations correspond to which ship 
design discipline: structure, hull-form, machinery, 
general arrangements and human-machine interface [15, 
16]. The presentation is simple, but beneficial for the 
designers who intend to apply the specific know-how to 
their work. 
 
The research presented in this paper applies a content 
analysis to explore how human factors have been 
covered in marine system design. The concept of human 
factors in ship design is explored and relevant literature 
is reviewed. Applicable codes, rules, regulations and 
guidelines will be examined. The aim is to investigate 
which aspects of human factors are mentioned and how 
they are addressed. The results should be beneficial for 
those who are involved in the design of marine systems 
and intend to apply principles related to human factors in 
their design. The remaining part of the paper will first 
give an introduction to relevant literature, and then 
describe the content analysis methodology applied, 
before results are presented and discussed.  
 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
A literature review is performed to clarify the concept of 
human factors in ships design. First, definitions of human 
factors from its own societies are explored. Then, the 
process of ships design is discussed. Finally, the 
application of human factors in ship design is presented. 
 
 
2.1  HUMAN FACTORS  
 
The International Ergonomics Association (IEA) defines 
human factors as [18]: 
 
“The scientific discipline concerned with the 
understanding of interactions among humans and other 
elements of a system, and the profession that applies 
theory, principles, data and methods to design in order to 
optimize human well-being and overall system 
performance.” 
 
A definition developed by the Human Factors and 
Ergonomics Society (HFES), stated that “Human Factors 
is concerned with the application of what we know about 
people, their abilities, characteristics, and limitations to 
the design of equipment they use, environments in which 
they function, and jobs they perform” [19]. Another 
definition provided by HFES declared that: 
 
“Human factors is that field which is involved in 
conducting research regarding human psychological, 
social, physical, and biological characteristics, 
maintaining the information obtained from that research, 
and working to apply that information with respect to the 
design, operation, or use of products or systems for 
optimizing human performance, health, safety, and/or 
habitability.”  
 
The International Maritime Organization (IMO) uses the 
term “human element” for this purpose, and defines [20]: 
“The human element is a complex multi-dimensional 
issue that affects maritime safety, security and marine 
environmental protection. It involves the entire spectrum 
of human activities performed by ships’ crews, shore-
based management, regulatory bodies, recognized 
organizations, shipyards, legislators, and other relevant 
parties, all of whom need to co-operate to address human 
element issues effectively.” 
 
 
2.2 SHIPS DESIGN 
 
The design process consists of developing requirements, 
conducting analyses, developing drawings, building 
electronic models and writing specifications [15]. Ship 
design is a long and iterative process, divided into stages 
or phases. The way people divide and name the stages or 
the phases varies across sources and across time. In the 
1980 edition of the Ship Design and Construction 
textbook, Kiss following Evans (1959) distinguished four 
phases of ship design process [21]: concept design, 
preliminary design, contract design and detail design. 
While, in the latter version of the textbook, Gale, 
following Lamb (1985, 1986) differentiates two ship 
design stages [22]: basic design and product engineering. 
The first stage is then subdivided into four phases: 
concept design, preliminary design, contract design and 
functional design. The second stage is subdivided into 
two phases: transition design and workstation/zone 
information preparation. Rawson and Tupper propose 
three major design stages: concept design, feasibility 
design and full design [23]. 
 
Each design stage covers specific issues and 
considerations. Usually the process will start with the 
mission statement, like what kind of vessel to be built to 
carry how much quantity of which particular cargoes in 
which area of the world. The further the process the more 
detail the issues cover, for instance the dimensions of the 
vessel, type of hull that is going to be used, type of 
machineries that will be installed, layout and 
arrangement of the vessel, bridge design, ER and ECR 
design, to plumbing and fixture list, accommodation 
arrangement, electrical equipment and installation 
diagram, and HVAC diagram and equipment list. 
Obviously, most of the topics covered above are typical 
marine related problems, but not all are under the 
responsibility of a naval architect or a marine engineer. 
Furthermore, not all issues are related to human factors, 
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but may still have an effect on people and their safety 
and effectiveness and efficiency of work.  
 
2.3  HUMAN FACTORS IN SHIPS DESIGN 
 
Humans are involved in the ship life cycle from 
procurement to disposal. They include the owners, the 
designers - naval architects, the classification societies, the 
regulatory authorities, the shipbuilders, the equipment 
suppliers, the ship managers/operators, the seafarers/unions 
and the insurers [7]. All of them have a different but 
significant impact on safety, effectiveness and efficiency. 
Shipowners play important roles that may have profound 
consequences on safety. They determine which flag state 
and which classification society their vessels will carry. The 
maritime administration, acting as the flag state control, has 
the job to ensure that regulations are obeyed [24]. 
Classification societies develop standards and set technical 
rules. They also have the responsibility to ensure that the 
design and construction follow the standards. It is a 
common practice that classification societies carry out the 
control functions on behalf of the flag state. Much of this 
knowledge is captured in standards and guides for non-
expert use, thus reducing the cost of human centred design. 
 
According to Rawson and Tupper, the human element in 
design is covered by multi-disciplinary human factors 
teams. These teams include physiologists, psychologists, 
engineers and scientists. These human factors teams can 
advise the naval architect on how to design a system or 
equipment so that the human can perform more 
effectively, increase system efficiency, improve human 
performance and inform the levels of environmental 
parameters which should not be exceeded [23]. 
 
In the ship design and construction textbook published 
by SNAME, human factors is defined as a 
comprehensive term that covers all biomedical and 
psychological considerations applying to the human in 
the system. Human factors is also stated to cover human 
engineering and life support, personnel selection, training 
and training equipment, job performance aids, and 
performance measures and evaluation as well. Human 
factors engineering in ship design is defined separately. 
Human factors engineering includes techniques to define 
the role of the human in complex systems, simulation 
and modelling of crew workloads for manning reduction, 
assessing operator/maintainer workloads, advanced man-
machine interfaces, decision aids to reduce human error 
and accidents and enhance human performance and 
safety, and ship design methods and data [17]. The role 
of the naval architects and marine engineers is 
highlighted to influence the final product of marine 
design by adequately addressing human factors in the 
ship design process. The importance of designing for 
human factors correctly from the bottom up is also 
emphasized. 
Lloyd’s Register (LR) described human factors as 
something that is concerned with the task people do and 
the environment they do it in - fitting the job to the 
person [25]. When applied to the design and operation of 
a ship and its systems, the term human factors means 
taking human capabilities, skills, limitations and needs, 
and the use of people as a component of the system into 
account. Ergonomics is defined as the study and design 
of the working environment for the benefit of the 
workers’ safety, efficiency, effectiveness, health and 
comfort. Working environments include ship bridges, 
machinery control rooms, galleys, and the related 
components, work practices and work procedures. It is 
mentioned that for any ship to operate safely and 
effectively, the ship must be designed to support the 
people who work onboard, without detriment to their 
health, safety and overall performance.  
 
Examples of ship design elements related to human 
factors are [14, 15, 25]:  ship motions, design 
arrangement, layout and location of operation, berthing 
and maintenance spaces, access, gangways, ladders, 
stairs and work platform, ergonomics and anthropometric 
considerations, accommodation criteria, maintainability, 
habitability, survivability and comfort of personnel, 
indoor climate, lighting, view, sight, visibility, noise, 
sound, vibration, ventilation, and temperature, human-
machine interfaces and interaction, incl. symbols, signs, 
labels, and job-performance aid, control, display, screen, 
alarms, workstations, consoles, and manual valve 
operation.  
 
There are three references to date which particularly 
cover human factors in ship design: “High Speed Craft 
Human Factors Engineering Design Guide” [26], 
“Human Factors in the Maritime Domain” [27] and 
“Human Factors for Naval Marine Vehicle Design and 
Operation” [17]. Nine areas of human factors in ship 
design have been identified [26]: motions, sight, sound, 
environment, health and safety, man-machine interface, 
habitability, maintainability, and design review.  
 
LR systematically distinguished several different design 
qualities in relation to human factors. These include [25]: 
 
• Habitability – the provision of adequate and 
comfortable accommodation, including 
furnishings and washing facilities, such as 
galleys, messrooms and recreational spaces. 
This provision must take into account seafarer’s 
variation in size, shape and gender, and various 
environmental stressors: noise, heat and 
vibration. 
• Maintainability – designing operational 
maintenance tasks to be rapid, safe and 
effective, to allow equipment and systems to 
achieve a specified level of performance. This 
includes consideration of access, removal 
routes, tools, expertise, disposal and through-life 
support. 
• Workability – due consideration must be given to 
the users, tasks, equipment (including any 
software), materials and procedures, and the 
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physical and social environments in which a 
system is used.  
• Controllability – designing the layout of ship 
control centers, machinery control rooms, cargo 
control rooms etc., considering integration of 
people with equipment, systems and interfaces, 
such as communication facilities, controls, 
displays, alarms, video-display units, and 
computer stations. 
• Manoeuvrability – having the most appropriate 
manoeuvring capabilities consistent with the 
intended role, manning and operational pattern of 
the ship, including the type, number and power of 
propulsion systems, steering systems and thrusters. 
• Survivability – the provision of adequate fire-
fighting, damage control and lifesaving facilities 
(including manpower), and of security 
arrangements. 
 
 
In a subsequent publication, LR adds two other 
qualities to human factors [31]: 
• Occupational health and safety (OHS) – 
consideration of the effect of work, the working 
environment and living conditions on the health, 
safety and wellbeing of workers. 
• System safety – consideration of the risks from 
people using (or mis-using) ship systems. 
 
 
3. METHODOLOGY 
 
To answer the question whether human factors has been 
considered in marine design by means of published 
documents such as rules, regulations, standards, and 
guides, a method of systematic literature survey as for 
instance content analysis is required. 
 
 
3.1  CONTENT ANALYSIS 
 
Content analysis is a research technique for making replicable 
and valid inferences from texts, or other meaningful matter, to 
the context of their use [28]. Leedy & Omrod and Neuendorf 
defined content analysis as a careful, detailed, systematic 
examination and interpretation of a particular body of material 
in an effort to identify patterns, themes, biases, and meanings 
[29]. Content analysis can be applied deductively in 
quantitative research, producing frequencies of pre-selected 
categories or values associated with particular variables [30]. 
This method is considered to be relevant to answer the 
problems that are being addressed in this study. Content 
analysis will be utilized as a structured and quantified 
literature study, to see if human factors is covered in the 
process of designing marine systems and how it is taken  
into account.  
 
Based on a theoretical construct of human factors in ship 
design, a coding sheet is developed. It can be seen that 
the construct is rather complex and multi-dimensional.  
Table 1 Coding Sheet 
Dimension Component Aspect / object 
Habitability 
(HAB) 
Accommodation Galleys, messroom 
Recreational spaces 
Cabins 
 Seafarer’s 
variation 
Size 
Shape 
Gender 
 Environmental 
stressors 
Environmental 
condition 
Indoor climate 
Comfort 
Noise, sound 
Heat, temperature 
Air velocity, ventilation 
Air quality, smell 
Motion 
Vibration 
Lighting 
Maintainability 
(MAIN) 
Maintenance 
tasks 
Layout, access, 
removal routes 
Tools 
Expertise 
Disposal 
Through-life support 
Workability 
(WORK) 
Users 
Tasks 
Equipment & 
software 
Material & 
procedures 
Physical & 
social 
environment 
Accessibility 
Layout 
Space 
Controllability 
(CONT) 
Control centres Bridge 
Engine control room 
Cargo control facilities 
 People-system 
integration 
Man-machine 
interface 
Communication 
facilities 
Controls and switches 
Displays, video-
display unit 
Alarms 
Automation 
Computer stations 
Manoeuvrability 
(MANV) 
Propulsion system 
Steering system 
Thrusters 
Survivability 
(SURV) 
Firefighting 
Damage control 
Lifesaving facilities 
Occupational 
Health and 
Safety (OHS) 
Effect to work 
Working environment 
Living conditions 
System safety 
(SS) 
Risk consideration 
 
 
There is no formal taxonomy of human factors in the 
maritime domain available to date. The framework 
provided by LR [31] is regarded as the most logical and 
comprehensive one, and is therefore employed as the 
basic skeleton. Eight design qualities are identified and 
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for the coding sheet purpose they are named as 
dimensions: habitability, maintainability, workability, 
controllability, manoeuvrability, survivability, 
occupational health and safety, and system safety. Under 
each dimension, several components and or aspects are 
identified. In the process of developing the coding sheet, 
it is realized that the framework does not really satisfy 
the mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive 
principle; overlapping occurs and there are some 
inconsistencies in classifying components or aspects. The 
initial coding sheet is presented in Table 1 which is 
developed together with the coding process. 
 
 
3.2 POPULATION AND SAMPLE 
 
There are many documents that can be explored to show 
how human factors are accounted for in ship design. A 
good source to start with is existing textbooks and 
handbooks of ship design, as presented above in section 
2.3. Next, periodicals like journal publications, 
conference papers, reports, bulletins and magazines will 
be essential sources of information. And finally, but 
often regarded as most important are codes, standards, 
rules, regulations, guides and recommended practices, 
published by the classification societies. Such 
publications from the class societies can be said to truly 
represent the reality in the industry, as they are required 
to class a ship. 
 
This research focus on commercial ship design, thus 
documents with military, aeronautics and nuclear reactor 
background is excluded. Documents provided for general 
purpose design, such as BS 6841:1987 Guide to 
Measurement and Evaluation of Human Exposure to 
Whole-body Mechanical Vibration and Repeated Shock 
and ISO 6385:2004 Ergonomic Principles in the Design 
of Work Systems, and documents not specifically 
addressing design issues, such as STCW, SOLAS and 
Maritime Labour Convention (MLC) 2006 are also 
excluded from the scope of this research. 
 
The population of the research is defined as those 
documents, standards, rules, or guides published by 
classification societies and other relevant international 
bodies which regulate certain aspects of ship design that 
can affect human performance, health, and or safety on 
board. Three classification societies are taken as the 
samples in the research: ABS, DNV and LR. Three 
international organizations are also sampled: IMO, and 
the standards organisations ISO and ASTM.  
 
Two levels of data exploration will be conducted 
according to the level of the unit analysis. First, a thorough 
look into the list of publications on each source will be 
carried out. At this stage, the title of the document will be 
identified. Next, on each document selected, detail content 
analysis will be done by applying a pre-defined coding 
sheet, covering human factors related keywords. 
 
3.2 (a)  Classification Societies 
 
ABS, DNV and LR are three major classification 
societies, representing a considerable part of the ship 
classification market, and they show a particular interest 
for human factors considerations in marine design. Each 
society addresses the human factors issue in its own way. 
ABS provides quite a few guides addressing human 
factors issues and offers additional notations like HAB 
and COMF. DNV offers additional COMF notation. LR 
offers CEPAC notation and does a lot of efforts in 
addition to the rules and regulations. 
 
American Bureau of Shipping [32] 
 
ABS publishes 138 rules and guides that are applied in 
marine industry, covering ships, offshore structures, 
floating structures, underwater vehicles, equipment, 
components and materials. As many as seventeen 
publications can be categorized as targeted documents in 
this research (see Table 2).  
 
 
Table 2 ABS rules and guides related to human factors in 
ship design 
Pub# Title 
86 Application of Ergonomics to Marine Systems   
94 Bridge Design and Navigational Equipment/Systems   
97 Risk Assessment Applications for the Marine and 
Offshore Oil and Gas Industries   
102 Crew Habitability on Ships   
103 Passenger Comfort on Ships   
116 Review and Approval of Novel Concepts   
117 Risk Evaluations for the Classification of Marine-
Related Facilities   
119 Ergonomic Design of Navigation Bridges   
122 Alternative Design and Arrangements for Fire 
Safety   
141 Fire-Fighting Systems   
145 Vessel Maneuverability   
147 Ship Vibration   
151 Vessels Operating in Low Temperature Environments   
154 Means of Access to Tanks and Holds for Inspection  
163 Crew Habitability on Workboats   
170 Rapid Response Damage Assessment 
185 Integrated Software Quality Management (ISQM) 
 
 
Det Norske Veritas [33] 
 
DNV differentiates their rules and standards into: Rules 
for Classification of Ships, Rules for Classification of 
High Speed, Light Craft and Naval Surface Craft, 
Statutory Interpretations, Service Specifications, 
Offshore Service Specifications, Offshore Standards, 
Recommended Practices, etc. 
 
Table 3 shows documents published by DNV that are 
presumed to accommodate human factors in commercial 
ship design. 
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Not all documents mentioned in Table 3 are developed 
based on the human factors viewpoint. For instance, Part 
6, Chapter 15 Vibration Class is established considering 
that vibration may influence function of some essential 
machineries and equipment as well as cause fatigue 
damage to some important structures. Chapter 24 
SILENT class notation is applied to ensure that those 
equipment used by the vessel can function properly. 
 
 
Table 3 DNV rules for classification of ships and craft 
related to human factors 
Rules for Classification of Ships 
Part 3 Hull and Equipment - Main Class 
 Ch 3    Hull Equipment and Safety 
Part 4   Machinery and Systems - Main Class 
 Ch 9 
Ch 10 
Ch 14 
Control and Monitoring Systems 
Fire Safety 
Steering Gear 
Part 5 Special Service and Type - Additional Class 
 Ch 12  Comfort Class 
Part 6 Special Equipment and Systems- Additional Class 
 Ch 2 
Ch 3 
Ch 4 
Ch 6 
 
Ch 7 
Ch 8 
Ch 9 
 
Ch 15 
Ch 20 
Ch 24 
Ch 26 
Redundant Propulsion 
Periodically Unattended Machinery Space 
Additional Fire Protection (F-AMC) 
Centralised Cargo Control for Liquid 
Cargoes 
Dynamic Positioning Systems 
Nautical Safety 
Loading Computer Systems (LCS) for 
Stability and Longitudinal Strength 
Vibration Class*) 
Nautical Safety - Offshore Service Vessels 
SILENT Class Notation*) 
Dynamic Positioning System - Enhanced 
Reliability DYNPOS-ER 
*) not developed based on human factors perspective 
 
 
Table 4 shows the rest of DNV documents addressing 
human factors in the design stage. 
 
 
Table 4 DNV documents related to human factors in 
design phase 
Recommended Practices (DNV-RP) 
A203 
C205 
 
D102 
 
D201 
Qualification of New Technology 
Environmental Conditions and Environmental 
Loads 
Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) of 
Redundant Systems 
Integrated Software Dependent Systems 
 
 
Lloyd’s Register [34] 
 
LR differentiates their rules and regulations into two 
categories: marine and energy. There are 130 documents 
under the marine category and 25 documents under the 
energy. Table 5 presents a list of LR documents that are 
relevant to HF in ship design. 
 
 
3.2 (b)  International Standards and Industry Standards 
 
In addition to those classification societies, three other 
relevant organizations in the global regulatory and 
standardization domain are evaluated: IMO, ISO and 
ASTM. 
 
The International Maritime Organization [35] 
 
IMO is a specialized agency of the United Nations which 
is responsible for measures to improve the safety and 
security of international shipping and to prevent marine 
pollution from ships. IMO is responsible for keeping 
legislation up to date, ensuring that it is ratified by as 
many countries as possible, and to ensure that theses 
conventions and other treaties are properly implemented 
by the countries that have accepted them. A considerable 
share of IMO’s publications is related to human factors 
in ship operations. IMO publishes documents in different 
format: agreements, circulars, codes, conventions, 
guidelines, manuals, model courses, procedures, 
recommendations, regulations, rules and resolutions. 
 
Table 5 LR documents related to HF in design 
Rules & Regulations for the Classification of Ships 
Part 3 Ship Structures (General) 
 Ch 13   Ship Control System 
Part 5 Main and Auxiliary Machinery 
 Ch 18 Integrated Propulsion Systems 
 Ch 19 Steering Gear 
 Ch 21 Requirements for Condition Monitoring 
Systems 
 Ch 22 Propulsion and Steering Machinery 
Redundancy 
 Ch 23 Safe Return to Port and Orderly 
Evacuation and Abandonment in 
Passenger Ships 
Part 6 Control, Electrical, Refrigeration and Fire 
 Ch 1 Control Engineering Systems 
 Ch 2 Electrical Engineering 
 Ch 4 Fire Protection, Detection and Extinction 
Requirements 
Part 7 Other Ship Types and Systems 
 Ch 4 Dynamic Positioning Systems 
 Ch 9 Navigational Arrangements and 
Integrated Bridge Systems 
 Ch 11 Arrangements and Equipment for 
Environmental Protection 
 Ch 12 Integrated Fire Protection (IFP) Systems 
 Ch 13 Passenger and Crew Accommodation 
Comfort 
 Ch 15 Requirements for Machinery and 
Engineering Systems of Unconventional 
Design 
Guidance Note 
 Ship Vibration and Noise Guidance Notes 
 
Several conventions are significantly important for the 
human factors’ perspective: 
 
• COLREGS – International Regulations for 
Preventing Collisions at Sea 
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• Load Lines, 1966 – International Convention on 
Load Lines 
• SOLAS – International Convention for the 
Safety of Life at Sea 
• STCW – International Convention on Standards 
of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for 
Seafarers 
 
IMO codes related to human factors are: 
• Code on Alerts and Indicators, 2009 
• FSS Code – Fire Safety System 
• LSA Code – International Life-Saving 
Appliance Code 
• Noise Levels – Code on Noise Levels on Board 
Ships 
• STCW Code – Seafarers’ Training, Certification 
and Watchkeeping 
 
 
Examples of other IMO publications that are relevant to 
human factors in ship design include: 
 
Table 6 IMO publications relevant to HF in ship design 
Assembly Resolutions (RES) 
A.342(IX) Recommendation on Performance Standards 
for Automatic Pilots 
A.468(XII) Code on Noise Levels on Board Ships 
A.601(15) Provision and Display of Manoeuvring 
Information on Board Ships 
A.708(17) Navigation Bridge Visibility and Functions 
A.817(19) Performance Standards for Electronic Chart 
Display and Information Systems (ECDIS) 
A.861(20) Performance Standards for Shipborne Voyage 
Data Recorders (VDRs) 
A.947(23) Human Element Vision, Principles and Goals 
for the Organization 
A.1021 (26) Code on Alerts and Indicators 
Maritime Safety Committee (MSC) Resolutions 
128(75) Performance Standards for a Bridge 
Navigational Watch Alarm System (BNWAS) 
137(76) Standards for Ship Manoeuvrability 
190(79) Performance Standards for the Presentation of 
Navigation-Related Information on Shipborne 
Navigational Displays 
IMO Circulars, MSC Circulars 
587 Life Saving Appliances 
601 Fire Protection in Machinery Spaces 
616 Evaluation of Free-Fall Lifeboat Launch 
Performance 
645 Guidelines for Vessels with Dynamic 
Positioning Systems 
834 Guidelines for Engine-Room Layout, Design 
and Arrangement 
846 Guidelines on Human Element Considerations 
for the Design and Management of Emergency 
Escape Arrangements on Passenger Ships 
849 Guidelines for the performance, location, use 
and care of emergency escape breathing devices 
(EEBD’s) 
982 Guidelines on Ergonomic Criteria for Bridge 
Equipment and Layout 
1002 Guidelines on Alternative Design and 
Arrangements for Fire Safety 
Some topics are addressed more than once in IMO 
publications. For instance, the STCW is published as a 
convention and also as a code, and noise levels on board 
is mentioned as a code as well as a resolution. To avoid 
redundancy, these topics are considered as one.  
 
The International Organization for Standardization [36] 
 
ISO is a non-governmental organization who develops 
and publishes international standards. Browsing ISO 
standards can be done in two ways. Through the 
international classification for standards (ICS) or by the 
technical committee (TC) responsible to prepare the 
standard. Standards in shipbuilding and marine structures 
are covered in ICS number 47, while TC 8 covers 
standards regarding ship and marine technology. 
Ergonomics is regulated separately in TC 159.  
 
The scope of this research is covered in ICS 47.020 and 
47.040, and TC 8/SC 1, TC 8/SC 6 and TC8/SC 8. 
Examples of ISO documents that are related to human 
factors in ships design are presented in Table 7. 
 
Table 7 ISO documents related to HF 
ISO Title of document 
2631-1:1997  Mechanical vibration and shock -- 
Evaluation of human exposure to whole-
body vibration -- Part 1: General 
requirements  
2923:1996 Acoustics -- Measurement of noise on 
board vessels 
3797:1976 Shipbuilding -- Vertical steel ladders 
5488:1979 Shipbuilding -- Accommodation ladders 
5489:2008 Ships and marine technology -- 
Embarkation ladders 
6954:2000  Mechanical vibration -- Guidelines for the 
measurement, reporting and evaluation of 
vibration with regard to habitability on 
passenger and merchant ships  
17631:2002 Ships and marine technology -- Shipboard 
plans for fire protection, life-saving 
appliances and means of escape 
17894:2005 Ships and marine technology – Computer 
applications – General principles for the 
development and use of programmable 
electronic systems in marine applications 
20283-2:2008 Mechanical vibration -- Measurement of 
vibration on ships -- Part 2: Measurement of 
structural vibration 
20283-4 Mechanical vibration -- Measurement of 
vibration on ships -- Part 4: Measurement 
and evaluation of vibration of the ship 
propulsion machinery 
24409-1:2010 Ships and marine technology -- Design, 
location and use of shipboard safety signs, 
safety-related signs, safety notices and 
safety markings -- Part 1: Design principles 
27991:2008 Ships and marine technology -- Marine 
evacuation systems -- Means of 
communication 
8468:2007 Ships and marine technology -- Ship's 
bridge layout and associated equipment -- 
Requirements and guidelines 
2412:1982 Shipbuilding -- Colours of indicator lights
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Documents under TC 159 exclusively cover ergonomics, 
such as: 
• ISO 6385:2004 Ergonomic principles in the 
design of work systems 
• ISO 26800:2011 Ergonomics -- General 
approach, principles and concepts 
• ISO 9241-1:1997 Ergonomic requirements for 
office work with visual display terminals 
(VDTs) -- Part 1: General introduction 
• ISO 9241-210:2010 Ergonomics of human-
system interaction – Part 210: Human-centered 
design for interactive systems 
• ISO 11064-3:1999 Ergonomic design of control 
centres -- Part 3: Control room layout 
• ISO/TR 16982:2002 Ergonomics of human-
system interaction -- Usability methods 
supporting human-centered design 
 
Since those publications are broadly applied in any 
domain, they are excluded from this study.  
 
ASTM International [37] 
 
ASTM International develops and delivers international 
voluntary consensus standards. ASTM formed a 
committee called F25 to develop standards on Ships and 
Marine Technology in 1978. Two specific standards are 
in accordance with the scope of this research: 
• F1166 – 07 Standard Practice for Human 
Engineering Design for Marine Systems, 
Equipment, and Facilities 
• F1337 – 10 Standard Practice for Human 
Engineering Program Requirements for Ships 
and Marine Systems, Equipment, and Facilities 
 
 
4.  RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
 
Two levels of data analyses were conducted with 
different units of analysis. First, all related publications 
from six institutions were being processed. The title of 
the documents was taken as the unit of analysis where 
the HF dimensions (Table 1) were used as the coding 
framework. Second, several most significant and most 
relevant documents were selected and then analysed in 
detail manner, where components and aspects of human 
factors were used as the coding framework. 
 
4.1.  DOCUMENT ANALYSIS  
 
95 document titles were coded according to human 
factors dimensions. Detail results are presented in Table 
A1 in the Appendix while the summary is presented in 
Table 8. 
 
It should be noted that some documents are very thin; 
only two pages while some are comprehensive, counting 
hundreds of pages. Some titles represent one complete 
document while some others represent chapters from a 
compiled document. Therefore, those statistics in Table 8 
should be interpreted carefully. 
 
Table 8 Summary results of documents covering HF in 
ship design 
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ABS 17 2 6 1 7 4 1 3 3 9 
DNV 18 0 1 1 6 7 3 3 0 11
LR 16 0 2 1 2 6 3 6 1 7 
IMO 27 2 2 1 6 8 3 11 4 14
ISO (TC8) 13 0 7 0 3 2 0 4 0 2 
ASTM 2 2 1 1 2 1 0 1 1 2 
Total 93 6 17 5 25 28 10 29 9 45
 
 
Table 8 shows that all human factors dimensions are 
covered by the existing documents: codes, rules, 
regulations, guidelines, etc. Clearly, as safety has long 
been the main concern in the industry, “System Safety” 
is the most mentioned by the documents while 
"Maintainability" is the least covered. This finding 
confirms the criticism raised by Andersson and Lützhöft 
[9] regarding how poor the engine control rooms were 
designed. Similar complaints are also mentioned by the 
engineers during the exploratory surveys in the study 
[12]1. Quite a significant number of documents are 
available in "Survivability", "Controllability" and 
"Workability". "Habitability" is sufficiently covered, but 
not so many documents cover the "OHS" given that the 
focus of this study is on the ‘design’ part.  
 
4.2.  CONTENT ANALYSIS 
 
As mentioned, detailed explorations were conducted by 
using the components and aspects of each HF dimension. 
As the coding process took place, more components and 
aspects were discovered and then included to the 
framework, which then became quite a long list. The 
coding process was done iteratively as the framework 
developed. The final result is presented in Table A2 in 
the Appendix. Some documents that cover a very specific 
topic such as risk management, software, fire safety, 
steering gear and life-saving appliances were excluded. 
 
From the results of tabulating the content of the 
documents it can be seen that "Habitability" (or 
"Comfort") and "Controllability" are covered the most on 
the dimensions level. These two dimensions dominate 
                                                 
1 To be noted, ABS launched a new guide for Ergonomic 
notations (July 2013). 
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the content of HF in ship design. Following those are 
"Workability" and "System safety". 
 
In "Habitability", noise, vibration, indoor climate and 
lighting or illumination are the most common topics 
covered by the documents. In “Controllability”, alarms, 
control centres, workstations and control and switches 
are the most common topics covered. It can be seen that 
the basic HF issues on board have been addressed by the 
documents. However, as the basic issues are covered, 
more specific problems appear. For example, noise was 
recognized to be a problem on board. As many as 15 
documents in this survey are found to regulate the 
maximum level of noise on board. Apparently, noise is 
no longer identified as a substantial problem on board. 
This is consistent with field survey findings [12] which 
recognize a comfortable level of noises; in general. 
However, more specific noise problems are recognized. 
It is the high pitch, impulsive and intermittent types of 
noise that disturb people on board. Most of those 15 
documents do not deal with the specific issues. ISO 2923 
is the only document that mentions "impulsive noise"  
and "tonal sound", but it does not indicate how to deal 
with them. 
 
Another basic HF issue that has been addressed 
adequately is "vibration". It is covered by 14 documents 
according to this survey. Vibration generally should no 
longer be considered as an intimidating problem.  But, 
some particular types of "vibration" emerge to be 
problematic [12]: ship motion and slamming.  One 
document discusses ship motion from the HF 
perspective: ISO 2631-1. This is the only document 
found that differentiates vibrations into two regimes: 
high frequencies (>0.5 Hz; for health, comfort and 
perception) and low frequencies (<0.5 Hz; for motion 
sickness). ABS 147 and 103 are referring to ISO 2631 as 
well as BS 6841 to consider Motion Sickness Dose Value 
(MSDV) on board. Among all documents surveyed in 
this study, only ABS 86 deals with slamming. Similar 
pattern occurs also in “alarms” which are sufficiently 
covered by 14 documents in the survey. The basic issue 
of alarms has been resolved, but in reality, more specific 
issues of alarms are discovered, such as overwhelming 
number of alarms and irrelevant alarms that disturb the 
operators. Fortunately, IMO A.1021(26) points out some 
of these issues: reducing the variety of alerts and 
indicators to provide unambiguous information.  
 
4.3.  DISCUSSION 
 
Although the human factors issues have been sufficiently 
addressed by various documents, they are not really 
mandatory. The rules and regulations published by the 
class societies are optional or voluntary while the rest are 
guidelines. The actual implementation of human factors 
principles primarily relies on the shipowner’s 
commitment. Obviously, shipyards play a significant 
role. The cargo owner or the clients and the crew may 
have some contribution to make it happen. But, the 
classification societies and the regulators could go 
further. Some basic human factors issues should be made 
compulsory without exception, such as noise, vibration, 
motion, and indoor climate. Some of these subjects also 
need to be introduced to future naval architects and ship 
designers, such as basic ergonomics, habitability, 
controllability, workability and human-related criteria in 
ship design. 
 
It should be noted that the application of HF standard is 
rather different with the other standards. For instance, a 
ship that carries COMF class does not guarantee that the 
people on board will feel comfortable, while a ship that 
carries Ice Class must be capable to handle ice loads. 
 
Three documents are found to be comprehensive 
covering the topics of human factors: ABS 86, DNV 
Nautical Safety and ASTM F1166. These three are the 
most recommended documents to address human factors 
in ships design disregarding the colors of the flags, 
wherever the ships are registered and classed. Some 
issues were identified in the development stage of the 
coding sheet but not covered in any document, i.e. 
seafarer’s variations in gender, religious differences and 
disabilities. 
 
Due to limited resources, the study does not come with 
any reliability index. However, the validity across time is 
confirmed. Compared to the findings that were published 
earlier [38] this study reveals a rapid development of 
human factor applications in ship design, characterized 
by the increasing number of documents published. The 
pattern is relatively consistent. Among all human factors 
aspects, it was found that noise, vibration, and alarms are 
covered abundantly, while maintainability still lacks 
attention, especially related to the engine room. A more 
intelligent endeavour should be performed to select 
which aspect of human factors in ship design should be 
developed in relation with the least considered, but 
problematic issues on board, such as high pitch 
intermittent noise, ship motion, slamming, smell, and 
gender issues, as reported in [12]. A quick comparison 
with a HF reference [39] shows that human reliability, 
decision making, and social factors are not yet covered 
by any of the documents surveyed in this research.  
 
5.  CONCLUSIONS 
 
A literature survey on various documents was conducted 
using a content analysis methodology. The study was 
carried out to answer if human factors are neglected in 
ships design. At least 95 documents were identified to be 
relevant in addressing human factors in ships design, and 
the numbers keep growing rapidly. Thirty documents 
were explored in detail. From the study it can be 
concluded that human factors are not neglected in ship 
design requirements. A lot of effort has been carried out 
in the industry to explore human factors and to 
implement it. Human factors turns to be a broad 
discipline that covers many dimensions and elements of 
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the ships, but the level of intensity and coverage vary 
across the dimensions. Safety and survivability are the 
two dimensions mostly covered, shown by the total 
number of documents published in the topics. 
Habitability (comfort) and controllability comprise the 
broadest spectrum of coverage, shown by the number of 
aspects found within the dimensions. A more assertive 
action is recommended to endorse human factors 
principles to be implemented in ship designs. Further 
studies by interviewing ship owners, naval  
architects, marine engineers, and shipyards/shipbuilders 
are recommended. 
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Appendix: Table A.1. Document analysis 
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Appendix: Table A.2. Content analysis 
 
 
Continue on the next page 
Trans RINA, Vol 156, Part A3, Intl J Maritime Eng, Jul-Sep 2014 
A-264                  ©2014: The Royal Institution of Naval Architects 
 
																																																																																																																																										Appendices																																		
	
	
Appendix	B:	Preliminary	Qualitative	Study	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
Exploratory	Surveys	of	Human	Factors	on	Offshore	Supply	Vessels	in	
the	Norwegian	Sea	
	
Naval	Engineers	Journal,	Vol	125,	issue	2,	June	2013.	
	
	 	
																																																																																																																																										Appendices																																		
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
This	page	is	intentionally	left	blank	
NAVAL ENGINEERS JOURNAL June 2013  No. 125-2  69
T E C H N I C A L  P A P E R
  keywords 
Human factors 
Marine design 
Offshore supply vessel (OSV)
Vincentius Rumawas and Bjørn Egil Asbjørnslett
Norwegian University of Science and Technology (NTNU), Marine Technology
Exploratory Surveys of Human Factors on 
Offshore Supply Vessels in the Norwegian Sea
ABSTRACT
  Surveys of human factors on offshore 
supply vessels (OSV) were conducted using 
the qualitative approaches of observations, 
interviews, and discussions. The purpose of 
this study was to explore how “human fac-
tors” is considered in ship design. Certain 
problems that were mentioned in previ-
ous studies were reexamined. A human 
factors framework was adopted, further 
developed, and subsequently applied for 
the survey. Two different state-of-the-art 
offshore supply vessel designs (OSVs) were 
selected as samples. The results of human 
factors application in ship design are pre-
sented. Selected signiﬁcant improvements 
are identiﬁed, both in design and opera-
tion, but several issues still remain. Typical 
problems that are recognized include noise 
disturbance, ergonomics issues, layout limi-
tations, and limited space. Novel problems 
due to the application of new technologies 
are also identiﬁed. Common problems are 
also noted, such as an overwhelming num-
ber of alarms, communications, checklists, 
and procedures. Different levels of compli-
ance in various human factor dimensions 
are recognized, of which habitability was 
the most satisfactory and maintainability 
was the least satisfactory. 
Introduction
This article is a subset of a larger study that investigates human factors in marine 
system design. The study was triggered by previous findings, which stated that most 
accidents at sea are caused by human errors or human-related factors (Moore, Bea 
and Roberts 1993; McCafferty and Baker, 2006). Within this context, certain experts 
argue that less-than-adequate design is one significant factor that leads to human 
errors. Meister (1971, p. 266) states that the typical design engineer does not consider 
human factors in the design process. Moreover, Reason (1990, p. 173) argues that: 
“Rather than being the main instigator of an accident, operators tend to be the inheri-
tors of systems defects created by poor design, incorrect installation, faulty maintenance, 
and bad management decisions. Their part is usually that of adding the final garnish to 
a lethal brew whose ingredients have already been long in cooking.” 
Squire (2007) cites one master who complained of being frustrated with sailing 
the vessel on which he was assigned to work because it was designed without input 
from the crew. Graveson (2002) claims that the influence of human factors on the 
shipping industry is a topic that draws attention, but is rarely addressed and is not 
taken seriously. Calhoun and Stevens (2003) state that system and equipment fail-
ures are the common factor for accidents in many industries. The systems and equip-
ment are not sufficiently designed to meet human physical or cognitive capabilities. 
From a research study into this context, the larger expected effect is a reduction 
in the probability of accidents at sea by taking human factors into account in ship 
and marine system design. Therefore, the main research question is directed toward 
assessing whether ship design includes sufficient consideration of human factors, 
and how well this information has been applied.
Several methods exist to answer the points addressed above. First, we can directly 
query the owners and the designers. Second, we can perform an evaluation of the 
design either by conducting a field survey or by reviewing the vessel plans. Third, 
we can ask the users for an assessment of the vessel via interviews or questionnaires. 
Last but not least, we can carry out an evaluation through the documents that regu-
late the shipbuilding industry. 
Rumawas and Asbjørnslett (2010) found that numerous standards and guidelines 
exist as references for designers on the topic of human factors in marine system 
design. Given the redundant rules, standards, and guidelines that address the human 
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factors in marine system design, although not all 
of these are mandatory, one might ask whether 
the reality is in agreement with the regulations. 
This paper aims to answer that particular ques-
tion through field surveys. 
A number of field studies conducted by other 
researchers are documented in this study. Strong 
(2000) performed a survey to investigate ship 
habitability. Based on a literature review, initial 
interviews, and a pilot survey, Strong reported 
on the crew’s evaluation of the existing ships 
and their preferences for the design of future 
warships. Adequate levels of privacy and facilities 
for both individual and social relaxation are con-
sidered important aspects in the ship’s accommo-
dations. Hardwick (2000) carried out a com-
parative study on accommodations in the Royal 
Navy and merchant naval fleets by visiting ships 
and submarines and interviewing their crews. 
The suggested factors include a drive toward 
cabin-based accommodations for all cabin crew, 
increased space for sleeping and personal storage, 
improved ambient conditions (noise and tem-
perature), and provision of other facilities. 
Lutzhoft (2005) noted illumination prob-
lems on the bridge, displays that are too bright 
and cannot be dimmed, improperly attached 
equipment to which the operator must apply 
duct tape, and similar problems on the 15 vessels 
that she visited. Andersson and Lutzhoft (2007) 
found many deficiencies in the engine room 
(ER) of a merchant ship that do not comply 
with ergonomic principles or occupational, 
health, and safety (OHS) requirements. This 
study also described a situation in which an 
engineer must climb and stand on the turn-
ing gear’s electric motor in order to reach the 
start air valve. Grundevik, Lundh and Wagner 
(2009) conducted surveys on seven Swedish 
merchant vessels to evaluate the design of the 
engine control room (ECR), the layout, the 
consoles, and the workstations. Their results 
showed that the ECR design was not sufficiently 
developed to meet the demand and are not in 
accordance with technological progress. Ergo-
nomic issues have also been reported, including 
insufficient leg space, improper positioning 
of consoles, and problems of visibility. Defec-
tive hardware components, software bugs, and 
defective software are among the most common 
system/equipment failures mentioned.
Dalpiaz, Emmrich, Miller, and McQuillan 
(2005) used a 3-D computer model to review 
a new U.S. Navy ship design. They reported 
incorrect height/orientations for equipment, 
machinery, and other manually operated technol-
ogy as the most common mistakes. Stair, ladder, 
step, and walkway designs were also found to be 
inadequate. Other deficiencies included inacces-
sibility to valves, hand wheels, and hand pumps; 
incorrect control panel, console, control, and 
display designs; and problems with personnel 
access and movement. 
This study reexamines the issues reported 
previously, and reviews the current implementa-
tion of human factors in ship and marine system 
design. The concept of human factors in marine 
design is summarized, and the objective of the 
study is to present a holistic picture of human 
factors application in ship design. A qualitative 
research methodology is applied, and selected 
findings of interest are highlighted. The results 
are discussed and may be used as a reference for 
further investigations. 
Research Methodology
This study applied qualitative approaches to the 
examination of human factors in marine design. 
Qualitative research is defined as a research 
strategy that commonly emphasizes words rather 
than quantities to collect and analyze data (Bry-
man, 2001). A portion of the research methodol-
ogy included field research in which the study 
begins with a loosely formulated idea or topic. 
The researchers subsequently observe and 
interact in the field setting for a period of time, 
conduct informal interviews, take notes, refine 
their ideas, and subsequently retreat to write 
their reports (Neuman, 2006). 
The present study regarding human factors in 
marine design was conducted in a natural setting 
in which the author acted as an observer on two 
offshore supply vessels (OSV) operating in the 
Norwegian Sea. Several different data collection 
techniques were used, including observations, 
in-depth interviews, and focus discussions.
Informal interviews were conducted in English 
and included all onboard departments. Almost 
all personnel on the ships were surveyed. The 
questions asked varied from a general type of 
question, such as, “How long have you been 
working on this vessel?”, and “How do you like 
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working here?”, to more specific questions, such 
as “Do you experience difficulties in your job?”, 
“What is the most severe incident that you have 
experienced onboard?”, etc. The interviews and 
discussions were documented and summarized. 
The observations were conducted primarily 
when personnel were physically located at their 
working stations and engaged in performing their 
jobs. Pictures were taken and also documented 
as evidence. Further investigation into particu-
lar issues was carried out by contacting other 
relevant parties, including manufacturers and 
classification societies.
Lloyd’s Register (LR) describes human factors 
as “something that is concerned with the task 
people do and the environment they do it in, 
fitting the job to the person” (LR, 2008). Human 
factors considerations in marine design can be 
broken down into eight categories (LR, 2009):
r Habitability: ensuring that accommodations, 
washing and toilet facilities, mess rooms, and  
group meeting and exercise areas are 
comfortable, clean (or cleanable), and convivial
r Maneuverability: ensuring that ships contain 
the most appropriate maneuvering capabilities 
r Workability: ensuring that ships and 
systems are appropriate for the work situation 
(context of use)
r Maintainability: ensuring that availability 
of operational maintenance tasks, manuals, 
diagnostics, and schematics are rapid, safe, 
and effective to allow equipment and systems 
to achieve a specified level of performance
r Controllability: ensuring appropriate 
integration of people with equipment, 
systems, and interfaces
r Survivability: ensuring that there are adequate 
fire fighting, damage control, lifesaving, and 
security facilities to ensure the safety and 
security of crew, visitors, and passengers
r Occupational health and safety (OHS): 
ensuring appropriate consideration of the 
effects of work, the work environment, and 
living conditions on the health, safety, and 
well-being of workers
r System safety: ensuring appropriate 
consideration of the risks from people using 
(or misusing) the ship systems.
It must be stated that the human factors frame-
work presented by LR is still evolving. The earlier 
version (LR, 2008) contained six categories, 
and the latter (LR, 2009) has been expanded to 
eight. The description and the checklist provided 
do not adequately fulfill the mutually exclusive 
and collectively exhaustive principles. For the 
purpose of this study, the human factors frame-
work presented by LR is combined and matched 
with other documents (ABS, 2000, 2001a, 2001b, 
2003) and subsequently expanded (see Appen-
dix). This expanded framework is applied as a 
guide in the study. No further standardized ques-
tionnaire is prepared for the survey, but simple 
and direct questions (e.g., “What do you think of 
the cabin, the galley, the system, the safety on the 
vessel?”) are applied instead.
The objects of the study are the vessel as a 
complete entity and her elements, including the 
accommodations, the ship control center (SCC) 
or the bridge, the ER, the ECR, the cargo facili-
ties, and the layout of the vessel as separate units. 
The Scope of the Study: Offshore Supply 
Vessel (OSV)
An OSV represents one of the most advanced 
technologies in the maritime industry. The level 
of design changes rapidly and has leapt forward 
beyond that of most conventional vessels. Many 
improvements have been made along with the 
ship. Gibson (2007, p. 23) states that: “All the 
craft (supply) require a degree of sophistica-
tion unheard of previously and even currently 
in much of the marine world.” Furthermore, the 
operational effectiveness, low fuel consumption, 
low emissions, and safety are the most important 
factors in OSV design (Blenkey, 2004). An OSV 
can be described as a combination of a bulk 
vessel, a general cargo vessel, a container vessel, 
and a tanker, with the added capabilities of fire 
fighting and oil recovery.
Over the last ten years, a total of 26 collisions 
were recorded between visiting vessels and facili-
ties in the Norwegian shelf (Petroleum Safety 
Authority Norway, 2011). Six of these collisions 
are considered a high hazard potential (see Table 
1). Three of the accidents involved autopilot 
operation and can be categorized as man-
machine interface problems. Other types of acci-
dents recognized in the OSV operations include 
a deckhand hit in the head by a hook, a person 
squeezed between moving containers on deck, 
a deckhand falling against a hose coupling when 
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a large wave hit the vessel, persons slipping or 
twisting an ankle, a fall caused by a slippery deck 
or obstacles, a fall down a ladder, and unsecured 
cargo or loose objects in cargo (Hansson, 2006). 
This research investigates if these problems are 
still likely to occur, or if appropriate countermea-
sures have been implemented.
In this research, two different OSVs were 
chosen as the samples (Figure 1). These vessels 
were employed by the same oil companies in 
the same region, and both were among the top 
of the line in the respective ship owners’ fleets. 
However, the vessels were designed and built by 
different groups of companies, and most of the 
equipment onboard was supplied by different 
manufacturers. OSV A designates a type of ves-
sel that represents most of the OSVs available 
today, while OSV B indicates an alternative 
design built with the superstructure located 
at the aft of the vessel. In addition, a dual fuel 
system is applied that uses diesel oil and lique-
fied natural gas (LNG). Table 2 presents the 
principal information regarding the two types 
of OSVs.
The surveys were conducted in October 2010, 
February 2011 and July 2011.
Results of Onboard Surveys
The results of the field surveys that were carried 
out can be divided into two parts. The first part is 
associated with previous incidents or accidents, 
and confirms the measures that have been taken 
to improve conditions. The second part assesses 
the extent to which human factors frameworks 
are taken into consideration in the design of the 
researched ships. 
Date Collision Between (Vessel) and (Installation) Cause and Descriptions
7 March 2004 Far Symphony and West Venture
The duty officer did not recognize that autopilot was engaged 
and could not take control of the vessel.
2 June 2005
Ocean Carrier and Ekoﬁsk 2/4 
P bridge
The 1st officer navigated the vessel in poor visibility due to fog. 
The captain entered the bridge with the vessel passing the safety 
zone at 10 knots. Misunderstandings occurred as to who was 
responsible for navigation.
13 Nov 2006
Navion Hispania (tanker) 
and Njord B
Polluted fuel, system malfunction, blackout, and propeller halt. 
Vessel drifted toward the installation.
18 July 2007 Bourbon Surf and Grane
The platform was identiﬁed as a target for the autopilot. The 
master misjudged the ship’s speed and distance to the platform. 
He did not keep a proper lookout at the time. 
6 June 2009
Big Orange XVIII
and Ekoﬁsk 2/4 W
The vessel approached the installation with the autopilot en-
gaged. The captain could not override the autopilot to  
control the vessel.
18 Jan 2010
Far Grimshader
and Songa Dee
The vessel was working on the lee side of the installation and 
was asked to move to the windward side. During the move, the 
vessel’s propeller was caught in a wire attached to the facility’s 
anchoring. The vessel lost control and hit the installation.
table 1. Collisions between visiting vessels and offshore facilities. (PSA Norway, 2011)
figure 1. Two different OSV designs. 
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IMPROVEMENTS IN RELATION TO PREVIOUSLY 
DOCUMENTED INCIDENTS
Design
Several design improvements and develop-
ments are identified as “lessons learned” from 
previous incidents: 
r 5PBWPJEXBUFSPOEFDLCPUI047TBSF
designed with high bulwarks or sidewalls. The 
cargo deck remains dry most of the time. 
r 5PTFDVSFUVCVMBSDBSHPPOEFDLBVUPNBUFE
cargo securing systems have been developed 
and installed on OSV A. The system consists of 
portable stanchions that run transversely across 
the full width of the deck on a series of tracks. 
However, no such facility is installed on OSV B.
r 5PJNQSPWFTBGFUZJOCVMLDBSHPUSBOTGFSUXP
different hose-securing systems are under 
development and testing. On OSV B, the 
system was shown to work well; unfortunately, 
this was not the case on OSV A. The oil 
company or the client pays for the development. 
There have been no additional autopilot inci-
dents on either OSV. However, measures have 
been taken to modify the systems. Currently, 
the autopilot is automatically deactivated when 
the crew operates the joystick. This action is  
a consequence of carrying the NAUT OSV  
notation (DNV, 2012).
Procedures
In 2006, a joint project between maritime and 
offshore organizations in Denmark, the Neth-
erlands, Norway, and the U.K. resulted in the 
development of the North West European 
(NWEA) Guidelines for the Safety Management 
of Offshore Supply and Anchor Handling Opera-
tions (NWEA, 2011). These guidelines were 
revised during 2008-2009, and were updated in 
June 2009 (NWEA, 2009). Certain items in the 
guidelines that are related to the previously men-
tioned incidents are discussed as follows:
r 5PBWPJEJOKVSZUPUIFDSFXXIJMFMPBEJOHBU
sea, it is now forbidden for the deckhands to 
assist in positioning of suspended lifts. The 
crane operator must be able to place the lift 
in position without any assistance from the 
deckhands (section 3.3.6.5). Cherry picking 
(i.e., selective discharge of cargo from within 
the stow) is also forbidden (section 3.3.6.3). 
r 5PBWPJEDPMMJTJPOTCFUXFFOUIFWFTTFMBOE
the offshore installation, a 500 m safety 
zone is stipulated. The vessel is not allowed 
to enter the safety zone before permission 
is granted by the offshore installation. The 
vessel must contact the offshore installation 
approximately one hour before arrival. Both 
parties must complete checklists before the 
vessel can approach the installation and must 
ensure the safety of the loading/unloading 
process with respect to environmental 
conditions. In practice, the vessel must stop 
outside of the 500 m safety zone before 
approaching the installation. Should any 
person feel unsafe in the conduction of 
loading/unloading, that person can refuse to 
proceed without any pressure. 
r 5PSFEVDFUIFSJTLPGDPMMJTJPOUIFPĎTIPSF
installation and the vessel should also 
minimize the frequency of visits and the 
time spent alongside the installation. It is 
OSV A (built in 2008) OSV B (built in 2007)
Main Class, DNV 
(not all mentioned)
䘬1A1, Supply Vessel
COMF-V(3)
Clean
E0, DYNPOS-AUTR 
NAUT OSV (A)
Oil Rec
䘬1A1, Supply Vessel
E0, COMF-V(3)
Clean Design
E0, DYNPOS-AUTR 
in compliance with NAUT OSV
Oil Rec
Ice C, Gas Fuelled
LOA / B mld / draft / 
DWT (approx.)
93.90 m / 21.00 m / 6.6 m / 
5000 mt
92.20 / 21 m / 7.3 m / 6000 mt
table 2. Main class and dimensions.
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preferable for the vessel to work on the lee 
side of the installation when working with 
cargo. It is the master’s decision as to whether 
the vessel should work on the weather side, 
if required. Each scenario incurs its own 
restrictions with respect to environmental 
conditions, including maximum wind speed, 
significant wave height, and current speed.
Due to these measures, the probability of 
accidents on deck should be minimized, as should 
the probability of the vessel hitting the installation 
(see Table 3).
Discussions were also held with the captains 
with respect to the previously mentioned inci-
dents and accidents. One issue was left out of the 
six collision cases presented in Table 1, and that 
is the case of the Far Grimshader and Songa Dee. 
According to one of the captains, the design of 
the Songa Dee platform is unique because it uses 
spread mooring lines. This type of design restricts 
the movement of visiting vessels. Visiting vessels 
must be exceptionally cautious in maneuvering 
around the platform, and the operators should 
be familiar with the conditions. According to the 
captain, it is fortunate that notably few platforms 
were built with such an arrangement.
RESULTS OF THE HUMAN FACTORS  
EXPLORATORY SURVEY
Exploratory surveys were conducted onboard 
both OSVs from a human factors perspective. 
The human factors framework presented in the 
Appendix was used as a guide. The key findings 
are reported and discussed in this section, and 
comparisons with previous studies are discussed. 
Habitability 
The crew members on both OSVs had no 
complaints regarding the onboard accommoda-
tion facilities. Most issues brought up by Strong 
(2000) and Hardwick (2000) garnered positive 
responses for recent OSV designs. Both vessels 
have excellent standards in their facilities. Every 
crew member has his/her own cabin equipped 
with a bed, TV set, Internet connection, table, 
sofa, wardrobe, and a toilet and shower located 
inside the cabin. The galley, the mess room, the 
lounge, the laundry, and all related facilities are 
Previous incidents
Causal problems  
and related issues
Countermeasures
Collisions
Autopilot, man-machine 
interface.
Modiﬁcation of the system. Autopilot will  
automatically be deactivated when the crew  
operates the joystick.
Platform identiﬁed as a  
target in the voyage planning.
Human error, improper lookout.
Procedure applied: NWEA (2009); platform cannot be 
identiﬁed as a target in the voyage planning. A 500 m 
safety zone is stipulated. Checklists used.
Deckhand hit by a hook.
Deckhand falling against 
a hose coupling.
Motions of the hook (and hose 
coupling) caused by the wind.
Motions of the ship induced by 
the sea. 
Procedures applied: NWEA (2009); adverse weather 
working guidelines used.
Development of an automatic hose securing system, 
reduction of direct intervention of the deckhand with 
the hose coupling.
Person squeezed 
between moving con-
tainers.
Water on deck, move-away 
containers.
Motion of the vessel.
Cherry picking.
Increase in the height of the bulwark to minimize 
water on deck.
Procedure applied: no deckhand allowed on deck 
during rough weather, adverse weather working 
guidelines used.
Person slipping, fall 
caused by slippery deck.
Wet deck, slippery deck. Increase in the height of the bulwark.
A deck hand twisted  
an ankle, fall caused  
by obstacles.
Unstable stack of cargo.
Moving cargoes on deck.
Development of an automated cargo-securing system 
on deck.
Fall down a ladder.
Slippery surface.
Steep ladder.
Conversion of ladder to stairs.
table 3. List of previously documented incidents and countermeasures.
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available, are in good condition and are consid-
ered to be more than sufficient. Large screen 
televisions with satellite connections, leather 
sofas, reclining seats, DVD movies, game con-
soles, and personal computers with an Internet 
connection are among the standard facilities  
on both OSVs. OSV A is even equipped with  
a sauna facility.
However, one issue in the accommodation 
facilities on both OSVs that was raised by the 
crew is that of the gym facility. On one vessel, 
the gym is located in an inconvenient location 
that makes crew members reluctant to visit the 
facility. On the other vessel, the gym is too small. 
The crews on both OSVs mentioned that the 
company has recognized the problem, and has 
made necessary modifications for the next line  
of vessels to be built.
OSV B is noted as a being relatively tall vessel, 
and this is reflected in the height of stairs and lad-
ders. The stairs on OSV B are relatively steep. At 
first, personnel might totter while walking down 
the stairs and stumble going up, but eventually 
become acclimated to the steep height.
The two OSVs display different characteristics 
in terms of motion, vibration, and noise. OSV A 
is quite sensitive to rolling. Vibrations occur when 
the vessel must travel through harsh weather or 
requires high power. At times, in high seas, those 
onboard feel that the entire ship is quivering, and 
the cabin is shuddering. During such conditions, 
slamming also occurs and can be disturbing 
because the slammed area is quite close to a subset 
of cabins. High-pitched noise caused by the tunnel 
thrusters can be heard inside the cabins, and was 
reported to occasionally interrupt sleep. Noise 
produced by such deck machinery as winches and 
windlasses was identified on both OSVs as being 
an issue. Fortunately, this type of noise occurs 
quite rarely and usually takes place during rela-
tively short periods (i.e., when berthing).
In general, OSV B is a quite stable ship, 
particularly with respect to rolling and heaving 
motions. However, in particular sea states (i.e., 
moderate seas), OSV B is sensitive to pitch-
ing motions. Small amplitude/high frequency 
vibrations are perceived in the cabins and even in 
bed while sleeping. These are caused by engines, 
thrusters, and funnels located close to the accom-
modation facilities. A constant hissing noise 
from the air ducts is also noticeable. Because the 
accommodation facilities are located far away from 
the bow thrusters and the slamming area, no sleep 
disturbances were reported during the surveys. 
However, a type of creaking sound was heard dur-
ing severe or rough weather due to twisting. 
Vomit incidences took place on both vessels, 
particularly when the vessels were steaming and 
experienced considerable motions. On OSV A the 
incidences occurred on high seas due to a combi-
nation of heave, pitch, and roll, while on OSV B 
the incidences occurred with a 2 to 3 m significant 
wave height and were mostly due to pitch.
The seafarers on OSV B appear to be quite 
happy with their vessel. One officer said: “You 
know when I decided to go back to work in the 
North Sea, I was worried. I easily get seasick. It is 
not a nice condition for a seaman. But, I’m happy 
that the company put me on this ship. Here, I 
never got seasick.” One deckhand mentioned: “I 
have been working and sailing in more than 30 
different vessels, small, large, and even on a 300 
m tanker. But this vessel is the best!”
On OSV A, a subset of the beds lie perpen-
dicular to the length of the ship, while on OSV 
B, all of the bed are oriented parallel with the 
ship’s longitudinal axis. A subset of the arrange-
ments on OSV A are in conflict with the crew’s 
expectations (Hardwick, 2000), but the benefit 
was recognized during heavy weather when the 
vessel experienced severe rolling motions. Unlike 
the crew members who sometimes found them-
selves thrown out of their beds, those who slept 
transversal to the ship’s longitudinal axis never 
had this unpleasant experience.
The smell of fuel was detected inside the accom-
modations on both vessels during the summer 
season. Certain odors are quite strong and can be 
disturbing, affecting the crew’s well being, interfer-
ing with the respiratory system, and occasionally 
causing dizziness if inhaled for too long. Odors 
seem to travel from the tanks through the vent 
pipes. The relatively high onboard temperature 
creates additional vaporization, and thus a greater 
amount of gas is released through the vent pipes. 
At the same time, the crew tends to leave doors 
open in warmer weather, which allows the gas 
particles to flow into the accommodation unit.
Workability
Both OSVs display a high level of workability, 
adopting the standards to which the oil and gas 
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industries adhere, including the hardware, the 
software, and the users. Certain interesting find-
ings are listed as follows:
Users 
Several issues exist in the recruitment of onboard 
personnel. Because the industry is developing 
quite rapidly, the need for human resources has 
increased in terms of quantity and competence. 
In contrast, the supply is limited, and recruiting 
of foreign crews cannot be avoided. A subset of 
female crew members was onboard; two worked 
on the bridge and two were assigned to the ER. 
Female crew members reported additional issues 
regarding their careers and private lives. They 
expressed the difficulty of raising children while 
still working at sea.
On average, the newer generation of seafarers 
is taller than their predecessors. During the sur-
vey, a number of notably tall crew members were 
encountered, with heights greater than 180 cm. 
Their heads almost touch the ceiling of the vessel 
in certain cases, and this anthropometric issue 
requires adjustments in the design of accommo-
dations and workstations.
Due to the novelty and uniqueness of the 
systems, new user adaptation and familiarization 
is required on both OSVs. This practice has been 
formalized in training programs. Simulator-based 
training has become obligatory for OSV opera-
tors, and new training facilities are being built 
and upgraded all over Norway. 
In contrast to the findings of Squire (2007), 
which claim a lack of user feedback in ship 
design, most senior officers and engineers on 
OSV A and B were involved in the process of 
designing and building the vessel. 
Equipment and software
Many systems on both OSVs are digital and 
computerized. The methods by which the vessel 
is operated have changed, and have become 
quite similar to playing a game console. New 
types of problems associated with this technol-
ogy have been identified, including compatibil-
ity issues, operating system problems, software 
expiration dates, system overloads, unrespon-
sive systems, data validity, and software bug 
problems. Some officers stated that too much 
information is presented on the screens. Not all 
information is necessary, but particularly crucial 
information appears vague at times because of 
the underlying complexity. 
No traditional wheel exists to steer the vessel, 
and an engine telegraph is no longer used to 
regulate the speed. Most of the traditional con-
trols have been replaced by joystick, trackball, 
button, mouse, keyboard, and touch-screen 
controls. Given an emergency situation, inter-
vention with the system becomes less straight-
forward and less intuitive.
Most systems on the bridge are redundant, 
including all of the displays. However, the sys-
tems do not always show the most valid informa-
tion. The operators have learned which systems 
are flawed and simply ignore them. For example, 
the conning systems on both vessels occasionally 
show faulty information.
With respect to the workability of the equip-
ment and software, one of the engineers recalled 
the problems that surfaced just after the vessel 
was launched. Many systems were not 100% 
ready for use, and crewmembers had to contend 
Figure 2. The “normal” position for operating  
the OSV when steaming, arm reaching back to push 
the buttons.
Figure 3. Engine console designed without any  
leg space. Note the rack above that is full of manuals.
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with sixteen pages of warnings and alarm 
notifications. However, the situation was much 
different on the other vessel, where the systems 
were ready from the start, to the high satisfaction 
of the engineers.
Problems that were encountered on both 
OSVs include the following:
r #SJHIUMJHIUTPOUIFCSJEHFUIBUDBOOPUCF
dimmed, thus disturbing visibility at night, as 
addressed by Lutzhoft (2005).
r "MBSHFOVNCFSPGBMBSNTPOUIFCSJEHF
Certain audio alarms are considered to be 
annoying by the officers, and a subset of the 
warnings is considered irrelevant.
r 0WFSBCVOEBOUDPNNVOJDBUJPOTPOUIFCSJEHF
Such a large number of communication 
channels must be monitored, and the crew can 
be overwhelmed with calls at times.
r &SHPOPNJD*TTVFT1MBDFNFOUPGTXJUDIFTPS
other controls are not in line with ergonomic 
principles. At times, the crew must bend 
over or reach backward to operate certain 
functions (Figure 2). One engine console was 
designed with no leg space for the operator 
(Figure 3). This issue was criticized in 
Grundevik et al. (2009).
r -JNJUFEJOUFSOFUCBOEXJEUI"MNPTU
everybody onboard brings computer 
notebooks and smart phones and/or tablets 
for personal use during spare time. Most of 
the time, these devices are connected to the 
Internet. During the survey period, both 
vessels experienced problems with Internet 
bandwidth, and subsequently initiated a “no 
YouTube and no video streaming” policy. 
The same Internet connection is used as one 
of the primary communication lines in the 
vessel operation.
The most critical incident on each OSV has been 
identified as:
r Dynamic positioning (DP) incident on OSV A
 An officer shared his experience when the DP 
system failed without any warning. OSV A 
was lying beside an installation on DP. Instead 
of holding steady on the specified spot, the 
vessel began to move toward the installation. 
The officer took over the controls, shut down 
the DP system, and backed the ship away from 
the structure. One hose was still connected to 
the installation and snapped off. The system 
ascertained that the vessel was more than 
100 m away from the installation, while in 
reality it was approximately 20 m away. The 
manufacturer explained to the crew that the 
probability of this particular incident occurring 
is even smaller than that of winning the lottery. 
However, during further investigation as a 
part this study, the manufacturer stated: “…
this has happened only once on the entire 
DP X equipped fleet. We have found the root 
cause for this, and implemented a solution 
for it. This failure will not happen again.” This 
statement indicates that the manufacturer was 
not aware that this problem existed when the 
system was delivered. An accident with a high 
hazard potential may have occurred if a human 
operator had not reacted to the problem to 
prevent an incident.
r Blackout on OSV B
 A critical situation that OSV B experienced was 
a blackout. This incident occurred when the 
vessel was preparing to maneuver away from an 
installation. To cruise to the next installation, 
the bridge asked for a sudden increase of power 
that the system was unable to accommodate. 
At the time, the system was running on LNG 
fuel and attempted to automatically switch 
over to diesel, but the switchover failed. 
Apparently, LNG fuel has a characteristic of 
which the operator had not been made aware: 
it is less responsive to variations in the power 
requirements. In this case, it is suspected that 
both the designer and the manufacturer of the 
system had not considered this characteristic of 
LNG fuel. If they had been aware of this, they 
failed to inform users. However, the OSV B is 
equipped with a DYNPOS-AUTRO system, 
also known as the DP3 system, which only 
allows a blackout to take place for a short time 
(seconds) before the system returns to normal.
Other problems found on each OSV:
r 0O047"SFMFBTJOHUIF%1TZTUFNGSPN
automatic mode to manual mode requires a 
specific response time. Without full control, 
this delay can be critical when the vessel is 
located close to the installation. Normally, 
the operator will use the joystick to bring 
the vessel away from the installation before 
switching to full manual mode. On OSV B, 
this does not occur because the transition 
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occurs instantaneously. One expert from a 
classification society stated that the transfer 
of control between modes of operation 
should be immediate. A delay of 10 seconds 
is not acceptable for this class. The fact 
that the vessel is approved to operate and 
carry the associated class notation causes 
confusion. However, this expert admits 
that there are many factors that may 
influence the need to transfer control among 
different modes of operation, including 
the design of bridge workstations, the 
functions of different systems, the layout of 
different operator interfaces, the responses 
of mechanical systems, and operator 
procedures and training. It is likely that the 
issue was not recognized before the system 
became operational.
r 0O047#DFSUBJOCVĨPOTPOUIFCSJEHF
are difficult to press, leaving the operators 
confused at times as to whether he or she has 
already activated (or deactivated) the system. 
However, according to the designers, the 
defect has been noted, and the system has 
been improved for the next line of vessels. 
Procedures
Abundant procedures, checklists, and forms must 
be filled out during OSV operations. Some of 
these items are recognized as necessary, but oth-
ers are found to be irritating. A small focus dis-
cussion was conducted to examine the issue. One 
of the main questions asked was: “Which pro-
cedures should be eliminated?” Certain people 
realized the importance of the procedures, but 
others expressed reluctance, especially when they 
are required to make the same entry repeatedly. 
A subset of the crew admitted that they do not 
always follow the procedures, but preferred “dif-
ferent ways” of completing the tasks. Finally, they 
agreed to not omit any of the procedures, forms, 
or checklists, but they also expected certain types 
of improvements, including better design of the 
forms and the checklists.
Physical Environment
The crews of both OSVs identified environmen-
tal conditions as one of the most difficult situa-
tions to which they must acclimate. When the 
mean wind speed is above 35 knots, and/or sig-
nificant wave heights are above 4 m, operations 
are ceased (NWEA, 2009). The vessel is asked to 
move away from the installation and to wait until 
the environmental situation improves. However, 
waiting on a vessel for hours in high seas is an 
unpleasant experience, and sailing the high seas 
is even worse. If notably bad weather occurs, 
usually in the winter months, the vessels will be 
called into the base. 
In certain locations of the vessel, noise is iden-
tified as a problem. On OSV B, the area used as 
the muster station in the deck and the workshop, 
often used as the dirty mess, are noisy due to the 
close proximity of the ER air intake. 
Thus far, there have been no complaints 
associated with high/low temperature, lighting, 
and ventilation.
The ECRs on both OSVs are located on the 
main deck. This location is favorable to the human 
operators because they are spared from electro-
magnetic fields, high noise levels, vibrations, and 
the probability of CO2 exposure. Additionally, 
they can breathe fresh air and can see the horizon.
The ECR on OSV A is too small for adequate 
mobility. There is no space to open technical 
drawings, and the electrician, who must work 
shoulder-to-shoulder with the engineers, is 
located in a separate workplace three levels 
higher. The ECR on OSV B is rather spacious, 
and even contains a seating area for drinking cof-
fee. A small room is available for the electrician to 
work inside the ECR.
Several layout and arrangement issues 
related to onboard workability were identified 
on both vessels:
r 0O047"UIFQSFWJPVTMZEFTJHOFEiMJOFO
room” was converted to a server room.
r 0O047#UIFSFJTOPEJSUZNFTTXIFSFUIF
deckhands can spend time while waiting for 
operations at sea, and they use the workshop 
instead. The workshop is a narrow room 
without proper seating, located 10 m away 
from the cargo deck and it is not well oriented 
to the deck. 
r 0OCPUI047TUIFSFJTBTQFDJBMSPPNLOPXO
as the “ship’s office” that is almost never in use. 
In contrast, there is no particular place for the 
entire crew to hold a meeting.
Accessibility
Based on the observations made in this study, 
it seems that in both of the OSV designs in this 
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study, personnel accessibility is still problematic. 
OSV A contains an entry hatchet that requires 
people to duck under it to pass or risk a head 
injury (Figure 4). OSV B contains a long and 
high ladder (Figure 5) that must be carefully 
climbed before entering a narrow and winding 
gangway. A set of ladders is installed in one of the 
engine rooms without a safety cage (fortunately, 
it is rarely in use). Just before we conducted our 
survey on OSV B, a vertical ladder (such as the 
one shown in Figure 6) was modified into stairs 
in response to the crew’s request. 
In the ERs on both OSV A and B, there are 
locations where personnel are required duck 
and climb. However, no such acrobatic activity 
is required by the crew on either OSV during 
normal operation, as mentioned by Andersson 
and Lutzhoft (2007). There are no cited cases of 
incorrect height, poor orientation of equipment, 
or inaccessibility to valves, hand wheels, and 
hand pumps, as reported in Dalpiaz et al. (2005).
The OSVs adhere to proper standards for most 
safety equipment and facilities, as well as for fire 
fighting, damage control, lifesaving, and security 
facilities. One issue was noted regarding the 
location of the fire fighting equipment storage. 
The room directly faces the main deck with no 
alternative access. In the case of a fire on deck, it 
Figure 4. Short entry hatchet; one deckhand hit his 
head when passing under it.
Figure 5. Long and high ladders; the steps are not 
ﬂat but curvy to anticipate changes in the ladder 
angle due to draft variations; the handrails are made 
of steel wire and are not rigid.
Figure 6. Vertical ladders. Note the hand wheel on 
top that must be operated to get through when one 
is near the top.
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would be difficult for the fire squad to enter this 
storage area and equip themselves expediently. 
The accessibility of the paint and chemical store-
room was also noted as an issue, which is located 
adjacent to the crew’s cabin.
Maintainability
Methods of onboard maintenance have changed 
drastically in the last decade. Restarting, testing, 
and updating systems, software, and data has 
become a routine onboard procedure. The opera-
tors follow the maintenance program generated 
by the system. Obviously, the system is not 100% 
accurate. According to the engineers, certain 
corrections and adjustments must be made. For 
instance, the standard running hours required for 
some maintenance activities must be manually 
altered. False alarms or warnings sometimes 
occur as the result of a broken sensor. 
Lack of storage for supplies, tools, and provi-
sions is a common complaint. It was noted that 
OSV B is significantly more spacious than A, 
but both crews complained at approximately the 
same level of lack of storage. When this study 
took place, the crews on OSV B were in the 
process of constructing a new storage space using 
select corners of the vessel.
Limited space for conducting maintenance 
is another issue. Climbing and crawling are 
actions common in maintenance. Those with 
experience on other larger vessels understand 
the constraints on OSVs; their typical size sim-
ply limits the available space.
Most systems on the both OSVs are more com-
plex than those of the older ones. The engineers 
are able to perform only limited troubleshooting. 
Should problems remain, supplier technical sup-
port is required, often onboard. An azipull propel-
ler demonstrated a problem when it failed to point 
in the right direction. The engineers attempted to 
repair it by restarting and reconfiguring the system 
and following the instructions in the manual, but 
the problem was not solved. They had to call for 
support from the manufacturer, who subsequently 
came onboard with a computerized unit to make 
the necessary adjustments.
One incident related to the application of a 
new maintenance system was related to testing an 
ozone treatment used to clean the water system. 
The results were rather satisfactory in cleaning 
the pipes, valves, strainers, and tanks, and in 
reducing the requirement for maintenance. Several 
deckhands were working on the deck when a full 
tank of ozone was filled with water. The ozone gas 
was pushed upward, was forced out through a vent 
pipe, and was inhaled by the deckhands, leaving 
them choked for air and experiencing respiratory 
problems for almost an hour.
Discussion
 Much progress has been accomplished using the 
lessons learned from previous incidents (Table 3). 
Compared with the problems previously raised by 
other researchers, this research indicates that there 
have been significant improvements (Table 4). 
Therefore, most of the issues addressed by Meister 
(1971), Reason (1990), Graveson (2002) and 
Squire (2007) have been rectified. Human factors 
has been sufficiently considered in recent design 
of OSVs, so the topic is being taken seriously. The 
results are not perfect yet, but the learning process 
is noticeable. Excellent standards of accommoda-
tion facilities, bridge facilities, deck facilities, and 
engine rooms are provided onboard. Most systems 
were designed so that the crew can operate the 
vessel more safely and more effectively. However, 
minor flaws still remain (e.g., illumination prob-
lems on the bridge, ergonomics of the worksta-
tions as well as certain layout issues, including 
access and a lack of storage) that could be fixed 
with minimal effort.
Noise, vibration, motion, and slamming were 
recognized as a more important issue onboard. 
Tunnel thrusters were identified as one major 
source of noise. On OSVs, tunnel thrusters are 
frequently activated, and running on DP is their 
main activity. A solution via silent type tunnel 
thrusters is available on the market, and is highly 
recommended for those vessels in which cabins 
are located close to the thrusters. 
Locating the superstructure at the aft pro-
vides several benefits from the operators’ per-
spective: they are safe from slamming, and they 
experience lower motion amplitude and thus 
additional comfort. In terms of controllability, 
they require only one control unit to oper-
ate the vessel, which reduces the potential for 
confusion. Regular OSVs are equipped with two 
control units, one facing forward and the other 
facing astern. However, there are several disad-
vantages to locating the superstructure at the 
aft: the vessel is less flexible while positioning 
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Previous studies  
and publications Claims and evaluation Status and comments based on OSV surveys
Meister (1971) Design engineer does not consider human factors in his design.
Human-related factors have been sufficiently addressed. 
The learning process is taking place. 
Reason (1990)
Poor design, incorrect installa-
tion, faulty maintenance, and bad 
management decisions.
Good vessel design, no incorrect installation, no faulty 
maintenance identiﬁed, supportive management  
decisions for human factors.
Calhoun and Stevens 
(2003)
Systems and equipment failures 
as common factor for accidents in 
many industries. 
Systems and equipment are not 
well designed to meet human 
physical or cognitive capabilities.
Systems and equipment failures are still identiﬁed as a po-
tential cause for accidents; DP system failure and blackout 
are examples found in this study.
Most systems and equipment are designed to meet 
human capabilities. Certain ergonomics problems and 
problems of too much information are still found, but  
are not disturbing.
Squire (2007) Ship was designed without input from the crew.
Officers from both OSVs were involved in the process  
of designing and constructing the vessels.
Strong (2000)
Adequate levels of privacy  
are expected.
Fulﬁlled—all crewmembers are assigned their  
own cabins.
Facilities for social relaxation  
are expected.
Fulﬁlled—plenty of facilities are available onboard: satellite 
TV, video games, DVD movies, stereo sets, gym, etc.
Hardwick (2000)
Drive toward cabin-based  
accommodations is suggested.
Fulﬁlled on OSV B and partly fulﬁlled on OSV A; there are 
certain cabins on OSV A in which beds lie transversal to 
the ship’s length.
Increased space for sleeping & 
personal stowage is expected.
Fulﬁlled—all crewmembers get their own cabins  
and lockers.
Improved ambient conditions are 
expected.
Fulﬁlled—the vessels are equipped with sufficient  
air-conditioning systems and built with comfort  
class notation.
Lutzhoft (2005)
Illumination problems on  
the bridge.
Illumination problems are still found on both OSVs,  
but there are only one or two displays on each OSV  
that cannot be dimmed properly.
Equipment not attached properly; 
operator mush use duct tape.
No equipment found not attached properly on  
both OSVs. No sign of duct tape used.
Grundevik et al. (2009)
Insufficient leg space. One console on one OSV built without sufficient  leg space, but the console is rarely used.
Bad position of the consoles.
No console is found in such a bad position that it is hard 
to operate. However, the autopilot buttons are located 
somewhat behind the operators so they must reach 
backward to operate them. Certain keyboards are located 
far enough away that the operator must bend over to 
reach them.
Visibility problems. No visibility problems found on either OSV.
Defective hardware components. No defective hardware components found on both OSVs. However, broken sensors are quite often found. 
Software bugs.
Defective software.
Problems related to software are still found in this study. 
Revisions, corrections, and improvements are in progress.
Dalpiaz et al. (2005)
Incorrect height/orientation. No equipment found with incorrect height/orientation.
Stairs, ladders, steps,  
and walkways.
Problems with stairs and ladders are still found on  
both OSVs.
Inaccessibility to valves,  
hand wheels, and hand pumps.
No valves, hand wheels, or hand pumps found that  
cannot be accessed.
Incorrect control panel, console 
design, control, and display design.
No incorrect control panels, console designs, or display 
designs found, but there are buttons that are hard to press.
Problems with access and  
personnel movement.
Access of personnel from the pier onto the vessel  
is still problematic on both OSVs.
table 4. Status and comparison between current surveys and issues raised in previous studies.
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alongside the installation, and the deck is more 
complicated. This design of OSV B is perceived 
as rather odd for the market. 
Certain improvements and innovations that 
occurred on these vessels were stimulated and 
sponsored by the client (i.e., the oil and gas com-
panies), which in turn are driven by tax incen-
tives and other governmental policies. It can be 
observed that if profit is not the only goal, and if 
competition is not the principal motivation, then 
opportunities exist to develop additional aspects 
of the vessels in addition to those that maximize 
productivity and minimize cost. Human factors 
engineering is not a suitable arena for competi-
tion. Issues exist that must be agreed upon in the 
development of human-related technology to 
avoid those characteristics in the final product 
that might create confusion or frustration for  
the operators. 
There is another intangible consideration that 
was identified to significantly encourage improve-
ments on the OSVs, particularly for human factors 
concerns, and that is the egalitarian culture of a 
society that induces effective communications 
between the seafarers and the ship owners. The 
willingness of the ship owners and the designers 
to listen to the seafarers’ opinions and assessments 
and to involve them in the design process are valu-
able not only to improve the quality of the vessel, 
but also to increase the sense of belonging and 
familiarity of the seafarers with their vessel.
Based on this study, two keywords are high-
lighted: novelty and abundance. 
Novelty
New technologies and new systems are important 
issues that must be regarded cautiously, because 
unknown uncertainties are implicitly contained in 
a novel system that may eventually be discovered. 
The autopilot-related accidents mentioned in 
Table 1 serve as hard evidence of this fact. In this 
research, we found that an LNG characteristic in a 
dual fuel system has a potential to cause blackouts. 
Imperfect development of the DP system led to 
a dangerous situation in which the vessel almost 
collided with an installation. The application of the 
new ozone water treatment system with unrecog-
nized potential side effects is among those hazards 
that could not be avoided.
Technology development currently occurs 
at a rapid pace, much faster than the pace of the 
traditional shipbuilding industry, and too fast for 
the average operator to cope with. Therefore, it is 
important to differentiate between “what can be 
done” and “what should be done”. 
Abundance
An abundance of alarms, procedures, checklists, 
information, and communications must be dealt 
with onboard. Reasonable modifiers following 
abundance are naturally those of organization 
and optimization. It is important to select the 
alarms, procedures, checklists, information, or 
communications that are necessary, and those 
that are irrelevant, and to prioritize the arrange-
ment of the system accordingly. An SOS signal 
sent from a vessel sailing in the Caribbean Sea 
thousands of miles away is meaningless, and 
could even be disturbing to those working on the 
Norwegian Continental Shelf.
Conclusions
Exploratory surveys on OSVs have been con-
ducted to investigate human factors application 
in marine system design. A qualitative research 
methodology was applied. Two up-to-date OSVs 
were selected as the research samples. It can be 
concluded that human factors has been well 
considered in the design of OSVs. Considerable 
improvements have been made compared with 
the previously reported incidents and with those 
noted in past publications, and continuing devel-
opment is also noted. The scope of human factors 
application is quite broad, and not all of its dimen-
sions are considered equally. Based on observa-
tions made in this study, it can be concluded that 
habitability has been considered appropriately, but 
there are still issues in maintainability that require 
improvement. However, the overall conditions are 
above the acceptable limit. A significant difference 
in the human factors evaluation was found on two 
different OSVs. The vessel with the superstructure 
located at the aft has the benefit of better comfort, 
while locating the superstructure at the fore gives 
additional flexibility in serving the installations. 
Novel problems due to the application of new 
technologies and systems were recognized, includ-
ing a blackout caused by a dual fuel system, and an 
imperfect dynamic positioning system that led to 
vessel-platform contact. Many problems were also 
reported with respect to numerous alarms, com-
munications, checklists, and procedures. The risk 
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of a ship/platform collision during cargo transfer 
still exists, but the risk when the vessel approaches 
installation has been minimized.
Selected practical recommendations are  
summarized as follows:
r "IVNBOGBDUPSTFWBMVBUJPOPGBOFX
design before commencing construction is 
highly recommended. User feedback and 
user involvement is one alternative to the 
evaluation, and consultation with a human 
factors expert is another alternative.
r 4UFQCZTUFQJNQSPWFNFOUBOEBMPOHFS
development time allow the users to absorb 
and adapt to new design. A radical change of 
design that can alter the way in which people 
operate the vessel is not recommended.
r $PMMBCPSBUJPOCFUXFFOEJĎFSFOUHSPVQTPG
designers and manufacturers for agreement 
on certain basic principles in human-related 
development in ship design is recommended.
r "DPNQSFIFOTJWFQSPPGUFTUPOFBDIDSJUJDBM
system is highly recommended, in addition to 
those validations that are required by authorities.
r 5PSFEVDFOPJTFEJTUVSCBODFTFYQFSJFODFE
by the crew, the super silent type of tunnel 
thrusters should be used on vessels that have 
accommodations located close to the thrusters.
r ĉFBNPVOUPGBMBSNTDPNNVOJDBUJPOT
checklists, and procedures should be limited; 
screening should identify only the relevant 
ones, which can be subsequently prioritized 
and optimized. Further research for evaluating 
the existing conditions is advised.
r 5PSFEVDFUIFSJTLTPGDPMMJTJPOBOEDPOUBDU
between the ship and platform, minimization 
of the time spent operating alongside 
installations is advised.
Appendix
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HUMAN FACTORS ON OFFSHORE SUPPLY VESSELS IN THE NORWEGIAN SEA –  
AN EXPLANATORY SURVEY 
(DOI No: 10.3940/rina.ijme.20XX.a?.???) 
 
V Rumawas, Norwegian University of Science and Technology, Trondheim, Norway 
BE Asbjørnslett, Norwegian University of Science and Technology, Trondheim, Norway 
 
SUMMARY 
 
A survey of human factors on two state-of-the-art offshore supply vessels (OSVs) operating in the Norwegian Sea was 
performed by means of questionnaires. The purpose of the study was to examine whether human factors had been 
adequately addressed in ship design, how they were regarded by the crews, and whether design decisions were believed 
to have an effect on incidents on-board. The concept of human factors in ship design was operationalised into eight 
dimensions: habitability, workability, controllability, maintainability, manoeuvrability, survivability, occupational health 
and safety (OHS), and system safety. Inferential statistics were applied in order to draw conclusions, including means 
comparisons and multivariate regression analyses. The results show that human factors were given significant 
importance in the ship design. The level of accomplishment of human factors differs from one dimension to another. The 
highest satisfactory dimension was OHS and maintainability was the lowest, but still considered adequate. Design is 
revealed to have an impact on human factor ratings. Further, OSV design and human factor ratings are identified as 
having effects on particular incidents on board. 
 
 
NOMENCLATURE 
ABS American Bureau of Shipping 
ANOVA Analysis of variance 
COG Centre of gravity 
Contr Controllability 
DNV  Det Norske Veritas 
df degrees of freedom 
ECR Engine control room 
ER Engine room 
F Fischer test 
Hab Habitability 
H Hypothesis 
HF Human factors 
HFES Human Factors and Ergonomics Society 
IEA International Ergonomics Association 
IMO International Maritime Organization 
LNG Liquefied natural gas 
LR Lloyd’s Register 
Maint Maintainability 
N number of sample 
OHS Occupational health and safety 
OSV Offshore supply vessel 
p significance level 
RINA Royal Institution of Naval Architects 
sig significance 
SPSS Statistical Package for the Social Sciences 
Work Workability 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
This paper reports on part of a study investigating the 
application of human factors in ship design. The research 
was instigated from the notion that most accidents at sea 
are caused by human errors or human-related factors [1-
4]. Experts claim that some errors were inherited from 
the design stage [5-8]. Human factors are also often 
overlooked in the design of marine systems [9, 10].  
 
A comprehensive literature survey was conducted to 
reveal standards and documents involving human factors 
in ship design [11, 12]. The results included extensive 
references to human factors in ships design. The term 
“human factors” in ship design is quite a broad term and 
can be divided into several different aspects, such as 
safety, habitability, controllability and maintainability1. 
The survey also revealed that coverage varied across 
different aspects of human factors where safety-related 
element was addressed the most often, followed by 
habitability and controllability, with maintainability the 
least reported. A follow up field survey using a 
qualitative approach was performed to examine the 
implementation of human factors principles in the 
industry by through the study of two offshore supply 
vessels (OSV) [13, 14]. The survey aimed to compare the 
existing knowledge of human factors on paper, with the 
reality. Prior to the survey, a number of reports regarding 
ship design flaws and incidents on offshore vessels were 
documented, which included poor layout, some 
ergonomics-related issues, poor automation and 
inadequate procedures. The reports were used as a 
reference to check whether lessons had been learned. The 
results showed that the designs of the existing OSVs 
addressed human factors to a significant degree.. Many 
human factors issues were considered,, but not all issues 
addressed to the same level; some were very satisfactory 
addressed and some were not. 
 
This paper reports a quantitative survey that was 
conducted as a continuation of the study of human 
factors in two OSVs. The objective was to verify the 
preliminary findings [11-14] by asking users to fill in a 
custom-made questionnaire. The aim of the research was 
to refine the qualitative findings about how human 
                                                 
1 A detailed description of each term is presented in 
Section 2. 
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factors are implemented, and to assess the role of human 
factors on design and operation and the degree to which a 
lack of focus on human factors may lead to incidents. 
The previous study indicated that the crews were in 
general pleased with the habitability and workability but 
less satisfied with the maintainability [13, 14]. 
Survivability, OHS and system safety were considered 
the most satisfactory of the other aspects of human 
factors in ship design, as also revealed in the literature 
survey [11, 12]. This study also aims to provide 
quantitative evidence regarding the “existence” of human 
factors, which is still hard for some people, especially 
engineers to grasp. 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
The definition of human factors or ergonomics is briefly 
covered in this section. Lloyd’s Register (LR) provides a 
definition: [15] 
 
‘Ergonomics is the study and design of working 
environments for the benefit of the workers’ 
safety, efficiency, effectiveness, health and 
comfort. Working environments include ship 
bridges, machinery control rooms and galleys, 
and their components, work practices and work 
procedures.’ 
 
The International Maritime Organisation (IMO) defines 
ergonomics as follows: [16] 
 
‘…the study and design of working 
environments (e.g., workstation, cockpit, ship 
bridges) and their components, work practices, 
and work procedures for the benefit of the 
worker’s productivity, health, comfort, and 
safety. Application of the human factor in the 
analysis and design of equipment, work and 
working environment’.  
 
Human factors considerations in ship design can be 
categorised into eight dimensions as follows [15, 17]: 
 
 Habitability: the provision of adequate and 
comfortable accommodation 
 Workability: condition of  users, equipment, 
software, materials, procedures and  
environments that are appropriate for work 
 Controllability: the design of the navigation 
bridge, engine control room, cargo control 
room, etc. in a manner that integrates  people 
with equipment, systems and interfaces 
 Maintainability: the design of  systems in a way 
that allows maintenance tasks to be performed 
rapidly, safely and effectively  
 Manoeuvrability: the capability of the ship to 
manoeuvre according to operating requirements 
in terms of speed and course parameters  
 Survivability: the provision of adequate 
firefighting, damage control and lifesaving 
facilities 
 Occupational health and safety (OHS): 
appropriate consideration of the effect of work, 
the working environment and living conditions 
on the health, safety and wellbeing of workers 
 System safety: appropriate consideration of the 
risks related to the human operation of ship 
systems 
 
Table 1 shows in greater detail the elements of human 
factors in ship design based on the exploration of 
different sources [15, 17-21]. 
 
3. RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
The logic of the research model is presented in Figure 1 
where three variables are defined: (1) OSV design, (2) 
human factors rating and (3) incidents. Two different 
rating methods are developed for validity purposes: 
direct evaluation and a Likert-scale. A distinction is 
made between personnel incidents and vessel incidents. 
Figure 1 Research design and defined hypotheses 
 
Figure 2 Offshore supply vessels [14] 
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Table 1 Human factors considerations 
  Habitability   Maintainability   Survivability 
    Accommodation     Accessibility     Firefighting 
    Washing     Tools provision & location     Damage control 
    Bathroom     On board expertise     Lifesaving & security facilities 
    Toilet     Disposal of parts & equipment     Security arrangements 
    Galleys     Through-life support     Ship layout 
    Messroom     Location of heavy spare-parts     Equipment fit 
    Exercise area     Maintenance tasks     Manpower availability 
    Recreation & personal study facilities     Manuals     Emergency response system & procedure 
    Personal storage     Diagnostics   Occupational Health and Safety 
  Workability     Schematics     Effect of work 
    Users     Bench space     Working environment 
    Equipment & software     Noise protected communications     Living conditions 
    Materials     Policy for on board spares     OHS policy 
    Procedures     Storage of spare parts and supplies     Safe working practices 
    Physical environment     Handling of heavy parts     Development of safety culture 
    Social environment   Manoeuvrability     Permit to work 
    Accessibility     Propulsion systems     Health awareness 
    Information, handbooks     Steering system     Medical screening 
    Communications     Thrusters     Medical support 
    Signage     Potential weather conditions     Balanced diet 
    Protective equipment     Communications     Drug and alcohol policy 
  Controllability     Min & max manoeuvring speed     Provision, maintenance, access & use of PPE 
    Ship control centres     Critical system redundancy   System Safety 
    Machinery control rooms     Through-life costs     Hazard identification 
    Cargo control rooms     Protection of the environment     Potential for human error 
    Equipment     Fuel economy     Risk analysis 
    Systems     Management of risks 
    Interfaces     Operating instructions & procedures 
    Communication facilities     Communication/working language 
    Control & switches     Business imperative 
    Displays     Training & familiarisation 
    Alarms     Potential for environmental damage & pollution
    Video-display units     Recording, reporting & feedback procedures 
    Computer workstations 
 
Two advanced OSVs of different design were chosen for 
the survey as objects for study. OSV A follows the 
traditional design of most OSVs, with the superstructure 
at the fore end (see Figure 2). OSV B is of an alternative 
design with the superstructure at the aft. 
 
Several research questions and their corresponding 
hypotheses are proposed in this study. 
 
The first main research question asks: “Are human 
factors addressed in the design of marine systems?” To 
answer the question the following hypotheses are 
specified and will be tested by statistical analysis:  
 
H1   : Human factors are addressed in the design of 
marine systems. 
H2i  : Habitability is addressed in the design of marine 
systems. 
H2ii  :  Workability is addressed in the design of marine 
systems. 
 
The second research question: “How are human factors 
applied in the design of marine systems?” is more 
complicate. As mentioned above, safety has been 
implemented at the highest level. Habitability and 
workability on OSVs have been addressed satisfactory 
for the crew members. Maintainability seems to be the 
least satisfactory issue. The crews on OSV B seemed to 
be more satisfied with the habitability and the 
workability of their vessel compared to those on OSV A. 
 
Several hypotheses are specified to test the second 
research question: 
 
H3    : The human factors dimensions are not rated 
equally in the design of marine systems. 
H3i    : Survivability, OHS and system safety are rated 
more highly compared to the other human 
factors dimensions. 
H3ii   : Maintainability is rated lower compared to the 
other human factors dimensions. 
H4    : There is a difference in human factors rating as 
the result of OSV design. 
H4i   : There is a difference in habitability rating as the 
result of OSV design. 
H4ii   : There is a difference in workability rating as the 
result of OSV design. 
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The third research question: “Is there any significant 
effect of human factors rating to incidents on board” is 
assessed by the following hypotheses: 
 
H5    : There is a difference in personnel incidents as a 
result of OSV design 
H5i    : There is a difference in seasickness incident as a 
result of OSV design 
H5ii   : There is a difference in the fatigue level of 
personnel as a result of OSV design 
H5iii  : There is a difference in sleep disturbance 
incident as a result of OSV design 
H6    : There is a difference in vessel incidents as the 
result of OSV design 
H6i : There is a difference in water on deck incidents 
as a result of OSV design 
H6ii : There is a difference in moving cargo on deck 
incidents as a result of OSV design 
H7   : Human factors rating has a positive effect on 
reducing personnel related incidents  
H8   : Human factors rating has a positive effect on 
reducing vessel related incidents 
 
4. METHODOLOGY 
 
Questionnaires were used as a tool of measurement to 
answer the questions raised above and to test the 
hypotheses proposed. 
  
4.1. QUESTIONNAIRES ABOUT HUMAN 
FACTORS ON SHIPS 
 
A set of questionnaires was developed based on the 
framework outlined in Table 1. Typical issues in OSV 
design and operation were also customised to 
complement the object of the study. Examples of these 
issues are motion, slamming, dynamic positioning, 
automation, reliability, procedures, and deck cargo and 
bulk cargo facilities. The initial questionnaire consisted 
of 112 items, divided into four sections. The first part, 
Section A contained 26 questions about how human 
factors in general, and human factors dimensions, were 
rated by the crews. The respondents were, for instance 
asked the following question: “How would you rate the 
following characteristics of the vessel?” Five alternatives 
were available from very poor to very good with scores 
from one to five. An option for “no answer” was also 
provided for people who found the question irrelevant or 
hard to answer. For example, a cook would probably not 
have an opinion regarding manoeuvrability. The second 
part, Section B contained eight items involving the 
symptoms and personal related incidents that had been 
experienced by the crew. The third part, Section C 
contained eight items involving vessel related incidents. 
In both Section B and C the respondents were asked to 
give their assessment of the frequency of each incident, 
ranging from very often to never. The “no answer” 
option was also available. The last part, Section D was a 
supplementary list of human factors questions regarding 
the vessel. There were 70 items where the respondents 
were asked their opinions about a statement and offered a 
5-point Likert-scale: from strongly disagree to strongly 
agree with a midpoint of being neutral. Table 2 shows a 
selection of items in the questionnaire. Before 
distributing the questionnaire on board, it was checked 
by a number of experts in ship design, marine engineers, 
ship officers, ship operators and terminal operators. 
 
4.2.  PILOT TEST 
 
A pilot test was conducted in February 2011 with twelve 
respondents on OSV B. Reliability analyses were 
performed to ensure the internal consistency of the 
measurements in Section A and Section D, with alpha (α) 
Cronbach coefficients calculated using SPSS software 
version 14.1 for Windows. Five items from Section D 
were eliminated for showing poor validity. The final 
results showed high reliability indices:  0.949 for the 26-
items of direct measurement on Section A and 0.955 for 
the remaining 65-item Likert-scale in Section D. 
Reliability analyses were also conducted on each 
dimension of the Likert-scale questionnaires. Table 3 
presents the detailed results, calculated based upon 42 
respondents including respondents from the pilot test and 
the target respondents from OSV A and OSV B. 
 
4.3.  SAMPLE AND POPULATION 
 
The population of the study was that of offshore supply 
vessels operating in the Norwegian Sea. Three OSVs 
with long-term contracts served the offshore installations 
on a regular basis. Two of them were used as samples in 
the study. Long-term contracts mean that the vessel has 
fixed revenues all year long irrespective of the number of 
trips they make or the amount of cargo they carry. Each 
OSV had a crew of thirteen to eighteen persons, 
including a captain, a first officer, a chief engineer, a 
cook, two deck officers, one electrician, two engineers 
and four deckhands. A crew worked four weeks on board 
and had four weeks off. Sometimes trainees and students 
were on board. It was not uncommon that visitors were 
on board. The whole crew worked in shifts, for 
approximately twelve hours a day (1-in-2). There were 
two different watch systems adopted; the traditional 6-
on/6-off/6-on/6-off system on OSV A and the 8-on/4-
off/4-on/8-off system on OSV B. 
  
Questionnaires were distributed on board in person, in 
July 2011. We explained the background of the study to 
the crew, ensured the confidentiality of their responses 
and encouraged them to participate in the survey. It is 
important that the respondents answer the questions as it 
is, according to their opinion and their experience, not 
according to what they think it should be. Sixteen out of 
seventeen crewmembers on OSV A and fourteen out of 
eighteen on OSV B answered the questionnaires. These 
did not include the same people who filled in the 
questionnaires in the pilot test. The survey was 
completely anonymous. No demographic information 
was collected about the respondents.  
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Table 2 Human factors in ship design questionnaire (sample items) 
 
 
Table 3 Results of Reliability Analyses of Human 
Factors in Ship Design Questionnaires (N = 42)*) 
Measurement No of Cronbach's 
  Dimension items Alpha 
Section A, direct questions 26 0.949 
Section B, personnel incidents 8 0.760 
Section C, vessel incidents 8 0.619 
Section D, Likert-scale 65 0.955 
  Habitability 13 0.907 
  Workability 11 0.746 
  Controllability 26 0.882 
  Maintainability 4 0.579 
Manoeuvrability 3 0.843 
*) N = N pilot study + N OSV A + N OSV B = 12 + 16 + 14 
 
5.  RESULTS AND STATISTICAL ANALYSIS 
 
Inferential statistics were used to draw conclusions from 
the hypotheses constructed. Due to the limited number of 
respondents, inferential statistics were performed with 
some caution. Parametric statistics were applied when 
assumptions were satisfied: normality, homogeneity of 
variances, linearity and independence. Should any of the 
assumptions be violated, robust estimates were utilised. 
For instance, the Brown-Forsythe test was used as an 
alternative in analysis of variance when the group 
variances were not homogeneous. A Bonferonni 
correction was applied as multiple tests were performed 
to one data set; the p value was corrected by dividing p 
value for one test by the number of tests performed (n): p 
< 0.5/n for accepting significant results. 
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5.1.  DATA EXPLORATION 
 
Note that there were many missing values in the answers. 
The people who worked on the bridge did not respond to 
the questions regarding the engine control room, and vice 
versa. Missing values were non-random; therefore they 
were left as they were. Tests of normality were 
conducted on Section A and Section D, and both were 
satisfied for each OSV. Detailed human factors 
dimensions data in Section D were also analysed. 
Habitability, workability, controllability, maintainability 
and OHS fulfilled the normal distribution requirement (p 
> .05).  
 
5.2.  HUMAN FACTORS RATINGS: 
MEANS COMPARISONS 
 
One-sample t-tests were applied to analyse H1 and H2n. In 
total, 42 respondents were included in this analysis. The 
test value was set at 3.0 which was the midpoint of the 
“neutral” response. The null hypothesis was defined as: x 
= 3.0. If the null hypothesis is accepted, it means that 
human factors are addressed indifferently. The results of 
analysis showed that the null hypotheses were rejected, 
meaning that the measurements were significantly 
different from, or in this case higher than 3.0 (see Figure 
3). It can therefore be concluded that habitability is 
significantly addressed in these two OSVs (t = 7.315, df 
= 41, p < .001) and so is workability (t = 7.082, df = 41, p 
< .001). The result also shows that human factors in 
general (overall) is significantly addressed in these two 
OSVs (t = 8.576, df = 41, p < .001) as rated by the crews. 
Detailed results are presented in Table 4 and Table 5.  
 
 
Figure 3 Human Factors Likert-Scale Evaluation Result: 
Mean plot with error bar for each dimension (N = 42) 
 
Analysis of variance and paired-samples t-tests were 
conducted to determine whether there were different 
levels of assessment among human factors dimensions 
(H3); habitability, workability, maintainability and OHS. 
A significant difference between groups can be seen in 
the results (F = 13.015, p < 0.001). OHS is the most 
highly rated aspect in the human factors dimensions (x = 
3.865). The level of OHS is significantly higher than 
workability (t = 5.535, p < 0.01) and maintainability (t = 
7.795, p < 0.01), but not habitability (t = 2.269, p = 
0.029). The results verify that maintainability (x = 3.179) 
is the lowest rated dimension of human factors on OSVs 
(p < 0.008). There is a significant difference between 
maintainability and habitability (t = -6.527, p = 0.000) 
and workability (t = -5.181, p = 0.000). Detailed results 
are presented in Table 6 and Table 7. 
 
Table 4 One-Sample Statistics of Human Factors Likert-
Scale  
  N Mean Std. Dev 
Std. Error  
Mean 
Habitability 42 3.682 0.604 0.093 
Workability 42 3.492 0.451 0.070 
Maintainability 42 3.179 0.550 0.085 
OHS 42 3.865 0.487 0.075 
Overall HF 42 3.549 0.415 0.064 
 
Table 5 One-Sample Test of Human Factors Liker-Scale 
(df = 41) 
  
Test Value = 3                              
t 
Sig.  
(2-
tailed) *)
Mean  
Difference 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
Hab 7.315 0.000 0.682 0.493 0.870 
Work 7.082 0.000 0.492 0.352 0.633 
Overall HF 8.576 0.000 0.549 0.420 0.678 
*) Bonferonni correction was applied; p < 0.05/3; 
p < 0.017 for significant results 
 
Table 6 ANOVA table for HF dimensions comparison: 
Habitability, Workability, Maintainability and OHS 
ANOVA 
  
Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean  
Square F Sig. 
Between Groups 10.810 3 3.603 13.015 0.000
Within Groups 45.402 164 0.277 
Total 56.212 167 
 
Table 7 Paired Samples Test (df = 41) 
Pair Mean Std Dev 
Std 
Error 
Mean 
t Sig.
 *) 
(2-tailed) 
1 OHS - Hab .184 .524 .081 2.269 .029 
2 OHS - Work .373 .437 .067 5.535 .000 
3 OHS - Maint .686 .570 .088 7.795 .000 
4 Maint - Hab -.502 .499 .077 -6.527 .000 
5 Maint - Work -.313 .392 .060 -5.181 .000 
*) Bonferonni correction was applied; p < 0.05/5; 
p < 0.01 for significant results 
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Hypothesis H3 can be confirmed; human factors 
dimensions are rated unequally in the design of marine 
systems. OHS have been most addressed (H3i) while 
maintainability is perceived as the least satisfactory (H3ii) 
by the crews.  
 
5.3.  THE EFFECT OF DESIGN ON  
HUMAN FACTORS RATINGS 
 
Analysis of variance was run to examine H4 and H4i. To 
ensure unbiased results, only data collected during 
summer 2011 was used in these analyses: one group from 
OSV A (NA = 16) and one group from OSV B (NB = 14), 
data from the pilot study was excluded. The results of the 
analyses show that OSV design has a tendency to 
influence the human factors rating on both OSVs (F = 
5.071, p = 0.032). The crews on OSV B gave a better 
assessment regarding human factors on board their 
vessel. The variation is not the same across all 
dimensions. The most prominent difference is 
habitability (F = 5.498, p = 0.026). The results also show 
that different OSV design provides different levels of 
workability (F = 6.086, p = 0.020). Figure 4 shows a 
summary of the measurement in bar graphs. Detailed 
results are presented in Table 8. Due to the Bonferonni-
correction, the p-level in these analyses was lowered to p 
< 0.017, and thus all these outcomes in testing H4 and H4i 
become inconclusive.  
 
5.4.  THE EFFECT OF DESIGN ON INCIDENTS 
ON BOARD 
 
Analysis of variance was applied in order to verify the 
effect of OSV design on incidents (H5 and H6). The 
results demonstrate that there is no significant variation 
in the overall average of personnel incidents (Figure 5), 
as reflected by the scores of Section B (F = 0.799, p = 
0.379), however, more detailed analysis show that there 
is a difference in seasickness incident (F = 3.339, p = 
0.079) and sleep disturbance incident (F = 2.991, p = 
0.096) as perceived by the crew on OSV A compared to 
the crews on OSV B. Due to Bonferonni-correction, the 
conclusion should be rejected. Detailed results are 
presented in Table 9.  
 
The homogeneity test of fatigue data showed that the 
variances on OSV A and B were not equal (p < 0.05), 
and so Welch and Brown-Forsythe tests were applied in 
addition to the analysis of variance and confirmed the 
difference (F = 5.091, p = 0.037). Again, the conclusion 
should be rejected due to the numerical correction.  
 
Results of the analysis demonstrate that there is no 
significant difference in the overall average of the 
vessels’ incidents (F = 0.558, p = 0.461) as presented in 
Figure 6. Detailed analyses also show more variations 
between the two OSVs. Significant differences are 
confirmed in the case of water on deck (F = 7.310, p = 
0.012) and moving cargo on deck (F = 7.039, p = 0.015). 
The results are presented in Table 10.  
 
Figure 4 Human factors assessment on two different 
OSV designs in the Norwegian Sea 
 
 
Figure 5 Mean frequencies of personal incidents 
perceived by the crew 
  
 
Figure 6 Mean frequencies of related incidents on 
vessels, as perceived by the crew of two OSVs 
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Table 8 Descriptive statistics and ANOVA table for human factors evaluation as a result of different OSV design 
Descriptives ANOVA 
   N Mean 
Standard  
Dev 
Standard 
Error 
Sum of 
Squares Df
Mean 
Square F Sig.*) 
Habitability 
OSV A 16 3.343 0.622 0.155 Between Groups 1.811 1 1.811   
OSV B 14 3.835 0.513 0.137 Within Groups 9.224 28 0.329 5.498 0.026 
Total 30 3.572 0.617 0.113 Total 11.035 29       
Workability 
OSV A 16 3.232 0.287 0.072 Between Groups 0.950 1 0.950   
OSV B 14 3.589 0.491 0.131 Within Groups 4.371 28 0.156 6.086 0.020 
Total 30 3.398 0.428 0.078 Total 5.321 29       
HF on OSV 
OSV A 16 3.323 0.339 0.085 Between Groups 0.723 1 0.723   
OSV B 14 3.634 0.418 0.112 Within Groups 3.992 28 0.143 5.071 0.032 
Total 30 3.468 0.403 0.074 Total 4.715 29       
 *) Bonferonni correction was applied; p < 0.05/3; p < 0.017 for significant results 
 
Table 9 Descriptives statistics and ANOVA table for personnel incidents 
Descriptives ANOVA 
   N Mean 
Standar 
Dev 
Standard 
Error 
Sum of 
Squares df
Mean  
Square F Sig. *) 
Seasick 
OSV A 15 3.933 0.884 0.228 Between Groups 1.776 1 1.776 
3.339 0.079 OSV B 14 4.429 0.514 0.137 Within Groups 14.362 27 0.532 
Total 29 4.172 0.759 0.141 Total 16.138 28   
Fatigue 
OSV A 15 2.900 0.471 0.121 Between Groups 3.265 1 3.265 
5.333 0.029 OSV B 14 3.571 1.016 0.272 Within Groups 16.529 27 0.612 
Total 29 3.224 0.841 0.156 Total 19.793 28   
Sleep disturbance 
OSV A 14 3.286 0.825 0.221 Between Groups 1.750 1 1.750 
2.991 0.096 OSV B 14 3.786 0.699 0.187 Within Groups 15.214 26 0.585 
Total 28 3.536 0.793 0.150 Total 16.964 27   
Personnel  
Incidents 
(Overall) 
OSV A 15 3.890 0.446 0.115 Between Groups 0.160 1 0.160 
0.799 0.379 OSV B 14 4.039 0.448 0.120 Within Groups 5.399 27 0.200 
Total 29 3.962 0.446 0.083 Total 5.559 28   
 *) Bonferonni correction was applied; p < 0.05/4; p < 0.013 for significant results 
 
Table 10 Descriptive statistics and ANOVA table for vessel incidents 
Descriptives ANOVA 
   N Mean Std Dev Std Error
Sum of 
Squares df
Mean 
Square F Sig. *) 
Water on deck 
 
OSV A 15 3.167 0.919 0.237 Between Groups 4.630 1 4.630  
OSV B 12 4.000 0.603 0.174 Within Groups 15.833 25 0.633 7.310 0.012  
Total 27 3.537 0.887 0.171 Total 20.463 26       
Moving cargo  
on deck 
OSV A 14 4.464 0.634 0.170 Between Groups 1.674 1 1.674 
OSV B 10 5.000 0.000 0.000 Within Groups 5.232 22 0.238 7.039  0.015  
Total 24 4.688 0.548 0.112 Total 6.906 23       
Vessels’  
Incidents 
OSV A 16 4.401 0.262 0.065 Between Groups 0.425 1 0.425   
OSV B 14 4.162 1.249 0.334 Within Groups 21.306 28 0.761 0.558 0.461 
Total 30 4.289 0.866 0.158 Total 21.731 29       
*) Bonferonni correction was applied; p < 0.05/3; p < 0.017 for significant results 
 
The moving cargo on deck data did not satisfy the 
assumption of equal variance. All crew on OSV B 
answered “never”, meaning there was no variation in the 
moving cargo data from OSV B. Instead, a t-test was 
used to examine the situation of moving cargo on OSV A 
by defining the test value of 5.0. The result verifies the 
difference in moving cargo on OSV A compared to OSV 
B (t = -2.876, p = 0.013). 
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Table 11 Results of stepwise linear regression analysis of personnel incidents on board 
Dependent  
variable 
Independent
 variables  
entered 
Adjusted R2 Coef Const F Sig 
Seasickness Hab 0.120 0.456 2.494 6.474 0.015
Fatigue/tired Hab 0.138 0.501 1.464 7.402 0.010
Stumble or hit an object N/A      
Slip, fall or loss of balance N/A      
Misoperate a switch/control N/A      
Confused by the system N/A      
Fail to follow the system/procedure N/A       
Sleep disturbance or sleep interrupted Hab 0.143 0.472 1.844 7.519 0.009
  
Table 12 Results of stepwise linear regression analysis of vessel related incidents on board 
Dependent  
variable 
Independent
 variables  
entered 
Adjusted R2 Coef Const F Sig 
Loss of power/black out N/A      
Loss of navigation/control N/A      
Contact/collision N/A      
Water on deck N/A      
Moving cargo on deck N/A      
Falling objects N/A      
Fire or explosions Maint 0.181 -0.282 5.757 9.393 0.004
Bulk cargo spill  N/A      
 
5.5.  THE EFFECT OF HUMAN FACTORS  
 RATING TO INCIDENTS ON BOARD 
 
A stepwise regression analysis was performed to test the 
effect of human factors rating to incidents on board (H7 
and H8). Stepping criteria of 0.05 for entry level and 0.10 
for removal were used. The average overall score for 
personnel incidents (Section B) was regressed by the 
human factors ratings: the overall score and the 
dimensions habitability, workability, controllability, 
maintainability and OHS. The result show that there was 
no significant variable entering the equation. The same 
method was applied to related incidents on the vessels 
(Section C), and no human factor dimension were found 
significant, affecting the equation. 
 
More detailed analysis was conducted for each personnel 
incident; seasickness, fatigue, stumble, slip, misoperate a 
switch, confused by the system, fail to follow procedure 
and sleep disturbance, as well as vessel incident: loss of 
power, loss of navigation/control, water on deck, moving 
cargo on deck, falling objects, fire and cargo spill. The 
results are presented in Table 11 and Table 12. No 
specific hypothesis was defined explicitly at this stage of 
the study, but it is obvious that  a significant relationship 
between relevant variables should be expected: for 
instance habitability would have an impact on sleep 
disturbance, fatigue and seasickness. A relationship 
between habitability and misoperating a switch/control 
incident would not be expected. Controllability was 
expected to have a significant effect on misoperating a 
switch/control.  
 
The results show that habitability has a positive effect on 
the frequency in which personnel on board are seasick, or 
experience fatigue and sleep disturbances. The better the 
habitability the lower the frequency of crew seasickness. 
Simultaneously, they become more fit and experience 
fewer sleep disturbances. Some 12% to 14% variance in 
the incidents can be explained by habitability as shown 
by the adjusted R2 (in Table 11). 
 
Maintainability had a significant effect on the probability 
of fire or explosion, in incidents on the vessel; however 
the relationship is counter-intuitive. It means that the 
higher the maintainability level the higher the frequency 
of fire or explosion on board. About 18.1% of the 
variance of fire or explosion can be explained by 
maintainability. 
  
6.  DISCUSSIONS 
 
6.1.  HUMAN FACTORS RATING 
 
The main conclusion from the literature survey [11, 12] 
and the exploratory surveys [13, 14] is that human 
factors have been addressed in OSV design and been 
taken seriously. Quantitative measurements and 
inferential statistics in this study support that finding. 
There is no doubt that human factors are addressed in 
these two OSVs, as rated by the crews. It was recognised 
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during the exploratory surveys that the crews were 
satisfied with habitability and less satisfied with the 
maintainability. It was also revealed in the exploratory 
study that OHS was addressed without compromise. The 
literature survey indicated that habitability (or comfort) 
was the most comprehensive dimension covered by the 
existing documents, and safety-related elements were the 
only dimension made compulsory. These findings are all 
verified in this study. Habitability is rated as satisfactory, 
OHS is rated most highly and maintainability lowest. The 
relationships between the existing rules, regulations and 
other documents about implementation are convincing.  
 
The findings provide a response to the claim that human 
factors are overlooked in the design of marine systems 
[9, 10]. As revealed in this study, human factors are not 
overlooked; but have been addressed adequately in OSV 
design. The conclusion is obviously limited for 
generalisation, but it certainly shows the ability of the 
industry to include human factors considerations in 
marine systems design. 
 
It is also important to point out that the concept of 
“human factors” is quantifiable and measurable. The 
method used in this study can be improved further and 
used to analyse the implementation of human factors on 
marine systems.  
 
6.2.  THE EFFECT OF DESIGN ON HUMAN  
 FACTORS RATING 
 
The results of the analysis show a strong indication that 
design can have a considerable impact on human factors 
assessment. It is also evident that design can influence 
dimensions such as habitability and workability, despite 
the numeric corrections that must be taken into 
consideration in the study. The number of respondents 
was rather small and the number of hypotheses was one 
too many that it lowered the p-level. The vessels were 
also similar. The study did signify the ability to 
differentiate a good ship design in relation to human 
factors. The two OSVs surveyed were built for the same 
purpose, in approximately the same period of time, 
following the same regulations and class, and operating 
in the same area, but designed by two different groups 
and yet demonstrate different levels of human factors 
ratings. The crew on OSV B are more satisfied with their 
vessel than the crew on OSV A with their vessel. This 
may be because the superstructure on OSV B is located 
at the aft where motion is usually less compared to the 
bow. The crews are located far away from the splash 
zone where slamming occurs and also away from the 
bow thrusters which are noisy and disturbing. The 
disadvantage of having the superstructure at the aft is the 
appearance. OSV B looks unusual compared to the 
traditional OSVs. Some of the equipment installed on 
OSV B is of a higher standard than that on OSV A, such 
as the dynamic positioning system level 3 used on OSV 
B, where OSV A uses level 2 system. Naturally, there is 
a price that must be paid for the extra investment. The 
questions is who will pay the price and at what expense? 
 
6.3.  THE EFFECT OF DESIGN ON INCIDENTS  
ON BOARD 
 
The effect of different OSV design in relation to comfort 
was recognised in the previous survey [13, 14] and is 
partly confirmed in this study using quantitative 
methods. The crew on OSV B experiences less fatigue, 
due to a more stable, less motion sensitive vessel. It is 
possible that the difference in fatigue level may be 
caused by different watch keeping regimes rather than 
the design. A number of studies under the HORIZON 
project indicated that the 6-on/6-off regime was more 
tiring that a 4-on/8-off system [22]. This finding verifies 
the fact that the crews on OSV B report less fatigue, as 
they implemented the 4-on/8-off system, however, a 
study of four supply vessels in the Norwegian Sea 
showed that different watch keeping regimes had no 
significant effect on the fatigue level experienced by the 
seafarers [23]. We did question the crews on both OSVs 
regarding the watch regimes. The company had endorsed 
vessels working in the area implementing the 4-on/8-off 
system, instead of the 6-on/6-off. The crews on OSV A 
insisted on keeping the old 6-on/6-off system with which 
they were more comfortable. Most also believed that 
there would be no difference in terms of their 
performance, and they tried to convince the management 
of this. Apparently, further investigations are required to 
clarify the relationships between these variables of 
interest. It will be interesting to determine the effects of 
habitability and watch regime on fatigue. 
 
The difference with respect to seasickness and sleep 
disturbance is indicative but not convincing. The 
quantitative survey was conducted in summer, when the 
sea state is generally gentle. This situation probably 
explains why the variations in seasickness and sleep 
disturbance are somewhat inconclusive. Another possible 
explanation could be the adaptability of the crews. 
Typically adaptation to motion sickness on board occurs 
within a period of several days [24, 25], however, the 
fact that the crews on OSV B experienced less motion 
and slamming and heard fewer disturbing noises from the 
tunnel thrusters explains the difference in sleep 
disturbance incident. 
 
OSV B is a stable vessel which reduces the movement of 
cargo on deck especially during high seas. This was 
verified by the survey. All the crews on OSV B 
responded “never” to the question: ‘how often does the 
vessel experience moving containers on deck’ It is the 
most positive rating in the scale. The same answer was 
given to the item contact/collision incident, which was 
also responded to with “never” by the crews on both 
OSVs. This shows how stable OSV B is, according to the 
crew assessment, based on their personal experience. 
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The finding regarding water on deck incidents was quite 
unexpected. Designed with superstructure at the fore, 
OSV A should have a deck relatively protected from 
green water compared to B. The result shows the 
opposite. Further investigation reveals that OSV B is 
higher than OSV A. There is an approximately one meter 
difference in the distance from the sea level to the cargo 
deck between OSV A and B. This could be why the 
crews notice less water on deck on OSV B. Another 
possible explanation could be the height of the freeboard 
and the shape of the bow, including the bulbous bow. 
The location of the longitudinal centre of gravity (COG) 
on OSV A is relatively forward. The vessel tends to 
experience trim by bow which lowers the freeboard and 
allows more water on deck. The COG on OSV B is 
instead to the aft. The vessel tends to trim by stern, 
leading to higher freeboard, and thus less water on deck. 
The detail bow design of OSV A differs from that of 
OSV B (Figure 2). The bow on OSV A was designed 
with a bigger rake angle and equipped with a bigger 
bulbous bow. OSV A was designed to operate at a 
slightly higher speed than OSV B. A detailed 
hydrodynamic analysis is required to explain the 
phenomena of water on deck on these two OSVs. 
 
6.4.  THE EFFECT OF HUMAN FACTORS 
ASSESSMENT ON INCIDENTS ON BOARD 
 
The overall human factors rating had no significant effect 
on the overall incidents on board, but specific dimensions 
emerged and were confirmed to have a considerable 
effect on their corresponding incidents.  
 
Habitability was revealed as one dimension that 
influenced personnel incidents on board. This could be a 
good argument for paying more attention improving 
habitability in order to reduce the probability of people 
getting seasick, to reduce sleep disturbance and to 
increase crew performance.  
 
An appealing finding is the negative relationship found 
between maintainability in relation to fire and 
explosions. Such a phenomenon is not novel. Perrow 
mentions the case of ‘radar assisted collisions’ [6]. 
Norman argues that as automation rises in industry, it 
often increases the chance of human error when failures 
do occur [26]. Better facilities can increase a lack of 
awareness, such as automation in the early development 
and implementation phase, which often comes with 
unexpected adverse effects. The grounding of the Royal 
Majesty shows the role of automation leading to error in 
navigation [27]. It seems to be a similar mechanism here. 
The crew on OSV B valued maintainability relatively 
more highly than those on OSV A. On the other hand, on 
OSV B the incident of fire/explosions scored lower, 
meaning that the frequency of fire is higher. 
 
OSV B is a gas fuelled vessel. This is a new technology 
that requires a certain level of safety and a different 
mode of preparedness. The designer had put a number of 
precautions and mitigating measures together with the 
system. A fire did break out, not on OSV B, but on an 
older sister vessel with almost the same specification. 
This could be an explanation of the negative trend in 
answers relating to maintainability and fire/explosions. 
Most of the crew on OSV B were aware of the fire, and 
thus responded to the questionnaire accordingly. These 
findings can also be interpreted conversely. Since the 
people on OSV B had experienced a fire on their vessel, 
they had learned the lesson, become more aware of 
maintainability on their vessels and made significant 
improvements. Further investigation of the data, by 
removing responses from OSV A showed that the result 
became weaker. This means that the argument that ‘OSV 
B experienced fire, therefore increased maintainability’ 
must be rejected, because the response from the crew on 
OSV A also counts. The probability of multi-collinearity 
occurring was also checked and it did not. 
Maintainability has a negative correlation with fire. This 
leaves us with the only possible explanation that better 
facilities (in this case: maintainability) in some instances 
may lead to lack of awareness (in this case: 
fire/explosion) incidents. Yerkes-Dodson law describes 
the relationship between arousal and performance as 
represented by an inverted U curve [28] where 
performance increases with arousal to a certain point, 
then decreases with higher levels of stress. In this case, 
better maintainability provides lower arousal, hence 
lower performance. 
 
Examining the outcome of the regression analysis, it 
appears that personnel incidents are more sensitive to 
variation in human factors rating than vessel incidents. 
All the significant intercept coefficients in Section B are 
higher relative to those in Section C. The validity of the 
findings can therefore be concluded. 
 
All the above incident analyses (in Subsections 6.3. and 
6.4) were based on questionnaires that were administered 
once. Questionnaires are subjective and a single 
administration is slightly inaccurate for some of the 
measured qualities such as incidents which fluctuate over 
time. Although, the questionnaires used in this study 
were confirmed as valid, it would be beneficial to verify 
the findings with the existing incident/accident records as 
well as the performance records. More accurate methods 
can be used to measure fatigue, seasickness and sleep 
disturbances in real time. Combination with other 
measurements such as sea states, ship motion, noise 
levels and crew performance would be advantageous to 
evaluate the design in relation to human factors. The 
results of hydrodynamic tests can also be used to analyse 
the performance of a vessel including motion, deck 
movement, water on deck, and slamming. 
 
With regard to the introductory part of the study, it has 
been confirmed that some errors were inherited from the 
design stage [5-8] such as dynamic positioning error and 
blackout that were reported previously [13, 14]. The 
relationships between design, human factors rating and 
Trans RINA, Vol 154, Part A2, Intl J Maritime Eng, Apr-Jun 2012 
©20XX: The Royal Institution of Naval Architects 
incidents were also revealed in this study. Although 
incidents are not “errors” per se, the connections are 
undeniable. The study also provides an index that can be 
used as an indicator of how much variation in a human 
factors rating will affect the corresponding incident. 
 
7. CONCLUSIONS 
Surveys were conducted on two offshore supply vessels 
in the Norwegian Sea to reveal the application of human 
factors principles in ship design via questionnaires. 
Information regarding personnel incidents and vessel 
incidents was also gathered. As many as eighteen 
hypotheses were established. Statistical analyses were 
performed. A summary of all the hypotheses tested and 
the results can be found in the following list: 
H1   : Confirmed  
Human factors are significantly addressed in the 
design of marine systems. 
H2i  : Confirmed 
Habitability is significantly addressed in the 
design of marine systems. 
H2ii  :  Confirmed 
Workability is significantly addressed in the 
design of marine systems. 
H3    : Confirmed 
Dimensions of human factors are not rated 
equally in the design of marine systems. 
H3i    : Confirmed 
OHS is rated more highly than workability and 
maintainability.  
H3ii   : Confirmed 
Maintainability is rated lower than habitability, 
workability and OHS. 
H4     : Inconclusive 
There is indication that human factors rating 
varies as a result of OSV design, but the finding 
is inconclusive 
H4i    : Inconclusive 
There is indication that habitability rating varies 
as a result of OSV design, but the finding is 
inconclusive  
H4ii   : Inconclusive 
There is indication that workability rating varies 
as a result of OSV design, but the finding is 
inconclusive  
H5    : Rejected 
There is no variation in personnel incidents as 
the result of OSV design 
H5i    : Inconclusive 
There is a slight variation in personnel being 
seasick as a result of OSV design, but the 
finding is inconclusive 
H5ii   : Inconclusive 
There is a slight variation in fatigue level of 
personnel as the result of OSV design, but the 
finding is inconclusive 
H5iii  : Inconclusive 
There is slight variation in personnel 
experiencing sleep disturbances as a result of 
OSV design, but the finding is inconclusive 
H6    : Rejected 
There is no variation in vessel incidents as the 
result of OSV design 
H6i : Confirmed 
There is a significant difference in water on 
deck incident as the result of OSV design 
H6ii : Confirmed 
There is a significant difference in moving cargo 
on deck incident as the result of OSV design 
H7   : Mostly rejected, partly confirmed 
Human factors rating has no significant effect 
on personnel related incidents, however, 
habitability is revealed to have a positive effect 
on the frequency of personnel becoming seasick, 
fatigued and experiencing sleep disturbance. 
H8   : Mostly rejected, partly confirmed 
Human factors evaluation has no significant 
effect on vessel related incidents, however, 
maintainability is revealed to have a negative 
effect on the probability of fire or explosion. 
 
Based on quantitative surveys performed on two OSVs in 
the Norwegian Sea, it can be concluded that human 
factors are far from being neglected. It has been 
addressed satisfactorily in the design of marine systems, 
not perfectly but adequately. Human factors is a broad 
subject with many dimensions. The level of knowledge 
and implementation of human factors varies from one 
dimension to another. The most satisfactory dimension is 
occupational health and safety. Maintainability is 
considered the least satisfactory, but still adequate. 
 
Although all analyses regarding the effect of OSV design 
on human factors rating and incidents were inconclusive, 
the indication is promising. Conversely, the relationships 
between a certain human factor rating and particular 
incidents were revealed. A good human factors rating for 
habitability is revealed to have a positive effect on  
personnel incidents; sleep disturbances, fatigue and 
seasickness. At the same time, a good rating for 
maintainability was perceived to have a negative effect 
on the probability of fire or explosions on board. 
 
This study makes a contribution by presenting a holistic 
picture of human factors in ship design, involving most 
human factors dimensions, evaluating the effect of the 
design on the human operators and trying to draw a link 
between application of human factors and the likelihood 
of incidents.  
 
The study has identified limitations. The way human 
factors are considered in the process of design has not 
been examined. The sample size is small, obviously 
restricting generalisation of the results. The 
questionnaires that were developed in this research are 
unique; some of the questions are relevant for offshore 
supply vessel design and operation. Nonetheless, 
methods introduced here can potentially be applied to 
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other vessels and the results can be analysed to give a 
meaningful picture regarding actual risk in reality. It is 
expected that this study provides evidence for those who 
still believe that “human factors” is a difficult entity to 
deal with. Human factors exist, its effects are real and 
measureable, and affect performance and safety on board 
a vessel. The relationship is also measureable. 
 
Some recommendations based on this study are made: 
 
 Publish more documents related to human 
factors implementation, especially in the area of 
habitability, controllability and workability. 
 Increase the level of enforcement in human 
factors implementation, at least for the most 
fundamental issues, such as habitability and 
workability. 
Some recommendations for further research are proposed 
as follows: 
 
 To investigate the paradoxical relationship 
between maintainability and fire incident. 
 To investigate more thoroughly the relationships 
between the designs, the human factors ratings 
and the effects of those variables on 
performance, mishaps, and incidents using more 
accurate data collection methods. Obviously, 
more data is required. 
 To expand the study with more samples and 
larger populations, including other types of 
vessels and other areas of the world.2  
 
ENDNOTE 
The analysis performed in this study was continued to 
evaluate the theoretical construct of human factors in 
ship design and operations. The same data was used and 
the result is presented in a separate note in the same 
edition.  
 
8. REFERENCES 
 
1. BAKER, C.C. AND D.B. MCCAFFERTY. Accident 
database review of human-element concerns: What 
do the results mean for classification? International 
Conference on Human Factors in Ship Design, 
Safety and Operation, London: Royal Institution of 
Naval Architects, 2005. 
2. WAGENAAR, W.A. and J. GROENEWEG, 
Accidents at sea: multiple causes and impossible 
consequences. International Journal of Man-Machine 
Studies, 27: p. 587-598, 1987. 
3. MOORE, W.H. and R.G. BEA, Management of 
Human Error in Operations of Marine Systems Final 
                                                 
2  For this reason, the authors will share the 
questionnaires and methods of analysis with other 
researchers who are interested in performing similar 
investigations. 
Joint Industry Project Report. HOE-93-1. University 
of California at Berkeley, CA, 1993. 
4. MCCAFFERTY, D.B. and C.C. BAKER. Trending 
the Cause of Marine Incidents. International 
Conference on Learning from Marine Incidents, 
London: The Royal Institution of Naval Architects, 
2006. 
5. REASON, J., Human Error, New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1990. 
6. PERROW, C., Normal Accidents: Living with High-
risk Technologies, New Jersey: Princeton University 
Press, 1999. 
7. CALHOUN, S.R. and S.C. STEVENS, Human 
Factors in Ship Design. Ship Design and 
Construction, Ed. T. Lamb. Vol. I. The Society of 
Naval Architects and Marine Engineers: Jersey City, 
NJ, 2003. 
8. KINNERSLEY, S. and A. ROELEN, The 
contribution of design to accidents. Safety Science, 
45(1-2): p. 31-60, 2007. 
9. MILLER, G.E. The Omission of Human Engineering 
in the Design of Offshore Equipment and Facilities: 
How Come? Offshore Technology Conference 
(OTC), Houston, Texas, 1990. 
10. GRAVESON, A. Human Factors in Ship Design and 
Operation. International Conference on Human 
Factors in Ship Design and Operation, London: The 
Royal Institution of Naval Architects, 2002. 
11. RUMAWAS, V. and B.E. ASBJØRNSLETT. A 
Content Analysis of Human Factors in the Design of 
Marine Systems. International Conference on Ship 
and Offshore Technology (ICSOT) Surabaya: The 
Royal Institution of Naval Architects, 2010. 
12. RUMAWAS, V. and B.E. ASBJØRNSLETT, A 
Content Analysis of Human Factors in Ship Design. 
Trans RINA International Journal of Maritime 
Engineering, 156 (Part A3), 2014. 
13. RUMAWAS, V. and B.E. ASBJØRNSLETT. 
Offshore supply vessels design and operation: A 
human factors exploration. European Safety and 
Reliability Conference (ESREL), Troyes: European 
Safety and Reliability Association (ESRA), 2011. 
14. RUMAWAS, V. and B.E. ASBJØRNSLETT, 
Exploratory Surveys of Human Factors on Offshore 
Supply Vessels in the Norwegian Sea. Naval 
Engineers Journal, 125(2), 2013. 
15. LLOYD'S REGISTER, The Human Element: An 
Introduction, Lloyd's Register: London, 2008. 
16. IMO, Guidelines on Ergonomic Criteria for Bridge 
Equipment and Layout, International Maritime 
Organization: London, 2000. 
17. LLOYD'S REGISTER, The Human Element Best 
Practice for Ship Operators, Lloyd's Register: 
London, 2009. 
18. ABS, Guidance Notes for The Application of 
Ergonomics to Marine Systems, American Bureau of 
Shipping: Houston, TX, 2003. 
19. ABS, Guide for Crew Habitability on Ships, 
American Bureau of Shipping: Houston, TX, 2001. 
Trans RINA, Vol 154, Part A2, Intl J Maritime Eng, Apr-Jun 2012 
©20XX: The Royal Institution of Naval Architects 
20. ABS, Guide for Passenger Comfort on Ships, 
American Bureau of Shipping: Houston, TX, 2001. 
21. DNV, Rules for Classification of Ships Comfort 
Class, in Special Service and Type Additional Class,  
Det Norske Veritas: Høvik, Norway, 2009. 
22. HORIZON, Project Horizon - a wake-up call. 
Seventh Framework Programme, FP7-234000, 2012.  
23. KONGSVIK, T., K. STØRKERSEN, and J.H. 
HANSEN. The possible impact of different watch 
keeping regimes at sea on sleep, fatigue, and safety. 
European Safety and Reliability Conference 
(ESREL), Troyes, France: European Safety and 
Reliability Association (ESRA), 2011. 
24. CALVERT, J.J., Motion Sickness, Crew 
Performance, and Reduced Manning in High-Speed 
Vessel Operations, Naval Postgraduate School: 
Monterey, CA, 2005. 
25. MCCAULEY, M.E., J.W. ROYAL, C.D. WYLIE, 
J.F. O'HANLON, and R.R. MACKIE, Motion 
Sickness Incidence: Exploratory Studies of 
Habituation, Pitch and Roll , and the Refinement of a 
Mathematical Model. Human Factors Research, Inc., 
1976. 
26. NORMAN, D.A., The 'Problem' with Automation: 
Inappropriate Feedback and Interaction, not 'Over-
Automation'. Philosophical Transactions of the 
Royal Society of London. B, Biological Sciences, 
327(1241): p. 585-593, 1990. 
27. LÜTZHÖFT, M. and S.W.A. DEKKER, On your 
watch: Automation on the bridge. Journal of 
Navigation, 55(GEOBASE): p. 83-96, 2002. 
28. YERKES, R.M. and J.D. DODSON, The relation of 
strength of stimulus to rapidity of habit-formation. 
Journal of Comparative Neurology and Psychology, 
18(5): p. 459-482, 1908. 
 
																																																																																																																																										Appendices																																		
	
	
Appendix	D:	Criteria/Standard	Evaluation	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
Human	Factors	Evaluation	in	Ship	Design:	A	Case	Study	on	Offshore	
Supply	Vessels	in	the	Norwegian	Sea,	Part	I:	Theoretical	Background	
and	Technical	Constructs	
	
Naval	Engineers	Journal	(accepted)	
	
Authors:	
	
Vincentius	Rumawas	 	
Norwegian	University	of	Science	and	Technology	(NTNU)	
Department	of	Marine	Technology	
Bjørn	Egil	Asbjørnslett	
Norwegian	University	of	Science	and	Technology	(NTNU)	
Department	of	Marine	Technology	
Christian	A.	Klöckner		
	 	 Norwegian	University	of	Science	and	Technology	(NTNU)	
	 	 Department	of	Psychology	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
																																																																																																																																										Appendices																																		
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
This	page	is	intentionally	left	blank	
	1	
	
HUMAN	FACTORS	EVALUATION	IN	SHIP	DESIGN:		
A	CASE	STUDY	ON	OFFSHORE	SUPPLY	VESSELS	IN	THE	
NORWEGIAN	SEA,	PART	I:	THEORETICAL	BACKGROUND	
AND	TECHNICAL	CONSTRUCTS		
Keywords:	 Human	factors,	Comfort,	Noise,	Motion,	Slamming,	MII,	MSI,	Offshore	supply	
vessel,	Human	factors	criteria	
ABSTRACT	
Surveys	were	conducted	in	the	Norwegian	Sea	to	evaluate	the	existing	human	factors	standards	
and	 their	 implementations	 on	 two	 different	 offshore	 supply	 vessels	 designs.	 The	 results	 are	
reported	in	two	parts.	This	paper	(Part	I)	covers	the	theoretical	background	and	reports	all	the	
technical	 aspects	 of	 the	 research:	 noise,	 motion	 and	 slamming	 that	 includes	 measurements,	
analyses	and	evaluations.	Noise	level	and	motion	were	measured	by	means	of	sound	level	meter	
and	 accelerometer	 respectively.	 Data	 were	 collected	 in	 two	 periods:	 summer	 and	 winter.	
Results	 of	 measurements	 were	 compared	 with	 the	 existing	 criteria	 and	 discrepancies	 are	
identified.	 It	can	be	concluded	that	some	of	the	existing	human	factors	criteria	are	inadequate	
and	less	relevant	to	the	actual	experience	on	board	and	they	are	ineffective	to	induce	comfort	on	
both	 supply	 vessels	 studied.	 Improvements	 and	 revisions	 are	 strongly	 recommended	 with	
respect	to	noise,	motion	and	slamming	criteria.	An	extended	methodology	to	predict	MII	is	also	
advised.	The	other	paper	(Part	II)	reports	the	human	factors	subjective	evaluation	performed	by	
the	seafarers	where	multivariate	analyses	were	performed	to	reveal	a	human	factors	model	in	
ship	design	and	operations.	
INTRODUCTION	
MOTIVATION	
Working	as	seafarers	is	demanding.	It	is	not	only	a	job,	but	it	is	a	way	of	living.	They	are	isolated	
from	the	world,	separated	from	their	family	and	physically	cramped	with	their	shipmates.	They	
have	 relatively	 long	 working	 hours,	 often	 with	 monotonous	 working	 and	 living	 conditions.	
Occasionally,	 the	 situation	 becomes	 harsh	 and	 risky	 (Alderton	 2004;	 Oldenburg,	 Baur	 and	
Schlaich	2010).		
Almost	 all	 accident	 investigation	 reports	 mention	 fatigue	 as	 a	 feature	 underlying	 accidental	
events	 (Alert!	 2007).	Human	 fatigue	 is	 confirmed	 to	be	 closely	 related	 to	 failures	 of	 situation	
awareness	 and	 human	 errors	which	 then	 leading	 to	 accidental	 events	 (Baker	 and	McCafferty	
2005).	Unfortunately,	fatigue	has	been	under‐researched	in	the	maritime	domain	compared	to	
other	transport	sectors	(Allen,	Wadsworth	and	Smith	2008).		
Fatigue	 is	 caused	by	 factors	 such	as	 lack	of	 sleep,	poor	quality	of	 sleep,	 insufficient	 rest	 time,	
noise,	vibration,	ship	movement,	and	excessive	work	load	(Smith,	Allen	and	Wadsworth	2006;	
Alert!	2007).	Motion	and	noise	were	also	found	as	major	causes	of	sleep	interruptions	(Haward,	
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Lewis	 and	Griffin	 2009).	Motion	 can	 cause	 operator	 performance	 to	 degrade,	 and	 thus	 safety	
(Ross	2009).	Motion	of	a	vessel	at	sea	may	interfere	with	the	crew	members’	balance,	causing	
motion‐induced	interruptions	(MII),	increasing	the	energy	expenditure	and	increasing	the	levels	
of	 fatigue,	 drowsiness	 and	dizziness.	Motion	 also	 creates	 stomach	 awareness,	 induces	motion	
sickness	incidences	(MSI)	and	causes	vomiting	incidence	(Stevens	and	Parsons	2002;	Haward	et	
al.	2009).	
Advice	has	been	given	by	relevant	organizations	(Smith	et	al.	2006;	Alert!	2007;	ITF	Seafarers	
2012)	 how	 to	mitigate	 and	manage	 fatigue	 at	 sea	 during	 operations.	Measures	 proposed	 are	
sleeping	 pattern,	 watch	 schedule,	 environmental	 manipulation,	 workload	 management	 and	
dietary	 arrangement.	 Several	 measures	 have	 been	 addressed	 to	 the	 design	 of	 the	 vessel;	
including	to	provide	comfortable	accommodations,	to	minimize	noise	and	vibration,	to	improve	
indoor	climate	and	to	provide	better	working	facilities	to	reduce	workload.	
Prescriptive	guides	and	voluntary	 standards	on	how	 to	enhance	vessels’	design	by	 improving	
habitability	and	comfort	 for	the	sake	of	 the	crew	are	available	and	ready	to	apply.	Controlling	
the	 environment	 by	 design	 will	 increase	 the	 comfort	 level	 of	 the	 personnel,	 give	 them	 the	
opportunity	for	better	sleep	and	rest,	and	increase	their	performance.	For	instance,	Det	Norske	
Veritas	(DNV)	publishes	an	additional	comfort	class	which	is	divided	in	two	groups:	noise	and	
vibration	(COMF‐V	notation)	and	indoor	climate	(COMF‐C	notation)	(DNV	2009).	The	noise	and	
vibration	criteria	are	distinguished	into	three	levels	of	comfort:	1	(highest),	2	(medium)	and	3	
(acceptable).	 Table	 1	 shows	 examples	 of	 noise	 criteria	 on	 several	 different	 locations	 on	 the	
vessel.	Measurements	should	be	made	according	to	the	ISO	2923	standard.		
Table	1	Crew	Accommodation	Noise	levels	in	dB(A)	(DNV	2009)	
Locations	 Comfort	rating	nr	(crn)	
1	 2	 3	
Wheelhouse	 60	 60	 65	
Crew	cabins	 50	 55	 60	
Crew	public	spaces	 55	 60	 65	
Engine	control	room	 70	 70	 75	
Open	deck	recreation		 70	 70	 75	
	
The	 American	 Bureau	 of	 Shipping	 (ABS)	 publishes	 several	 guides	 covering	 habitability	 and	
comfort	 (ABS	 2001;	 ABS	 2001).	 The	 guides	 cover	 five	 comfort	 aspects	 of	 vessel	 and	 layout:	
accommodations	 criteria,	whole‐body	 vibration,	 noise,	 indoor	 climate	 and	 lighting.	 ABS	 gives	
HAB	notation	for	a	vessel	complying	with	the	minimum	criteria	for	those	five	aspects,	and	HAB+	
notation	for	more	stringent	habitability	criteria.	In	parallel	with	ABS’	outline,	the	International	
Maritime	 Organization	 (IMO)	 publishes	 a	 framework	 to	 consider	 ergonomics	 and	 work	
environment	 to	 reduce	 accidents	 and	 human	 errors	 on	 ships	 (IMO	 2006).	 In	 a	 separate	
document,	IMO	has	developed	and	published	a	code	on	noise	levels	on	board	ships	(IMO	1981).	
Table	2	shows	examples	of	criteria	for	maximum	noise	level	on	ships.	
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Table	2	Noise	levels	on	board	ships	(IMO	1981)	
Noise	level	limits	 dB(A)
Machinery	spaces	(continuously	manned)		 90
Machinery	spaces	(not	continuously	manned)		 110
Machinery	control	rooms	 75
Workshops	 85
Non‐specified	work	spaces	 90
Normally	unoccupied	spaces	 90
	
Apart	from	vibration,	noise,	and	indoor	climate,	criteria	for	ship	motion	are	not	covered	by	the	
classification	societies	or	other	regulatory	bodies	like	IMO.	Two	references	often	cited	for	ship	
motions	 criteria	 are	 North	 Atlantic	 Treaty	 Organization	 (NATO)	 Standardization	 Agreement	
(STANAG)	 4154	 (NATO	 2000)	 and	 Nordic	 Co‐operative	 Organization	 for	 Applied	 Research	
(NORDFORSK	 1987),	 covering	 maximum	 roll	 amplitude,	 pitch	 amplitude,	 vertical	 and	 lateral	
acceleration.	Table	3	and	Table	4	show	operability	criteria	 set	by	 the	 two	references.	Table	5	
presents	the	MII	risk	levels	used	by	Graham	(1990).	
Table	3	Personnel	criteria	limits	(NATO	2000)	
Recommended	Criteria	 Limit	 Location	
Motion	Sickness	Incidence	(MSI)	 20%	of	crew	@	4	hrs	 Task	location	
Motion	Induced	Interruption	(MII)	 1/min	 Task	location	
Default	Criteria	 	Root	mean	square	(RMS)	
Roll	 4°		 		
Pitch	 1.5°	 		
Vertical	acceleration	 0.2	g	 Bridge	
Lateral	acceleration	 0.1	g	 Bridge	
	
Table	4	Operability	and	criteria	set	for	ships	(NORDFORSK	1987)	
General	Operability	Limiting	Criteria	for	Ships	 For	merchant	ships	 		
Vertical	acceleration	RMS,	bridge	 0.15	g 		 		
Lateral	acceleration	RMS,	bridge	 0.12	g 		
Roll	(RMS)	 6° 		
Probability	of	slamming	(for	up	100	m	long	vessel)	 0.03 		 		
Criteria	with	regard	to	acceleration	and	roll	 Vert	acc	 Lat	acc	 Roll	
Light	manual	work	(RMS)	 0.20	g 0.10	g 6.0°	
Heavy	manual	work	(RMS)	 0.15	g 0.07	g 4.0°	
Intellectual	work	(RMS)	 0.10	g 0.05	g 3.0°	
Transit	passengers	(RMS)	 0.05	g 0.04	g 2.5°	
Cruise	liner	(RMS)	 0.02	g 0.03	g 2.0°	
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Table	5	MII	risk	levels	(Graham	1990)*)	
Risk	Level	 MII’s	per	minute	
1. Possible	 0.1	
2. Probable	 0.5	
3. Serious	 1.5	
4. Severe	 3.0	
5. Extreme	 5.0	
*)	original	source:	Baitis,	A.E.,	T.R.	Applebee,	and	T.M.	McNamara:	
“Human	Factor	Considerations	Applied	to	Operations	of	the	FFG‐8	
and	LAMPS	MK	III,”	Naval	Engineers	Journal,	Vol.	96,	1984,	pp.	191‐
199.	
	
Preliminary	 surveys	on	offshore	 supply	vessels	 (OSVs)	were	 conducted	prior	 to	 this	 research		
where	 two	COMF	class	vessels	were	 taken	as	 the	 samples	 (Rumawas	and	Asbjørnslett	2013).	
The	 surveys	 identified	 issues	 such	 as	 high	 pitch	 disturbing	 noise	 in	 the	 cabin,	 noisy	 deck,	
excessive	 rolling	 motion	 and	 slamming	 and	 pitching.	 Occasionally,	 being	 on	 board	 one	
experiences	stomach	awareness,	gets	seasick	and	even	vomits.	
SCOPE	OF	WORK	
The	present	research	was	conducted	to	answer	two	questions:		
1. Are	the	existing	criteria	of	human	factors	in	ship	design	relevant	and	adequate?	
2. What	factors	considerably	influence	seafarers’	performance	at	sea?	
Due	to	the	extent	of	the	present	research,	the	report	is	divided	into	two	parts.	Part	one	covers	
the	 introduction,	 methodology	 and	 the	 technical	 aspects	 of	 the	 research	 that	 includes	
measurements	of	the	environmental	conditions,	noise	and	motion	combined	with	some	relevant	
evaluations.	 Part	 two	 covers	 the	multivariate	 analyses	 regarding	 the	 seafarers’	 condition	 and	
performance	and	the	liable	underlying	factors.		
RESEARCH	DESIGN	
The	overall	 research	design	 is	 presented	 in	 Figure	 1.	 Before	 sailing,	 the	 vessels	 receive	work	
orders	 containing	 information	 which	 offshore	 facilities	 they	 are	 about	 to	 visit	 and	 at	
approximate	 time.	Then,	weather	 forecasts	will	be	provided	with	 information	about	 the	wind	
speed	and	wave	characteristics	(significant	wave	height,	Hs	and	peak	period,	Tp)	in	a	particular	
area	as	a	function	of	time.	During	the	voyage,	the	crew	registers	the	environmental	conditions	at	
least	every	four	hours	in	their	logbook.	The	ship	responses	to	the	environmental	conditions	in	
the	form	of	their	own	motions	are	measured	during	this	research	together	with	the	noise	levels	
at	 several	 locations	 on	 the	 vessel.	 Surveys	 are	 conducted	 in	 summer	 and	 in	 winter,	 as	 each	
season	 has	 their	 own	 environmental	 characteristics.	 Direct	 effects	 of	 the	 environmental	
condition	to	seafarers’	performance	are	investigated	as	well	as	how	the	effects	are	moderated	
by	the	different	ship	designs.	Seafarer’	performance	 is	assessed	 in	terms	of	sleeping	behavior,	
symptoms	on	 the	watch	and	performance	on	watch.	Sleeping	behavior	covers	 the	quality	and	
duration	of	the	sleep	and	sleep	related	problems	encountered	by	the	seafarers	before	they	go	to	
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watch.	 Symptoms	 on	 watch	 consist	 of	 ten	 aspects	 including	 fatigue,	 tiredness,	 sleepiness,	
motion‐induced	 interruptions	 (MII)	 or	 loss	 of	 balance,	 and	 stomach	 awareness	 or	 motion‐
sickness	incidence	(MSI).	Performance	on	the	watch	is	evaluated	in	terms	of	cognitive	activity,	
motoric	activity	and	communication.	Sleep	problems	are	divided	into	two:	ship‐related	and	non‐
ship	related	problems.	Watch	time	and	work	shift	are	also	 included	 in	 the	model	as	 they	may	
influence	performance.	
	
Figure	1	Research	design	
METHODOLOGY	
The	field	surveys	were	conducted	to	collect	different	types	of	information	simultaneously.	
SAMPLES	AND	DATA	COLLECTION		
Two	offshore	supply	vessels	(OSVs)	operating	in	the	Norwegian	Sea	were	chosen	as	the	object	
for	the	study.		Surveys	were	conducted	in	two	periods:	July	2011,	representing	summer	period	
and	October	2011,	representing	winter	period.		On	each	survey,	due	to	limited	resources,	both	
vessels	 were	 visited	 alternately.	 OSV	 A	 followed	 the	 standard	 OSV	 design,	 built	 with	 the	
superstructure	on	the	bow.	On	the	other	hand,	OSV	B	was	built	with	superstructure	at	 the	aft	
(Figure	2).	From	a	previous	study	(Rumawas	and	Asbjørnslett	2013),	it	was	indicated	that	the	
vessel	OSV	B	was	more	 stable	and	quiet	 than	OSV	A.	Both	vessels	 complied	with	DNV	COMF‐
V(3).		
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Figure	2	Two	different	OSV	designs	(Rumawas	and	Asbjørnslett	2013)	
ENVIRONMENTAL	CONDITIONS	
Information	 regarding	 the	 upcoming	 environmental	 conditions	 was	 obtained	 from	 weather	
forecasts.	 The	 data	 was	 downloaded	 from	 the	 website	 for	 any	 particular	 location	 and	 time.	
During	 the	 voyage,	 the	 officers	 on	 the	 bridge	 also	 recorded	 the	 true	 wind	 speed	 and	 wave	
heights	in	terms	of	the	sea	state	every	four	hours.	Wind	speed	measurement	was	provided	by	an	
anemometer	installed	on	the	vessel,	while	the	wave	height	was	observed	visually.	
NOISE	LEVEL	MEASUREMENT	
Noise	measurements	were	performed	in	accordance	with	the	procedures	described	in	ISO	2923	
(ISO	 1996)	 and	 ISO	 20283‐2	 (ISO	 2008)	 with	 respect	 to	 covering	 the	 type	 and	 class	 of	
instrument,	 setting	 and	 position	 of	 the	 instrument,	 and	 length	 of	 each	measurement.	 Class	 2	
sound	 level	 meter	 Bruel	 &	 Kjaer	 Type	 2236	 was	 used	 where	 A‐frequency‐weighting	 was	
applied.	Several	locations	on	the	vessel	were	surveyed:	cabin,	bridge,	engine	room	(next	to	the	
main	engines	and	in	the	bow	thrusters’	area),	engine	control	room,	cargo	deck	and	dirty	mess.	
Several	measurements	were	 conducted	 on	 each	 location	 for	 the	 different	modes	 of	 operation	
(working,	 non‐working,	 etc.).	 Average	 equivalent	 continuous	 sound	 levels	 (Leq)	 results	 in	
decibel	(dB)	are	presented.		
SHIP	MOTION	MEASUREMENT	
Motion	was	measured	by	using	a	high‐precision	tri‐axis	inertial	sensor,	ADIS16364,	a	product	of	
Analog	Devices.	The	sensor	can	measure	tri‐axis	angular	velocities	(roll,	pitch	and	yaw)	as	well	
as	tri‐axis	translational	accelerations	(surge,	sway	and	heave)	at	the	same	time.	The	sensor	was	
placed	in	the	cabin,	mounted	on	the	floor	facing	forward	parallel	to	the	ship’s	longitudinal	axis	
and	connected	to	a	personal	computer	by	means	of	a	universal	serial	bus	(USB)	cable.	Figure	3	
shows	the	distance	of	the	sensor	relative	to	the	centerline,	the	midship	line	and	the	waterline.	
Due	to	some	limitations	 in	the	study,	 the	 location	of	 the	sensor	could	not	be	kept	at	 the	exact	
same	spot.	
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Figure	3	Location	of	the	motion	sensor	during	the	survey		
Measurements	 were	 performed	 during	 the	 whole	 trip,	 from	 the	 time	 when	 the	 vessel	 was	
berthing	 and	 loading	 at	 the	 base,	 sailing,	 completing	 the	 offshore	mission,	 until	 she	 returned	
back	to	the	base.	The	sampling	rate	was	set	to	204	samples	per	second,	which	was	the	lowest	
frequency.	 Data	 was	 recorded	 in	 files,	 storing	 300.000	 samples	 per	 file.	 All	 three	 rotational	
velocities	 and	 three	 translational	 accelerations	 were	 recorded	 simultaneously	 with	 time,	
however	only	roll	(x_gyro),	pitch	(y_gyro),	lateral	acceleration	(y_acc)	and	vertical	acceleration	
(z_acc)	were	 further	processed	and	reported.	 In	 total	690	 files	were	collected	 in	 the	period	of	
283	hours	for	both	OSVs	in	summer	and	winter.	Recorded	data	were	downsized	and	a	low	pass	
filter	 was	 applied	 to	 reduce	 noise	 and	 other	 irrelevant	 high	 frequency	 signals.	 Rotational	
velocities	were	recorded	in	degrees	per	second	[deg/s]	while	translational	accelerations	were	in	
g‐force	 [g].	 For	 further	 analyses,	 rotational	 velocities	 were	 integrated	 to	 motions	 and	 were	
presented	in	degrees	[deg].	Irregular	extreme	values	were	checked	and	peculiarities	caused	by	
errors	in	measurement	were	removed.		
Results	 for	 each	 15‐minute	 record	 were	 presented	 in	 the	 form	 time	 series	 and	 spectrum	
diagram,	utilizing	a	Fast	Fourier	Transform	(FFT)	algorithm.	Statistical	values	of	the	results	for	
each	 OSV	 on	 each	 trip	 were	 calculated	 and	 summarized.	 MII	 index	 (Graham	 1990)	 and	 MSI	
index	(McCauley,	Royal,	Wylie,	O'Hanlon	and	Mackie	1976)	were	also	calculated	by	utilizing	an	
existing	in‐house	code.	Examples	of	a	15‐minute	period	of	roll	and	pitch	data	processed	using	
Matlab	v	2012a	are	presented	in	Figure	4	(velocity)	and	Figure	5	(motion).	Figure	6	shows	an	
example	 of	 lateral	 acceleration	 (sideways	 in	 y‐direction)	 and	 vertical	 acceleration	 which	
indicates	local	heave.	
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Figure	4	Roll	and	pitch	velocity	on	OSV	A	in	the	winter	
	
Figure	5	Roll	and	pitch	motion	on	OSV	A	in	the	winter	
	
Figure	6	Lateral	and	vertical	acceleration	on	OSV	A	in	the	winter	
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QUESTIONNAIRES:	DAILY	DIARIES	
An	anonymous	form	was	developed	based	on	the	NATO	questionnaire	(Colwell	2000;	Haward	et	
al.	 2009)	 and	 distributed	 among	 seafarers	 to	 be	 completed	 after	 every	 watch.	 A	 detail	
description	 regarding	 the	 questionnaire	 is	 presented	 in	 Part	 II	 (Rumawas,	 Asbjørnslett	 and	
Klöckner	2016).		
RESULTS	
In	the	summer,	the	weather	was	typically	calm	with	light	winds	and	the	sea	relatively	flat.	On	
the	contrary,	during	winter,	the	weather	tended	to	be	harsh,	characterized	by	strong	wind	and	
high	seas.	Sometimes,	the	vessels	were	not	even	allowed	to	sail	and	most	of	the	vessels	in	the	
area	were	called	in.		
Each	vessel	was	visited	two	times	for	this	study;	first	in	the	summer	and	second	in	the	winter.	
Each	visit	took	approximately	three	days	which	correspond	to	the	length	of	each	mission	of	the	
vessel.	Results	presented	 in	 this	research	cover	 the	environmental	conditions	or	 the	sea	state	
during	 the	 survey	 (predicted	 and	 recorded	 in	 the	 log	 book),	 the	 noise	 and	 motion	
measurements,	and	the	onboard	questionnaires	filled	in	by	the	seafarers	after	every	watch.		
ESTIMATED	SEA	CONDITIONS	AND	SHIPS’	LOG		
Figure	 7	 and	Figure	8	 show	 the	 estimated	 significant	wave	height	 (Hs)	 and	peak	period	 (Tp)	
along	the	trip	during	the	survey.	During	the	voyage	in	summer,	the	seafarers	on	OSV	B	assessed	
the	sea	as	moderate	(sea	state	4),	while	on	OSV	A	they	measured	the	sea	as	being	smooth	(sea	
state	2).	 In	 the	winter,	OSV	A	mostly	 logged	 sea	 state	5	 to	6	 (rough	 to	very	 rough)	 along	 the	
survey,	while	on	OSV	B	was	recorded	as	4	(moderate).	
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Figure	7	Estimated	sea	conditions	during	the	survey	in	summer	
	
Figure	8	Estimated	sea	conditions	during	the	survey	in	winter	
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NOISE	LEVEL	MEASUREMENT	
Results	of	noise	measurement	in	different	spots	on	the	two	OSVs	are	presented	in	Table	6.	Most	
of	the	measurements	were	conducted	more	than	once	in	different	operational	mode.	However,	
the	observations	did	not	vary	much	(+/‐	2	dB).	All	observations	did	satisfy	 the	criteria	set	by	
DNV	(Table	1)	as	well	as	by	IMO	(Table	2).		
Table	6	Noise	level	measurement	result	
Location	on	the	vessel	 Summer	 Winter	
OSV	A	 OSV	B	 OSV	A	 OSV	B	
Bridge	 59.7	 59.4	 57.5	
Bridge	(with	moderate	music)	 63.2	 61.4	 	 	
Cabin	(normal)	 40.9	 45.4	 42.4	 41.8	
Cabin	(on	DP)	 49.7	 	 56.7	 	
Cabin	(deck	machineries.	windlass	operating)	 	 	 49.5	 	
Cabin	(sailing	in	high	seas	with	slamming)	 	 	 54.1	 	
Engine	control	room	(normal)	 57.9	 66.7	 58.9	 57.7	
Engine	control	room	(with	additional	noises;	
music,	and	people	chatting)	 71.2	 		 		 61.7	
Engine	room	(main	engines)	 104.6	 105.9	 103.8	 104.9	
Engine	room	(bow	thrusters)	 96.5	 101.7	 102.3	 91.4	
Engine	room	(bow	thrusters.	non‐working)	 93.1	 73.2	 91.7	 70.0	
Cargo	deck	(muster	station)	 71.0	 85.9	 68.5	 83.9	
Dirty	mess,	workshop	 67.9	 77.7	 64.6	 78.8	
Noise	problems	caused	by	air	intake	to	the	engine	room	was	reported	on	the	muster	station	of	
OSV	B	 (Rumawas	 and	Asbjørnslett	 2013).	Measurement	on	 the	 location	 shows	 that	 the	noise	
level	was	below	the	limit	of	90	dB(A);	85.9	dB(A)	in	summer	and	83.9	dB	(A)	in	winter.		
Slamming	was	reported	to	be	disturbing	by	the	crew	on	OSV	A	and	high	pitch	noise	caused	by	
tunnel	 thrusters	was	reported	to	 interrupt	sleep	(Rumawas	and	Asbjørnslett	2013),	while	 	on	
OSV	B	it	was	the	squeaking	noise	from	the	deck	machineries,	hammering	noise	from	the	people	
working	 on	 the	 deck	 and	 creaking	 noise	 in	 the	 cabin	 that	 were	 found	 to	 be	 disturbing.	 The	
measurement	 performed	 in	 this	 study	 showed	 that	 there	 was	 a	 substantial	 difference,	 F(1,	
10)=37.458,	p<.001,	in	the	cabin’s	noise	level	between	normal	operation	and	on	DP	on	OSV	A	in	
summer.	Yet,	the	highest	level	of	noise	recorded	on	DP	and	sailing	in	high	seas	with	slamming	
were	still	 lower	 than	 the	maximum	 limit	of	60	dB(A).	The	 impulsive	noise	and	 the	high	pitch	
tone	could	not	be	captured	nor	reflected	by	the	outlined	procedures	in	this	study	(ISO	1996;	ISO	
2008).	
In	summer,	the	cabin	on	OSV	A	was	quieter	than	the	one	on	OSV	B,	i.e.,	40.9	dB(A)	on	OSV	A	and	
45.4	 dB(A)	 on	 OSV	 B.	 Cabins	 on	 OSV	 B	 was	 located	 closer	 to	 the	 engine	 room,	 giving	 more	
hissing	noises.	On	OSV	A,	during	normal	condition	the	situation	was	quiet.	But	in	high	seas,	the	
vessel	struggled	with	the	waves	and	winds,	consequently	generating	more	noise.		
In	 some	 places,	 the	 noise	 level	 on	 OSV	 B	was	 substantially	 higher	 than	 A,	 but	 there	 was	 no	
significant	difference	 in	the	aggregate	noise	 level	on	OSV	A	(M=70.39,	SD=18.82)	compared	to	
OSV	B	(M=	71.99,	SD=20.06),	F(1,	16)=.030,	p>.10.	Due	to	the	heat	in	summer,	the	crew	tends	to	
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left	the	doors	in	the	accommodation	open,	to	let	the	air	circulates.	This	condition	also	allowed	
the	noise	from	outside	to	propagate	in.	On	OSV	B,	it	explains	why	the	average	noise	levels	in	the	
bridge	 and	 in	 the	 cabin	 were	 slightly	 higher	 during	 summer.	 However,	 the	 noise	 level	
differences	between	summer	and	winter	in	the	engine	room	and	engine	control	room	on	OSV	B	
are	worth	noted	 and	 should	be	 explored	 further.	There	was	no	detail	 observation	performed	
during	the	survey	that	can	be	used	to	explain	the	phenomena.	
MOTION	MEASUREMENT	
Summary	of	statistical	analyses	on	motion	measurements	are	presented	in	Table	7	(roll),	Table	
8	(pitch)	and	Table	9	(translational	accelerations).	The	average	magnitude	of	the	motion	during	
each	 watch	 period	 was	 calculated,	 covering	 roll	 motion	 RMS	 [deg],	 pitch	 RMS	 [deg],	 lateral	
acceleration	RMS	[g]	and	vertical	acceleration	RMS	[g].	
ROLL	MOTION	
The	RMS	of	roll	velocity	on	OSV	A	during	summer	was	0.390	deg/s,	while	in	the	winter	it	was	
0.946	 deg/s.	 The	 RMS	 of	 roll	 motion	 was	 0.163	 deg	 in	 summer	 and	 0.355	 deg	 in	 winter,	
maximum	0.948	deg	 in	 summer	and	1.934	deg	 in	winter.	On	OSV	B,	RMS	 roll	 velocities	were	
0.318	deg/s	in	the	summer	and	0.355	deg/s	in	the	winter	which	leaded	to	RMS	of	0.124	deg	and	
0.127	 motions	 respectively.	 Figure	 9	 shows	 maximum,	 minimum	 and	 RMS	 of	 roll	 motions	
during	the	whole	survey	for	both	OSVs.	Rolling	periods	(in	sec),	derived	from	the	motions	were	
also	 calculated	 and	 presented	 in	 the	 figure.	 Rolling	 period	 OSV	 A	 (M=6.68,	 SD=0.521)	 was	
significantly	lower	than	of	OSV	B	(M=7.13,	SD=0.856),	F(1,	688)=70.357,	p<.001.	These	findings	
supported	that	OSV	A	was	more	sensitive	to	roll	motion	(Rumawas	and	Asbjørnslett	2013).	
With	respect	to	comfort	evaluation,	no	condition	was	found	beyond	any	of	the	criteria	presented	
in	Table	3	and	Table	4,	even	if	these	vessels	were	considered	as	cruise	liners.	The	highest	RMS	
roll	motion	measured	in	our	survey	was	0.54	deg,	while	the	criterion	for	cruise	liners	is	2	deg.	
Table	7	Summary	of	statistical	analyses	for	roll	velocity	and	roll	motion	
OSV	 Season	 Roll	Velocity	[deg/s]	 Roll	Motion	[deg]	
Min	 Mean	 Max	 RMS	 Min	 Mean	 Max	 RMS	
A	 Summer	 ‐2.463	 ‐0.391	 1.688 0.390 ‐0.801 0.000 0.948	 0.163	Winter	 ‐7.150	 ‐0.400	 5.763 0.946 ‐1.846 0.000 1.934	 0.355	
B	 Summer	 ‐2.288	 ‐0.430	 1.400 0.318 ‐0.677 0.000 0.701	 0.124	Winter	 ‐2.600	 ‐0.376	 1.788 0.355 ‐0.903 0.000 0.870	 0.127	
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Figure	9	Calculated	roll	motions	during	the	surveys	for	both	OSVs	
	
PITCH	MOTION	
On	average,	1.233	deg/s	(RMS)	of	pitch	velocity	was	measured	on	OSV	A	in	the	winter,	while	in	
the	summer	it	was	0.294	deg/s	(RMS).	This	gave	an	average	of	0.483	deg	(RMS)	pitch	motion	in	
winter	and	0.127	deg	(RMS)	in	the	summer.	On	OSV	B,	higher	pitch	was	found	in	the	summer	
0.605	deg/s	(RMS)	and	winter	0.375	deg/s	(RMS).	This	gave	a	0.605	deg	(RMS)	and	0.375	deg	
(RMS)	 pitch	motions	 respectively.	 Table	 8	 presents	 a	 detailed	 summary	 of	 pitch	 velocity	 and	
pitch	motion	measured	during	the	survey.		
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Table	8	Summary	of	statistical	analyses	for	pitch	velocity	and	pitch	motion	
OSV	 Season	 Pitch	Velocity	[deg/s]	 Pitch	Motion	[deg]	
Min	 Mean	 Max	 RMS	 Min	 Mean	 Max	 RMS	
A	 Summer	 ‐1.325	 0.644	 2.313 0.294 ‐0.888 0.000 0.828	 0.127	Winter	 ‐6.800	 0.698	 8.163 1.233 ‐2.525 0.000 3.073	 0.483	
B	 Summer	 ‐3.475	 0.639	 4.713 0.605 ‐1.915 0.000 1.882	 0.269	Winter	 ‐2.325	 0.708	 3.600 0.375 ‐1.440 0.000 1.419	 0.151	
	
Figure	10	shows	that	pitch	RMS	never	reached	1.5	deg	as	stated	by	the	NATO	criterion	in	Table	
3,	 but	 a	 maximum	 of	 0.74	 deg	 (RMS,	 OSV	 A,	 winter).	 The	 maximum	 pitch	 motion	 at	 that	
particular	 time	 reached	 a	 little	 above	 3	 degrees.	 Unlike	 the	 roll,	 the	 pitch	 period	 of	 OSV	 B	
(M=6.586,	SD=0.860)	did	not	differ	significantly	compared	to	OSV	A	(M=6.519,	SD=0.880),	F=(1,	
688)=1.012,	p>.10.	
	
Figure	10	Calculated	pitch	motions	during	the	surveys	for	both	OSVs	
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TRANSLATIONAL	ACCELERATIONS	
Table	9	shows	the	summary	of	the	statistical	values	for	both	lateral	and	vertical	accelerations,	
while	Figure	11	and	Figure	12	show	the	whole	range	of	the	data	recorded	during	the	surveys.	
The	highest	RMS	accelerations	measured	was	0.065	g	(lateral)	and	0.149	g	(vertical).	The	NATO	
criteria	(Table	3)	and	NORDFORSK	operability	criteria	(Table	4,	for	light	manual	work)	were	set	
to	 0.10	 g	 and	 0.20	 g	 for	 lateral	 and	 vertical	 accelerations	 respectively.	 The	 criteria	 were	
perfectly	met	at	all	time	during	our	survey,	including	in	sea	state	5	to	6,	where	the	wave	heights	
reached	more	than	10	m.	
Table	9	Summary	of	statistical	analyses	for	lateral	and	vertical	accelerations	
OSV	 Season	 Lateral	Acceleration	[g]	 Vertical	Acceleration	[g]	
Min	 Mean	 Max	 RMS	 Min	 Mean	 Max	 RMS	
A	 Summer	 ‐0.076	 0.010	 0.098 0.014 ‐0.149 ‐0.011 0.153	 0.026	Winter	 ‐0.269	 0.002	 0.263 0.038 ‐0.720 ‐0.012 0.562	 0.097	
B	 Summer	 ‐0.100	 0.015	 0.126 0.016 ‐0.156 ‐0.010 0.142	 0.024	Winter	 ‐0.125	 0.007	 0.124 0.015 ‐0.138 ‐0.011 0.111	 0.020	
	
	
Figure	11	Lateral	accelerations	measured	during	the	surveys	on	both	OSVs	
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Figure	12	Vertical	accelerations	measured	during	the	surveys	on	both	OSVs	
	
Figure	13	MII	and	MSI	calculated	during	the	surveys	on	both	OSVs	
	
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
‐1.0
‐0.8
‐0.6
‐0.4
‐0.2
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800
Pe
rio
d	[
sec
]
Ve
rti
cal
	ac
cel
era
tio
n	[
g]
Survey	time
Vertical	Acceleration	During	Survey
Max RMS Min Period
S	u	m	m	e	r
OSV B OSV A OSV B
OSV A
W	i	n	t	e	r
‐20
‐10
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
‐0.05
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800
MS
I	(%
)
MI
I	(n
um
be
r	o
f	in
cid
en
ces
	pe
r	m
inu
te)
Survey	time
Motion‐induced	Interruptions	and	Motion	Sickness	Incidences
MII MSI	@	4	hours
S	u	m	m	e	r W	i	n	t	e	r
OSV B OSV A
OSV B
OSV A
	17	
	
MII	AND	MSI	
The	MII	index	calculated	after	Graham	(1990)	during	the	survey	emerged	only	on	OSV	A	during	
winter	(Figure	13).	A	maximum	of	0.14	MII	per	minute	was	obtained	while	criterion	was	set	as	1	
per	minute	(Table	3).	The	maximum	risk	level	observed	in	the	survey	laid	between	“Possible”	to	
“Probable”	(Table	5).	These	results	looked	extremely	low	compared	to	the	experience	on	board.	
“0.14”	 is	 equivalent	 to	 one	MII	 in	 7	minutes,	while	 in	high	 seas,	 interruptions	occurred	more	
than	once	per	minute.	As	a	matter	of	 fact,	when	 the	wave	height	 reached	10	m,	 interruptions	
occurred	all	the	time;	the	crews	stopped	working	and	just	sat	tight	or	stood	still	by	holding	on	to	
something	to	keep	their	balance.	
The	MSI	index	calculated	for	4	hours	period	of	exposure	showed	the	average	of	less	than	5%	in	
summer	on	both	OSVs.	An	average	of	29%	MSI	was	calculated	on	OSV	A	during	winter	while	a	
maximum	of	50%	was	 indicated.	The	MSI	criterion	was	set	 to	be	20%	(Table	3).	On	OSV	B,	a	
maximum	of	23%	MSI	was	acquired	only	once,	 in	one	spike,	during	winter,	while	most	of	 the	
time	it	was	below	5%.	According	to	observations	on	board	during	the	survey,	only	a	few	of	the	
crew	actually	 experienced	MSI	 on	 either	 of	 the	OSVs.	The	majority	 of	 the	 seafarers	 state	 that	
they	became	tired	when	the	sea	was	harsh,	but	no	longer	nauseous.	The	majority	were	adapted	
to	motion	sickness.	
DISCUSSIONS	
NOISE	
Both	vessels	fulfilled	the	noise	criteria	set	by	IMO	(1981)	and	DNV	(2009),	even	if	 the	vessels	
were	rated	in	with	a	higher	comfort	rate.	However,	 it	 is	clear	that	the	current	noise	standards	
and	measurements	do	not	 represent	 the	 real	 comfort	 level	 perceived	by	personnel	 on	board,	
especially	for	sleeping.	The	existing	noise	level	standards,	which	specify	continuous	noise‐level	
measurements,	 were	 developed	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 a	 health	 perspective.	 The	 disturbing	 noises:		
short	 term	 impulsive	 noise	 (slamming),	 high	 pitch	 noise	 (tunnel	 thrusters	 and	 deck	
machineries)	and	squeaking	noise	are	not	yet	covered	nor	reflected	in	the	standard.	Therefore,	a	
noise	 measure	 based	 only	 on	 the	 equivalent	 continuous	 sound	 pressure	 level,	 expressed	 as	
dB(A)	is	not	sufficient	to	reflect	comfort	of	personnel	on	board.	The	World	Health	Organization	
(WHO)	published	a	document	on	community	noise	(Berglund,	Lindvall	and	Schwela	2009)	and	
specifies	 that	measures	 of	 individual	 events	 such	 as	 the	maximum	 noise	 level	 (LAmax),	 or	 the	
weighted	 sound	 exposure	 level	 (SEL)	 should	 also	 be	 acquired	 in	 addition	 to	 the	 A‐weighted	
equivalent	sound	 level	pressure	(LAeq)	when	there	are	distinct	events.	Two	sets	of	criteria	are	
therefore	presented:	for	continuous	noise	(LAeq	 in	dB(A))	and	for	single	sound	events	(LAmax	 in	
dB).	For	example,	the	guideline	values	for	bedrooms	are	30	dB	LAeq	for	continuous	noise	and	45	
dB	 LAmax	 for	 individual	 noise	 event.	 These	 numbers	 appear	 to	 be	 more	 realistic	 to	 induce	
comfort	 and	 to	 prevent	 sleep	 disturbances.	 In	 addition	 a	 frequency	 analysis	 should	 be	
performed	when	the	difference	between	dB(C)	and	dB	(A)	measurements	 is	more	than	10	dB.	
This	can	be	done	by	octave	band	analysis,	1/3	‐octave	band	analysis	or	narrow‐band	analysis	
(FFT).	A	spectral	analysis	may	be	utilized	to	assess	annoyance	(Brüel	&	Kjær	Sound	&	Vibration	
Measurement	 2000).	 ISO	 1996‐1	 (ISO	 2003)	 specifies	 a	 Rating	 Level	 (Lr)	 parameter	which	 is	
defined	as	a	numerical	value	to	quantify	a	level	of	annoyance	of	a	noise	in	relation	to	the	people.	
The	parameter	uses	 the	 adjusted	A‐weighted	 equivalent	 continuous	measure	 (LAeq)	 and	 takes	
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into	account	other	factors	such	as	impulsiveness,	tonality,	and	time	of	day.	There	is	no	criterion	
set	in	ISO	1996‐1	standard	regarding	the	maximum	Rating	Level	that	cannot	be	exceeded.	These	
are	regulated	separately	by	other	authorities	such	as	national	or	local	authority.		
The	 downside	 about	 noise	 problem	 on	 OSVs	 is	 that	 it	 occurs	 intermittently,	 in	 parallel	 with	
activities	positioned	near	an	offshore	installation	on	DP.	The	people	who	are	supposed	to	rest	
during	that	period	cannot	have	a	good	and	sufficient	sleep	because	of	the	disruption.	For	OSVs,	
operating	on	DP	is	one	of	the	main	operational	modes.	The	positive	side	regarding	noise	is	that	
it	is	not	considered	disturbing	while	on	watch.	
The	 crew	on	OSV	B	 claim	 that	 their	 vessel	 is	quiet	 (Rumawas	and	Asbjørnslett	2013).	 In	 this	
study	we	found	that	the	noise	level	on	OSV	B	is	slightly	higher	than	OSV	A,	although	not	being	
statistically	 significant.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 there	 are	 substantially	 more	 complaints	 on	 OSV	 A	
regarding	sleep‐disturbing	noise	and	watch‐disturbing	noise	compared	to	OSV	B.	Noise	level	is	
set	 and	 measured	 at	 specified	 locations.	 However	 comfort	 level	 perceived	 by	 the	 crew	 is	
determined	by	the	location	where	they	are.	For	instance,	the	noise	level	produced	by	the	tunnel	
thrusters	when	operating	on	OSV	A	and	OSV	B	do	not	differ	at	all	 for	both	OSVs	use	the	same	
equipment.	 But,	 the	 distance	 from	 the	 tunnel	 thrusters	 to	 the	 location	 of	 the	 people	 differ	
considerably.	Similar	explanations	are	found	for	the	deck	machinery	noise	and	slamming.		
MOTION	
The	motion	 studies	 show	 that	 all	 the	 criteria	 set	 by	NORDFORSK	 (1987)	 and	NATO	 STANAG	
(2000)	 are	 completely	 met	 in	 all	 conditions	 on	 both	 OSVs.	 The	 vessels	 have	 very	 small	 roll	
motions	compared	to	the	standards.	It	becomes	evident	that	the	criterion	set	for	the	roll	motion	
is	too	high,	at	least	for	OSVs,	as	they	never	are	exceeded.	The	criteria	set	for	pitch	seems	to	be	
more	reasonable	compared	to	the	observed	motion	on	the	vessels.	A	similar	conclusion	is	found	
for	 vertical	 and	 lateral	 accelerations	 as	 the	 results	 from	 the	 survey	 came	 near	 the	 criteria.	
However,	 referring	 to	 our	 experience	on	board	during	 the	most	 extreme	 condition,	when	 the	
RMS	 of	 the	 roll	 was	 0.54	 deg,	 the	 pitch	was	 0.74	 deg,	 vertical	 acceleration	was	 0.149	 g	 and	
lateral	acceleration	was	0.065	g,	it	was	difficult	to	stand	still	on	the	vessel.	The	criteria	still	allow	
heavy	 manual	 work	 to	 be	 performed	 in	 conditions	 up	 to	 4	 deg	 of	 roll,	 0.15	 g	 of	 vertical	
acceleration	and	0.07	g	of	lateral	acceleration.	We	strongly	argue	that	it	is	impossible	to	conduct	
safe	heavy	manual	work	under	such	conditions.		
With	 respect	 to	 comfort,	motion	 is	 identified	as	one	of	 the	most	disturbing	 factors.	When	 the	
weather	is	extreme,	it	is	not	uncommon	that	someone	finds	themselves	thrown	out	of	their	bed	
while	 sleeping.	 In	 contrast	 to	noise	which	occurs	 continuously,	motion	 takes	effect	 in	periods	
with	bad	weather	and	extreme	sea	states.	Some	people	argue	that	motion	is	part	of	the	risk	of	
going	to	sea	and	cannot	be	avoided.	We	did	witness	that	most	people	working	on	both	OSVs	are	
adapted	to	MSI.	On	the	other	hand,	we	also	notice	that	motions	are	possible	to	manipulate	and	
its	effect	can	be	made	more	acceptable	to	humans.	OSV	B	can	be	seen	as	an	evidence	of	this.		
NORDFORSK	(1987)	seems	to	be	quite	an	outdated	standard.	When	it	was	developed,	the	main	
focus	was	on	 seakeeping	 and	operability	with	 respect	 to	 safety	 and	not	 comfort.	 Some	of	 the	
criteria	 were	 determined	 based	 on	 expert	 judgment,	 specifically	 by	 captains	 on	 merchant	
vessels.	 NATO	 STANAG	 (2000)	 was	 developed	 primarily	 for	 military	 purposes	 where	 well‐
trained	navy	personnel	were	taken	as	 the	reference	population.	Most	operability	criteria:	MII,	
	19	
	
roll,	pitch,	vertical	acceleration,	lateral	acceleration	and	slamming	are	unrealistic	for	the	vessels	
studied.	They	need	to	be	revised	to	not	only	to	induce	comfort	but	also	to	ensure	safety.		
SLAMMING	
Seakeeping	 criteria	 state	 that	 a	maximum	 of	 three	 slamming	 occurrences	 is	 allowed	 for	 100	
pitch	 motions	 (.03).	 In	 reality,	 it	 is	 required	 that	 people	 can	 have	 a	 continuous	 sleep,	
uninterrupted	 for	 six	 hours.	 The	 standard	 implies	 roughly	 three	 slamming	 per	 hour.	 Three	
slamming	 is	 more	 than	 enough	 to	 interrupt	 sleep.	 One	 may	 argue	 that	 the	 crew	 could	 do	
voluntary	speed	reduction	once	they	 feel	 that	 the	vessel	 is	going	through	harsh	conditions.	 In	
reality,	 vessels	 operate	 on	 tight	 schedules.	 Voluntary	 speed	 reduction	 may	 be	 effective	 to	 a	
certain	degree,	but	efforts	to	reduce	slamming	should	also	be	taken	already	in	the	design	stage.	
According	to	our	experience,	1	slamming	per	hour	is	the	maximum	that	one	can	tolerate	when	
sleeping.	 Fortunately,	 particularly	 for	 working	 vessels,	 slamming	 only	 takes	 place	 when	 the	
vessel	is	cruising.	Another	advantage	is	that	a	lot	of	efforts	have	been	performed	in	the	industry	
to	reduce	slamming	i.e.	by	designing	the	optimum	hull	form.	
MOTION‐INDUCED	INTERRUPTIONS	
Graham	 (1990)	 applies	 a	 statics	 theoretical	 approach	 to	 describe	 MII	 where	 the	 person	 is	
modeled	 as	 a	 rigid	 body.	 It	 was	 derived	 as	 a	 function	 of	 roll	 and	 heave	 components.	 In	 the	
present	study,	we	see	that	the	pitch	component	is	more	dominant.	A	considerably	low	MII	was	
acquired	 compare	 to	 the	 actual	 MII	 experienced	 on	 board	 (see	 Part	 II	 for	 more	 detail	
information).	 The	MII	 index	 after	Graham	 (1990)	 needs	 to	 be	 extended	 to	 cover	more	 forces	
motion,	 especially	 pitch.	 It	 also	 needs	 to	 be	 calibrated	 for	 non‐military	 personnel	 doing	 non‐
military	activities.	 In	parallel,	 the	MII	 risk	 levels	 (Table	5)	are	overly	optimistic.	They	are	not	
applicable	for	non‐military	population	and	need	to	be	amended.	
MOTION	SICKNESS	INCIDENCE	
The	 MSI	 index	 calculated	 after	 McCauley	 et	 al	 (1976)	 is	 too	 conservative	 for	 the	 population	
taken	 as	 the	 sample	 in	 this	 survey	 (see	 Part	 II	 for	more	 detail	 information),	 but	 shows	 good	
agreement	with	 the	new	trainees	on	board.	This	 finding	 is	very	sensible,	 considering	 that	 the	
reference	 subjects	 involved	 in	 McCauley’s	 study	 were	 students.	 Improving	 the	 model	 for	 a	
broader	population	and	applying	the	appropriate	reference	for	a	particular	type	of	vessel	will	be	
issues	for	improvement.	Figure	9	to	Figure	12	present	the	motions	periods	along	the	survey	and	
they	are	close	to	the	most	critical	frequency	for	motion	sickness	of	0.167	Hz	and	equivalent	to	6	
seconds	period.	This	 is	 a	 tough	challenge	 for	 ships	designed	 to	operate	 in	 the	Norwegian	Sea	
where	the	sea	conditions	often	get	near	to	the	critical	frequency.	Moving	the	superstructure	to	
the	aft	 is	one	alternative	 that	works	and	already	recognized	by	the	crew	on	OSV	B.	Modifying	
hull	design	 is	another	approach	that	 is	currently	developed:	 the	X‐bow	and	the	wave‐piercing	
hull	designs	are	examples.		
CONCLUSION	
A	 comprehensive	 study	 to	 evaluate	 human	 factors	 in	 ship	 design	 has	 been	 completed.	 Two	
comfort	 class	 offshore	 supply	 vessels	 were	 taken	 as	 samples	 of	 the	 study.	 In	 this	 first	 part,	
human	 factors	 related	 criteria	 were	 referred	 and	 summarized.	 Field	 surveys	 with	 direct	
measurements	and	observations	on	board	were	reported,	analyzed	and	concluded.	Comparison	
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between	 the	existing	 criteria	 and	 the	observations	on	board	has	been	performed.	The	 results	
show	that	the	standards	are	inadequate	and	less	effective	for	the	vessels	studied	therefore	they	
should	be	revised	and	improved	for	better	relevance.	
 Noise	 criteria	 set	 by	 IMO	 (1981)	 and	 DNV	 (2009)	 do	 not	 reflect	 comfort	 but	 health.	
Disturbing	 noises	 such	 as	 impulsive	 noise,	 high	 pitch	 noise,	 squeaking	 noise	 and	
hammering	noise	are	not	covered	by	the	standard.	The	maximum	values	of	the	noise,	the	
number	 of	 the	 noise	 events	 combined	 with	 the	 frequency	 analysis	 should	 also	 be	
measured	 to	 ensure	 comfort,	 especially	 for	 those	 vessels	 which	 missions	 may	 take	
weeks	of	operation	at	sea.	
 Motions	 criteria:	 roll,	 pitch	 and	 accelerations	 set	 by	 NATO	 (2000)	 and	 NORDFORSK	
(1987)	 are	 not	 realistic	 as	 they	 are	 lenient	 for	 the	 vessels	 surveyed	 in	 this	 study.	 For	
instance,	 	 the	 maximum	 allowable	 roll	 motion	 is	 4	 deg	 (NATO	 2000)	 and	 6	 deg	
(NORDFORSK	1987)	while	 the	 highest	 roll	motion	 recorded	 in	more	 than	 10	m	wave	
height	was	only	 0.54	deg	 (RMS).	The	 criteria	need	 to	be	adjusted,	 especially	 for	 those	
working	vessels	that	are	represented	by	this	study.		
 Slamming	is	important	for	comfort	as	it	interrupts	sleep	and	makes	it	difficult	for	people	
to	fall	asleep.	The	existing	criterion	for	slamming	of	0.03,	i.e.	3	slamming	per	100	pitch	
motions	 is	 too	 moderate	 and	 it	 does	 not	 facilitate	 people	 to	 have	 adequate	 sleep	 on	
board.	One	slamming	per	hour	or	at	least	a	0.01	criterion	is	proposed.	
 The	 MII	 index	 calculated	 after	 Graham	 (1990)	 is	 relatively	 low	 compared	 to	 the	
observations	on	board.	It	needs	to	be	extended	and	adjusted	for	better	validity.	
 The	 MSI	 index	 developed	 by	 McCauley	 et	 al	 (1976)	 shows	 rather	 elevated	 figures	
compared	 to	 the	 crews	 experience	 on‐board.	 The	 predictions	 are	 rather	 low	 for	 a	
population	that	has	adapted	to	live	at	sea	for	periods	of	time.	It	should	be	adjusted	with	
an	adaptation	factor.	
To	sum	up,	it	can	be	concluded	that	the	existing	criteria	of	human	factors	do	not	ensure	comfort	
of	personnel	on	offshore	supply	vessels	operating	 in	Norwegian	Sea.	The	standards	 that	were	
followed	appear	like	a	formality	for	the	type	of	vessels	represented	in	this	study.	Further	studies	
that	include	more	vessels	are	recommended.		
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HUMAN	FACTORS	EVALUATION	IN	SHIP	DESIGN:		
A	CASE	STUDY	ON	OFFSHORE	SUPPLY	VESSELS	IN	THE	
NORWEGIAN	SEA,	PART	II:	MULTIVARIATE	ANALYSES	
AND	STRUCTURAL	MODELLING	
Keywords:	 Human	factors,	Noise,	Motion,	Slamming,	Daily	diary,	Sleep,	Sleep	problem,	MII,	
MSI,	Performance,	Multivariate	analysis,	Structural	Equation	Modelling	
ABSTRACT	
Surveys	 were	 conducted	 in	 the	 Norwegian	 Sea	 to	 evaluate	 the	 adequacy	 of	 human	 factors	
criteria	 in	 ship	design	by	 taking	 two	offshore	 supply	vessels	 as	 the	 samples.	Two	 reports	 are	
being	published	to	present	the	results.	Part	I	covers	the	theoretical	background	and	reports	the	
technical	aspects	of	the	research	that	include	noise,	motion	and	slamming.	It	is	concluded	that	
the	 existing	 human	 factors	 criteria	 are	 unjustifiable	 and	 need	 to	 be	 adjusted	 for	 the	 vessels	
studied.	This	paper	aims	to	discover	important	factors	that	are	relevant	to	seafarers’	conditions	
and	performance	at	sea.	Physical	measurements	were	performed	together	with	crew	member’s	
subjective	evaluation	of	ship	board	conditions.	Surveys	were	conducted	in	two	periods:	summer	
and	winter.	The	environmental	conditions	such	as	significant	wave	height	(Hs)	and	peak	period	
(Tp)	were	recorded	during	the	survey.	Noise	and	motion	were	measured	on	the	vessel.	Sleep,	
sleep	 problems,	 seafarers’	 conditions	 and	 performance	 were	 evaluated	 by	 means	 of	 self‐
administered	 questionnaires.	 Interconnectivities	 between	 variables	 of	 interest	 were	
investigated	using	multivariate	analysis	and	a	structural	model	was	developed.		
INTRODUCTION	
A	 comprehensive	 study	 to	 evaluate	 the	 implementation	of	 human	 factors	 (HF)	 in	 ship	design	
was	 conducted.	 Due	 to	 the	 extent	 of	 the	 study,	 the	 results	 are	 reported	 in	 two	 parts.	 Part	 I	
(Rumawas,	Asbjørnslett	and	Klöckner	2016)	covers	 the	background	of	 the	study,	 the	relevant	
standards,	the	scope	of	work	and	the	research	design.	It	also	reports	the	technical	aspects	of	the	
study	 that	 include	 noise,	 motion,	 slamming,	motion‐induced	 interruptions	 (MII)	 and	motion‐
sickness	incidence	(MSI).	Results	of	on	board	measurements	were	compared	to	the	standards.	It	
is	concluded	that	the	existing	criteria	of	human	factors	are	neither	realistic	nor	effective,	for	the	
vessels	studied.	
This	 paper	 (Part	 II)	 covers	 the	 seafarers’	 evaluations	 along	 the	 survey	 and	 reports	 their	
conditions	and	performance	and	is	complementary	to	the	Part	I	study.	The	aim	of	this	part	is	to	
verify	factors	that	considerably	influence	seafarers’	performance	at	sea.	The	greater	objective	of	
the	study	is	to	lower	the	probability	of	accidents	at	sea.		
METHODOLOGY	
Most	of	the	method	of	measurements	performed	in	this	study	was	covered	in	Part	I.	Information	
regarding	 the	 environmental	 conditions	 was	 obtained	 from	 weather	 forecasts,	 visual	
observations	and	onboard	measurements.	Noise	level	was	measured	by	means	of	class	2	sound	
	2	
	
level	 meter	 Bruel	 &	 Kjaer	 Type	 2236.	 Motion	 was	 measured	 with	 a	 high‐precision	 sensor,	
ADIS16364	 from	 Analog	 Device.	 To	 measure	 what	 happened	 on	 the	 humans’	 side,	 a	
questionnaire	was	constructed.	
QUESTIONNAIRES:	DAILY	DIARIES	
A	questionnaire	was	developed	based	on	the	NATO	questionnaire	(Colwell	2000;	Haward,	Lewis	
and	 Griffin	 2009)	 (see	 Appendix).	 Some	 adjustments	 were	 made	 based	 on	 preliminary	
observations	 on	 board	 (Rumawas	 and	 Asbjørnslett	 2013),	 to	 fit	 offshore	 supply	 vessel’s	
operation.	Four	aspects	were	measured	by	the	questionnaire:	sleeping	condition,	symptoms	on	
watch,	performance	on	watch	and	problems	on	watch.	“Sleeping	condition”	probed	whether	the	
respondents	sleep	before	they	went	to	watch,	how	good	and	how	long	their	sleeps	were.	It	also	
checked	 if	 the	 respondent	 experienced	 sleeping	problems.	 “Symptoms	on	watch”	 covered	 the	
respondent’s	 conditions	 or	 wellbeing	 during	 their	 watch,	 checking	 if	 they	 were	 tired	
(physically),	fatigue	(mentally),	sleepy,	etc.	Questions	regarding	MII	and	MSI	were	also	included	
in	this	section.	“Performance	on	watch”	assessed	how	the	crews	rated	their	own	performance	
during	 the	watch	 they	 just	 completed;	 including	 the	amount	of	 tasks	 completed,	 the	 speed	 to	
complete	the	tasks,	and	the	other	qualities	related	to	performance.	“Problems	on	watch”	were	
divided	into	two:	ship‐related	and	non‐ship‐related	problems.		
The	 surveys	were	 conducted	 on	 two	different	OSV	designs	 and	 performed	 in	 summer	 and	 in	
winter.	Other	possible	influencing	factors	such	as	watch	time	(day	time	or	night	time)	and	type	
of	shifts	(long	shift	or	normal	shift)	are	also	recorded	and	further	analyzed.		
The	questionnaire	was	distributed	among	seafarers	and	to	be	completed	after	every	watch.	We	
explained	the	nature	of	the	study,	the	purpose	of	the	questionnaires	and	we	asked	the	crews	to	
participate	in	the	survey,	voluntarily.	It	was	totally	anonymous	and	confidential.		
Before	sailing,	every	seafarer	received	a	number	of	forms	sufficient	for	the	voyage,	in	order	to	
cover	 the	watches	 that	 they	were	 going	 to	make.	 A	 box	was	 provided	 in	 the	mess	 room	 for	
submitting	the	forms	after	being	completed	after	each	watch.	
DATA	ANALYSIS	
The	 answers	 were	 coded	 before	 they	 were	 analyzed.	 Table	 1	 shows	 how	 the	 “Yes	 or	 No”	
questions	and	the	“Likert‐scale”	questions	were	coded.	Checklists	were	tallied	and	summarized.	
Table	1	Coding	table	for	responses	
Question	 Coding	and	response	
Yes	or	No	questions	 0 0.5 1 	
Did	you	sleep	before	this	watch?	 No A	little Yes 	
Did	you	experience	sleeping	
problems?	
No A	little Yes 	
Likert‐type		 1 2 3 4	 5	
Quality	of	your	sleep	 Very	
poor	
Poor Fair Good	 Very	good
Amount	of	time	of	your	sleep/rest	 Too	little A	little
	
Fair Enough	 More	than	
enough	
Symptoms	 Severe Consider‐
able	
Somewhat A	little	 Not	at	all
Performance	 Very	bad Bad Fair Good	 Very	good
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Quantitative	 inferential	 statistical	 analyses	 were	 applied	 to	 draw	 conclusions.	 Multivariate	
analyses	 were	 performed	 to	 evaluate	 factors	 that	 influence	 seafarers’	 conditions	 and	
performance	 at	 sea.	 Structural	 equation	 model	 (SEM)	 was	 applied	 to	 present	 a	 model	 that	
shows	the	relationships	between	variables	of	interest	in	this	study.	
STRUCTURE	
The	rest	of	the	paper	is	presented	as	follows:		
 Results;	where	summaries	of	observations	are	presented	they	are	followed	by	simple	
comparisons	
 Analysis;	where	relationships	between	measured	variables	(including	Part	I)	are	
examined	by	means	of	multivariate	analysis	
 Discussions	
 Conclusions	
RESULTS	
Data	 regarding	 the	 environmental	 conditions,	 noise	 level	 measurement	 and	 motion	
measurement	(pitch,	roll	and	translational	accelerations)	are	presented	in	Part	I	(Rumawas	et	
al.	 2016).	 This	 paper	 presents	 the	 results	 of	 the	 seafarers’	 subjective	 evaluations	 on	 board	
regarding:	 sleeping	 or	 resting	 condition	 before	 the	watch,	 symptoms	 experienced	 during	 the	
watch,	performance	and	problems	encountered	during	the	watch.		
AFTER‐WATCH	QUESTIONNAIRES	
In	 total,	 188	 forms	were	 filled	 in	 and	 returned	 (Table	 2).	 It	was	 the	 same	 group	 of	 seafarers	
surveyed	in	the	summer	as	in	the	winter	time.	There	were	17‐18	members	on	each	OSV	on	each	
visit.	The	crew	in	general	can	be	divided	into	three	groups	according	to	their	watch	schedule;	
two	groups	work	alternately	in	normal	shift	and	one	group	works	long	shift.	The	former	filled	in	
around	five	to	six	questionnaires,	while	the	latter	handed	in	three.	OSV	A	follows	the	6/6	watch	
system	where	the	crew	watch	for	6	hours	and	then	off	for	the	next	6	hours.	OSV	B	follows	4/8	
system.	It	was	a	modification	of	the	6/6	system	by	extending	one	shift	for	the	crew	to	be	able	to	
get	one	long	sleep.	Long	shift	started	at	07:00	or	08:00	and	ended	at	19:00	or	21:00.	Each	group	
consisted	of	5	to	7	people,	including	some	trainees,	most	of	which	worked	long	shift.	
Table	2	Total	number	of	responses	collected	
Survey	period	 OSV	A	 OSV	B	 Total	
Summer	(July	2011)	 49	 53	 102	
Winter	(October	2011)	 52	 34	 86	
Total	 101	 87	 188	
SLEEPING	CONDITION	
Sleeping	behavior	
Only	25.8%	of	those	who	were	going	on	watch	during	the	night	actually	slept	before	they	went	
on	duty	(Table	3).	More	than	80%	of	those	who	were	going	on	watch	during	the	day	had	slept	
before	 their	watch.	 The	 difference	 between	 the	 two	watch	 groups	 on	 their	 sleeping	 behavior	
was	highly	significant,	χ2	(2,	N=185)=53.73,	p=<.001.			
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Table	3	Sleep	before	watch	
Question:	 Did	you	sleep	before	this	watch?	
Time	of	
Watch	 "No"	 "A	little"	 "Yes"	 Total	
Day	 3.0	%	 15.8	% 81.2	% 100	%
Night	 40.9	%	 33.3	% 25.8	% 100	%
Total	 18.4	%	 20.5	% 61.1	% 100	%
	
Sleeping	problems	
Variation	of	 sleeping	problems	was	 found	 significant	 across	OSVs,	 χ2	 (2,	N=164)=8.033,	p<.05	
and	across	seasons,	χ2	(2,	N=164)=8.194,	p<.05,	but	not	across	watch	time,	χ2	(2,	N=164)=0.312,	
p>.10	or	across	shifts	χ2	(2,	N=164)=4.588,	p>.10.	Table	4	shows	the	proportion	of	respondents	
having	 sleeping	 problems	 on	 both	 OSVs	 in	 summer	 and	 in	 winter.	 There	 was	 only	 one	
respondent	(2.4%)	that	experienced	sleeping	problems	on	OSV	A	in	summer	and	none	on	OSV	B.	
There	was	 only	 one	 respondent	 (3.6%)	 on	OSV	B	 that	 reported	 sleeping	 problems	 in	winter,	
while	 on	 OSV	 A	 there	 were	 eight	 (16.7%).	 These	 results	 supported	 the	 previous	 findings	
reported	by	the	crews	on	the	exploratory	surveys	(Rumawas	and	Asbjørnslett	2013).	The	two	
OSVs	showed	different	characteristics	in	terms	of	motion,	vibration,	and	noise.		
Table	4	Sleeping	problems	
Question:	 Did	you	experience	sleeping	problems?	
OSV	 Periode	 "No"	 "A	little"	 "Yes"	 Total	
A	 Summer	 73.2	%	 24.4	% 2.4	% 100	%	
	 Winter	 54.2	%	 29.2	% 16.7	% 100	%	
	 Sub	Total	 62.9	%	 27.0	% 10.1	% 100	%	
B	 Summer	 76.6	%	 23.4	% 0.0	% 100	%	
	 Winter	 85.7	%	 10.7	% 3.6	% 100	%	
	 Sub	Total	 80.0	%	 18.7	% 1.3	% 100	%	
Aggregate	 Summer	 75.0	%	 23.9	% 1.1	% 100	%	
	 Winter	 65.8	%	 22.4	% 11.8	% 100	%	
	 Grand	Total	 70.7	%	 23.2	% 6.1	% 100	%	
	
Seasonal	changes	contributed	to	a	substantial	difference	for	people	on	board	to	fall	asleep,	χ2	(2,	
N=140)=7.951,	p<.05	(see	Table	5).	However,	there	was	no	difference	found	across	OSVs,	χ2	(2,	
N=140)=2.211,	p>.10,	across	watch	time,	χ2	(2,	N=140)=3.306,	p>.10,	and	across	work	shifts,	χ2	
(2,	N=140)=1.092,	p>.10.	
Both	watch	time	and	work	shift	had	an	insignificant	influence	to	sleep	interruption	problems	on	
board	(p>.10,	see	Table	6).	Comparing	sleep	interruption	problems	reported	by	the	crew	on	two	
OSVs	only	in	summer	showed	no	significant	difference,	χ2	(2,	N=71)=.152,	p>.10,	while	in	winter	
the	difference	was	obviously	very	significant,	χ2	(2,	N=57)=9.662,	p<.01.	
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Table	5	Difficult	to	fall	asleep	 	
Question:	 Did	you	experience:	Difficult	to	fall	asleep?	
OSV	 Periode	 "No"	 "A	little"	 "Yes"	 Total	
A	 Summer	 72.2	%	 11.1	% 16.7	% 100	%	
	 Winter	 40.0	%	 35.0	% 25.0	% 100	%	
	 Sub	Total	 55.3	%	 23.7	% 21.1	% 100	%	
B	 Summer	 69.0	%	 14.3	% 16.7	% 100	%	
	 Winter	 63.6	%	 18.2	% 18.2	% 100	%	
	 Sub	Total	 67.2	%	 15.6	% 17.2	% 100	%	
Aggregate	 Summer	 70.5	%	 12.8	% 16.7	% 100	%	
	 Winter	 48.4	%	 29.0	% 22.6	% 100	%	
	 Grand	Total	 60.7	%	 20.0	% 19.3	% 100	%	
	
Table	6	Sleep	interrupted	 	
Question:	 Did	you	experience:	Sleep	interrupted?	
OSV	 Periode	 "No"	 "A	little"	 "Yes"	 Total	
A	 Summer	 75.8	%	 15.2	% 9.1	% 100	%	
	 Winter	 38.9	%	 36.1	% 25.0	% 100	%	
	 Sub	Total	 56.5	%	 26.1	% 17.4	% 100	%	
B	 Summer	 73.7	%	 18.4	% 7.9	% 100	%	
	 Winter	 81.0	%	 14.3	% 4.8	% 100	%	
	 Sub	Total	 76.3	%	 16.9	% 6.8	% 100	%	
Aggregate	 Summer	 74.6	%	 16.9	% 8.5	% 100	%	
	 Winter	 54.4	%	 28.1	% 17.5	% 100	%	
	 Grand	Total	 65.6	%	 21.9	% 12.5	% 100	%	
	
The	questionnaire	did	further	ask	for	the	causes	of	sleep	problems	experienced.	Table	7	shows	
the	 proportion	 of	 respondents	mentioning	 ship‐related	 sleep	 problems	 on	 both	 OSVs	 during	
summer	and	winter	surveys.	Table	8	shows	the	non‐ship	sleep	related	problems.	It	can	be	seen	
that	more	ship‐related	problems	were	reported	by	the	crew	during	the	survey.	Slamming	was	
the	most	 frequently	mentioned	 problem	 (13.8%),	 noise	was	 in	 the	 second	 (10.6%)	 and	 ship	
motion	was	in	the	third	highest	(9.6%).	The	forth	most	frequent	mentioned	was	temperature	or	
indoor	climate	(8.5%),	still	a	ship	related	problem.	The	fifth	in	the	rank	was	toilet	visit	(7.4%)	
which	was	the	most	reported	among	the	non‐ship‐related	sleep	causal	problems.	Habit	(6.4%)	
and	time	schedule	(5.9%)	were	the	second	and	third	stated	in	the	corresponding	category.		
Ship	motion,	 noise	 and	 vibration	were	 reported	 to	 disturb	 sleep	 on	 OSV	 A	mostly	 in	 winter	
while	 on	 OSV	 B	was	 in	 summer.	 Slamming	was	 only	 seen	 as	 a	 problem	 on	 OSV	 A	 in	winter.	
Indoor	climate	was	reported	constant	on	OSV	A	in	summer	and	winter,	while	on	OSV	B	only	in	
summer.	Not	a	single	ship‐related	sleep	disturbing	problem	was	actually	mentioned	on	OSV	B	in	
the	winter.	 However,	 the	 “Other”	 factor	 only	mentioned	 on	OSV	B	 (3.7%)	 and	 it	 consisted	 of	
training	(2),	phone	call	(1),	first	night	onboard	(1)	and	not	specified	(3).	
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Table	7	Ship‐related	sleep	causal	problems	
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OSV	A	 12.9	%	 16.8	%	 13.9	%	 25.7	% 13.9	% 0.0	% 2.0	%	
Summer	 2.0	%	 12.2	%	 6.1	%	 0.0	%	 14.3	% 0.0	% 4.1	%	
Winter	 23.1	%	 21.2	%	 21.2	%	 50.0	% 13.5	% 0.0	% 0.0	%	
OSV	B	 5.7	%	 3.4	%	 3.4	%	 0.0	%	 2.3	%	 0.0	% 1.1	%	
Summer	 9.4	%	 5.7	%	 5.7	%	 0.0	%	 3.8	%	 0.0	% 1.9	%	
Winter	 0.0	%	 0.0	%	 0.0	%	 0.0	%	 0.0	%	 0.0	% 0.0	%	
Total	 9.6	%	 10.6	%	 9.0	%	 13.8	% 8.5	%	 0.0	% 1.6	%	
	
Table	8	Non‐ship‐related	sleep	causal	problems	
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OSV	A	 2.0	%	 3.0	%	 5.0	%	 1.0	%	 2.0	% 2.0	% 1.0	% 3.0	% 0.0	% 5.0	%	 0.0	%	
Summer	 0.0	%	 6.1	%	 6.1	%	 2.0	%	 2.0	% 2.0	% 0.0	%	 2.0	% 0.0	% 6.1	%	 0.0	%	
Winter	 3.8	%	 0.0	%	 3.8	%	 0.0	%	 1.9	% 1.9	% 1.9	%	 3.8	% 0.0	% 3.8	%	 0.0	%	
OSV	B	 0.0	%	 9.2	%	 8.0	%	 2.3	%	 0.0	% 3.4	% 6.9	% 4.6	% 0.0	% 10.3	%	 8.0	%	
Summer	 0.0	%	 11.3	%	 9.4	%	 0.0	%	 0.0	% 5.7	% 3.8	%	 5.7	% 0.0	% 11.3	%	 5.7	%	
Winter	 0.0	%	 5.9	%	 5.9	%	 5.9	%	 0.0	% 0.0	% 11.8	% 2.9	% 0.0	% 8.8	%	 11.8	%	
Total	 1.1	%	 5.9	%	 6.4	%	 1.6	%	 1.1	% 2.7	% 3.7	% 3.7	% 0.0	% 7.4	%	 3.7	%	
	
SEAFARERS’	CONDITION:	SYMPTOMS	ON	WATCH	
Results	of	seafarers’	conditions,	measured	by	a	number	of	symptoms	experienced	during	their	
watch	are	presented	in	Table	9.	The	higher	the	numbers	indicate	the	less	severe	the	symptoms	
experienced	 by	 the	 crews	 (see	 Table	 1	 for	 descriptions).	 General	 trend	 shows	 that	 the	 crew	
experienced	worse	symptoms	in	the	winter:	significantly	more	physically	tired,	F(1,	170)=3.931,	
p<.05,	experienced	more	motion‐induced	interruptions,	F(1,	165)=5.620,	p<.05	and	experienced	
more	 stomach	 awareness,	 nausea,	 leading	 to	 vomiting,	 F(1,	 164)=3.649,	p<.10.	 However,	 the	
overall	 symptoms	 of	 the	 crew	 between	 summer	 and	 winter	 did	 not	 differ	 statistically,	 F(1,	
186)=.752,	p>.10.		
There	was	a	highly	significant	difference	on	the	overall	symptoms	across	OSVs,	F(1,	186)=6.871,	
p<.001.	The	results	showed	no	significant	difference	on	the	tiredness	reported	across	OSVs,	F(1,	
170)=2.638,	p>0.10.	However,	 a	highly	 significant	difference	on	motion‐induced	 interruptions	
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was	found,	F(1,	165)=8.346,	p<0.01	and	a	marginally	significant	difference	on	motion‐sickness	
incidence	was	reported,	F(1,	164)=3.008,	p<0.10	across	OSVs.	
Analyses	of	variance	showed	that	there	was	no	significant	effect	of	watch	time	to	the	symptoms	
reported	by	the	crew	(p>.10).	But,	different	work	shifts	brought	a	significant	effect	to	the	overall	
symptoms	 of	 the	 seafarers,	 F(1,186)=5.196,	 p<0.05.	 Those	 who	 worked	 long	 shift	 showed	 a	
higher	 motivation	 (M=4.78,	 SD=.420)	 compared	 to	 those	 who	 worked	 normal	 shift	 (M=4.53,	
SD=.741),	F(1,	165)=3.318,	p<.10.	At	the	same	time,	they	also	admitted	more	severe	seasickness	
(M=4.66,	 SD=1.004)	 compared	 to	 those	 in	 normal	 shift	 (M=4.91,	 SD=.450),	 F(1,	 164)=4.708,	
p<.05.	As	described	in	the	earlier	part	of	this	section	regarding	the	questionnaires	respondents,	
most	new	trainees	worked	long	shift.		
Table	9	Symptoms	reported	by	the	crew	during	watch	
		 Summer	 Winter	 		
Symptoms	 OSV	A	 OSV	B	 Subtotal OSV	A	 OSV	B	 Subtotal	 Total	
Tired	(physical)	 4.33	 4.42	 4.38	 4.04	 4.30	 4.15	 4.27	
Fatigue	(mental)	 4.40	 4.56	 4.48	 4.39	 4.50	 4.44	 4.46	
Sleepy	 4.24	 4.28	 4.26	 3.88	 4.30	 4.05	 4.16	
Headache,	dizzy	 4.84	 4.73	 4.79	 4.64	 4.94	 4.77	 4.78	
Low	motivation	 4.82	 4.49	 4.65	 4.48	 4.53	 4.50	 4.58	
Tension,	anxiety,	stress	 4.75	 4.80	 4.78	 4.67	 4.85	 4.75	 4.76	
MII,	loss	of	balance	 4.91	 4.91	 4.91	 4.47	 5.00	 4.69	 4.81	
Stomach	awareness,	nausea,	vomit	 4.98	 4.91	 4.94	 4.60	 5.00	 4.77	 4.86	
Ill,	sick		 5.00	 5.00	 5.00	 4.62*)	 5.00	 4.78	 4.90	
Other	 5.00	 5.00	 5.00	 5.00	 4.90**)	 4.95	 4.98	
Overall	 4.49	 4.64	 4.56	 4.32	 4.71	 4.47	 4.52	
*)	cold		
**)	back	pain		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	
Above	all,	sleepiness	and	tiredness	were	the	two	most	severe	symptoms	reported	by	the	crew	
on	both	OSVs	in	both	periods	of	survey,	F(9,	1577)=27.915,	p<0.001.	Sleepiness	occurred	when	
a	 person	 experienced	 sleep	 deprivations,	 sleep	 interruptions,	 difficulties	 to	 fall	 asleep	 and	
therefore	 he	 or	 she	 needed	 to	 sleep.	 Tiredness	 occurred	 because	 the	 high	 amount	 of	 energy	
expenditures,	usually	due	to	the	ship’s	motion,	more	works,	and	the	need	to	rest.	
PERFORMANCE	ON	WATCH	
Both	crew	on	OSV	A	and	OSV	B	reported	lower	performance	in	winter	compare	to	the	survey	in	
summer	(see	Table	10	for	detail	results),	F(1,	186)=12.844,	p<.001.	All	the	differences	reported	
by	 the	crew	on	OSV	A	were	statistically	confirmed	(p<.05),	however	on	OSV	B	 the	differences	
were	 insignificant	 (p>.10).	 There	 was	 a	 marginally	 significant	 difference	 on	 the	 overall	
performance	across	OSVs,	F(1,	186)=3.90,	p<.10.	No	difference	in	performance	was	found	across	
watch	 time	 and	 across	 work	 shifts	 (p>.10).	 However,	 seafarers	 who	 worked	 in	 long	 shift	
reported	better	reaction	time	(M=4.30,	SD=.637)	compared	to	those	who	worked	in	normal	shift	
(M=4.09,	SD=.638),	F(1,	172)=3.123,	p<.10.		
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There	was	no	difference	 in	 seafarers’	 performance	 across	OSVs,	 across	watch	 time,	 nor	work	
shifts	in	summer	(p>.10).	In	winter,	the	difference	across	OSVs	was	highly	significant	in	motoric	
activities,	F(1,	80)=8.513,	p<.01	and	thus	 in	amount	of	tasks	completed,	F(1,	80)=8.457,	p<.01.	
Results	 also	 indicated	 a	 significant	 difference	 in	 communication,	 F(1,	 80)=6.832,	 p<.05,	 and	
concentration	F(1,	81)=5.204,	p<.05.	A	marginal	difference	was	 identified	 in	decision	making,	
F(1,	80)=3.099,	p<.10.	There	was	no	difference	in	seafarers	performance	across	watch	time	and	
work	shifts	in	winter,	p>.10.	
Table	10	Performance	on	watch	
		 Summer	 Winter	 		
Performance	 OSV	A	 OSV	B	 Subtotal OSV	A	 OSV	B	 Subtotal	 Total	
Concentration	 4.20	 4.33	 4.27	 3.88	 4.18	 4.00	 4.14	
Decision	making	 4.31	 4.28	 4.29	 3.90	 4.15	 4.00	 4.16	
Communication	 4.34	 4.30	 4.32	 3.88	 4.25	 4.02	 4.18	
Motoric	 4.26	 4.34	 4.30	 3.76	 4.22	 3.94	 4.13	
Accuracy	 4.32	 4.31	 4.31	 3.86	 4.13	 3.96	 4.15	
Reaction	time	 4.24	 4.19	 4.22	 3.94	 4.16	 4.02	 4.13	
Speed	 4.27	 4.15	 4.21	 3.86	 4.09	 3.95	 4.09	
Amount	of	task	 4.14	 4.17	 4.16	 3.68	 4.09	 3.84	 4.01	
Overall	 4.26	 4.24	 4.25	 3.84	 4.15	 3.97	 4.12	
	
Problems	on	Watch	
Problems	 identified	 during	 the	 watch	 were	 summarized	 and	 grouped	 into	 ship‐related	 and	
operational‐related	problems.	The	former	consisted	of	ship	motion,	noise,	slamming,	vibration,	
bad	smell	and	indoor	climate.	The	latter	covered	bad	weather,	bad	visibility,	technical	problems	
and	operational	problems	(see	Table	11).	Ship	motion	and	slamming	were	reported	as	the	most	
frequent	problems	encountered	during	watch.	Bad	weather	and	indoor	climate	were	being	the	
third	and	 forth	 in	 the	 rank,	before	vibration	and	bad	smell.	Operational	problems	were	 those	
problems	 experienced	 by	 the	 offshore	 platforms	 such	 as	 crane	 problems,	 space	 limited	
problems	and	offshore	personnel	problems	that	affected	activities	of	the	OSVs.		
There	 was	 a	 highly	 significant	 difference	 on	 ship	 motions,	 χ2(1,	 N=188)=13.858,	 p<.001,	
slamming,	χ2	(1,	N=188)=17.453,	p<.001,	and	vibration,	χ2	(1,	N=188)=8.142,	p<.01	reported	by	
the	crew	across	OSVs.	A	significant	difference	was	discovered	in	noise	level,	χ2(1,	N=188)=4.425,	
p<.05	and	indoor	climate,	χ2(1,	N=188)=6.227,	p<.05	across	OSVs.		
In	parallel,	highly	significant	differences	were	also	found	on	ship	motion,	χ2(1,	N=188)=20.478,	
p<.001,	 slamming,	 χ2(1,	 N=188)=24.807,	 p<.001	 and	 vibration,	 χ2(1,	 N=188)=11.211,	 p<.01	
across	seasons.	But,	no	significant	difference	on	noise	as	well	as	indoor	climate	reported	by	the	
crew	in	across	seasons,	p>.10.	
No	difference	was	reported	by	the	crew	who	were	on	watch	during	the	day	compared	to	those	
who	worked	during	the	night	with	respect	to	the	problems	encountered	on	their	watch,	p>.10.		
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Table	11	Problems	encountered	on	watch	
	 Ship‐related	problems	 Operational‐related	problems	
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OSV	A	 19.8	%	 5.0	%	 20.8	%	 8.9	%	 5.9	% 11.9	% 18.8	% 3.0	% 5.0	% 1.0	%	
Summer	 0.0	%	 8.2	%	 0.0	%	 0.0	%	 2.0	% 12.2	% 0.0	%	 0.0	% 2.0	% 0.0	%	
Winter	 38.5	%	 1.9	%	 40.4	%	 17.3	%	 9.6	% 11.5	% 36.5	%	 5.8	% 7.7	% 1.9	%	
OSV	B	 2.3	%	 0.0	%	 1.1	%	 1.1	%	 3.4	% 2.3	%	 2.3	%	 0.0	% 1.1	% 0.0	%	
Summer	 3.8	%	 0.0	%	 1.9	%	 1.9	%	 5.7	% 3.8	%	 3.8	%	 0.0	% 0.0	% 0.0	%	
Winter	 0.0	%	 0.0	%	 0.0	%	 0.0	%	 0.0	% 0.0	%	 0.0	%	 0.0	% 2.9	% 0.0	%	
Total	 11.7	%	 2.7	%	 11.7	%	 4.8	%	 4.8	% 7.4	%	 11.2	% 1.6	% 3.2	% 0.5	%	
ANALYSIS	
Inferential	 statistics	was	applied	 to	 test	 the	 relationships	between	variables	of	 interest	 in	 the	
study.	 Multivariate	 approach	 was	 applied	 where	 correlation	 analysis	 was	 performed	 as	 the	
preliminary	 stage	 of	 the	 investigation.	 Stepwise	 regression	 analysis	 was	 utilized	 to	 confirm	
causal	relationships	between	the	variables.	Finally,	the	structural	equation	modelling	was	used	
to	describe	the	overall	construction	of	the	researched	topic.	
WEATHER	FORECAST	AND	SHIP	MOTION	
Correlations	 between	 the	 estimated	 significant	 wave	 height	 and	 the	 motion	 data	 measured	
during	 the	 survey	were	 calculated.	 Data	was	 converted	 into	watch	 group	 time	 scales	 (N=32)	
where	 long	 shifts	 were	 removed	 from	 the	 analysis	 to	 avoid	 duplication.	 The	 results	 are	
presented	in	Table	12.	All	correlation	indices	were	highly	significant.	It	can	be	inferred	from	the	
table	that	47%	variance	of	roll	motions,	59%	of	pitch,	53%	of	lateral	accelerations	and	69%	of	
vertical	 accelerations	 along	 the	 trip	 can	be	 explained	by	 variance	 in	 the	 estimated	 significant	
wave	 height.	 Vertical	 acceleration	 had	 the	 highest	 correlation	 index	 with	 the	 predicted	
significant	wave	height.	Roll	had	a	very	strong	correlation	with	lateral	acceleration	while	pitch	
with	vertical	acceleration.	
Table	12	Correlation	between	estimated	wave	height	and	ship	motions		
Pearson	
Correlation	*)	 Hs	 Roll	 Pitch	 Y_acc	 Z_acc	
Hs	 1.000	 0.683	 0.768	 0.728	 0.829	
Roll	 1.000	 0.783	 0.927	 0.892	
Pitch	 1.000	 0.830	 0.922	
Y_acc	 	 	 	 1.000	 0.913	
Z_acc	 	 	 	 	 1.000	
*)	All	Sig.	(2‐tailed)	=	0.000;	N	=	32	
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SHIP	MOTIONS	AND	SLEEP	
Correlations	 between	 ship	 motions	 and	 sleep	 problems,	 sleep	 quality	 and	 sleep	 amount	 are	
presented	in	Table	13.	Highly	significant	relationships	between	all	motion	components	to	ship‐
related	sleep	problems	were	identified.	On	the	other	hand,	insignificant	correlations	were	found	
between	 non‐ship	 related	 problems	 and	 motions.	 Further	 investigation	 using	 stepwise	
regression	method	 showed	 that	 vertical	 acceleration	 and	 pitch	were	 the	motion	 components	
that	truly	predict	ship‐related	sleep	problems	(see	Figure	1;	Adjusted	R	square	=	 .237;	F2,185	=	
30.040	and	p=.000)	while	lateral	acceleration	and	roll	motion	were	excluded.	
	
Figure	1	Results	of	stepwise	regression	analysis	on	ship‐related	sleep	problems	reported	by	the	
crew	as	a	function	of	ship	motions	(index	shows	β	and	significant	level:	 **	p	<	 .01;	 *	p	<	 .05;	#	p	<	 .10;	
ns	not	significant)	
Highly	significant	correlations	were	revealed	between	ship	motions	and	sleep	quality.	Vertical	
acceleration	 was	 found	 to	 be	 the	 strongest	 element	 for	 sleep	 problems	 (r=0.477)	 as	 well	 as	
sleep	quality	(r=‐0.349).	A	stepwise	regression	was	conducted	on	sleep	quality	with	respect	to	
all	 four	 ship‐motion	 components.	 The	 result	 confirmed	 the	 above	 findings	 and	 confirmed	
vertical	acceleration	as	the	only	factor	to	remain	in	the	equation	while	the	others	were	excluded	
(Adjusted	R2		=	.117;	F1,177	=	24.478,		p=.000,	see	Figure	2).		
	
Figure	 2	 Results	 of	 stepwise	 regression	 analysis	 on	 sleep	 quality	 reported	 by	 the	 crew	 as	 a	
function	of	ship	motions	(index	shows	β	and	significant	level:	***	p	<	.001;		#	p	<	.10;	ns	not	significant)	
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The	effects	of	survey	period	and	OSV	design	on	sleep	quality	were	 investigated	by	controlling	
the	 significant	 wave	 height.	 Analysis	 of	 covariance	 (Ancova)	 was	 performed.	 The	 result	
confirmed	that	the	effect	of	OSVs	on	sleep	quality	was	highly	significant	when	wave	height	was	
controlled,	F(1,	175)=11.372,	p<.01.	On	the	contrary,	there	was	no	significant	effect	caused	by	
survey	period	on	sleep	quality,	F(1,	175)=.0534,	p>.10,	if	wave	height	was	controlled.	There	was	
no	significant	interaction	between	survey	period	and	different	type	of	OSVs	to	sleep	quality,	F(1,	
175)=0.902,	p>.10.	
Table	13	Correlations	between	ship	motions	and	sleeping	behavior	
	 Ship‐related		Sleep	Problems
Non‐ship	related	
Sleep	Problems	 Sleep	quality Sleep	amount	
Roll	 Pearson	Correlation 0.427*** ‐0.105 ‐0.268*** ‐0.099	
N	 188 188 179 176	
Pitch	 Pearson	Correlation 0.448*** ‐0.075 ‐0.241** ‐0.075	
N	 188 188 179 176	
Y_acc	 Pearson	Correlation 0.395*** ‐0.128# ‐0.309*** ‐0.152*	
N	 188 188 179 176	
Z_acc	 Pearson	Correlation 0.477*** ‐0.139# ‐0.349*** ‐0.200**	
N	 188 188 179 176	
***	p	<	.001;	**	p	<	.01;	*	p	<	.05;	#	p	<	.10	
	
Sleep	 amount	 correlated	 highly	 significant	 with	 vertical	 acceleration	 and	 significantly	 with	
lateral	 acceleration.	No	significant	effect	was	 found	 for	 rotational	motions,	p>.10.	Ancova	was	
conducted	to	further	examine	the	effect	of	OSVs	sleep	amount	by	controlling	the	environmental	
condition,	i.e.,	significant	wave	heights.	The	results	were	similar	to	sleep	quality:	OSV	design	had	
a	 significant	 effect	 on	 sleep	 amount,	 given	 significant	 wave	 height	 was	 controlled,	 F(1,	
172)=5.836,	p<.05),	 but	 no	 significant	 effect	 caused	 by	 seasons	 and	 no	 significant	 interaction	
effect	between	OSVs	and	survey	periods,	p>.10.	
Table	14	Correlation	between	sleep	causal	problems,	sleep	quality	and	sleep	amount	
	 Ship‐related	Sleep	Problems	
Non‐ship‐related	
Sleep	Problems	 Sleep	quality	 Sleep	amount
Ship‐related	
Sleep	Problems	
Pearson	Correlation	 1.000 ‐0.184* ‐0.462***	 ‐0.260**
N	 188 188 179	 176
Non‐ship‐related	
Sleep	Problems	
Pearson	Correlation	 1.000 ‐0.034	 ‐0.088
N	 188 179	 176
Sleep	quality	 Pearson	Correlation	 1.000	 0.608***
N	 179	 174
Sleep	amount	 Pearson	Correlation	 	 1.000
N	 	 176
***	p	<	.001;	**	p	<	.01;	*	p	<	.05		
	
Ship‐related	sleep	problems	had	a	very	significant	correlation	with	sleep	quality,	but	non‐ship	
related	sleep	problems	did	not	(see	Table	14).	A	similar	tendency	was	found	in	the	relationship	
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of	 sleep	 causal	 problems	 to	 sleep	 amount.	 Obviously,	 sleep	 quality	 had	 a	 strong	 relationship	
with	sleep	amount.	
SHIP	MOTIONS,	SLEEP	AND	OVERALL	SYMPTOMS	(SYMPTOMS	DURING	WATCH)	
Stepwise	 regression	 analysis	 was	 conducted	 on	 the	 overall	 symptoms	 (symptoms	 reported	
during	 watch).	 Motion	 components	 (before	 watch),	 sleep	 causal	 problems,	 sleep	 quality	 and	
sleep	 amount	 were	 treated	 as	 independent	 variables	 (see	 Figure	 3).	 Ship‐related	 sleep	
problems,	 sleep	 amount	 and	 non‐ship	 related	 sleep	 problems	 were	 revealed	 as	 significant	
influencing	factors	for	the	overall	symptoms	(Adjusted	R2		=	.297;	F3,170	=	25.386,	p=.000),	while	
the	others	were	excluded	(see	Figure	3).		
	
Figure	 3	 Results	 of	 stepwise	 regression	 analysis	 on	 the	 overall	 conditions	
(β	***	p	<	.001;	**	p	<	.01;	*	p	<	.05;	#	p	<	.10;	ns	not	significant)	
Several	 symptoms	 of	 interest	 were	 analyzed	 separately:	 tiredness,	 motion‐induced	
interruptions	(MII),	and	motion‐sickness	incidence	(MSI).	Similar	procedures	and	independent	
variables	were	entered.	The	results	showed	that	tiredness	was	significantly	influenced	by	sleep	
quality,	sleep	amount,	ship‐related	sleep	problems	and	non‐ship	related	sleep	problems	while	
all	motions	were	excluded	from	the	equation.	Vertical	acceleration	during	watch	was	found	by	
stepwise	 regression	 analysis	 significantly	 to	 affect	MII	 (Adjusted	R2	=	 .110;	 F1,165=21.499,	 β=‐
.340,	p=.000,	).	The	other	motions	showed	little	 influence	on	MII,	 therefore	excluded.	A	rather	
low	correlation	index	was	found	between	MII	reported	by	the	crew	in	this	survey	and	the	index	
calculated	using	the	existing	code	(Graham	1990),	r=‐0.1841,	p=.018.	
																																																													
1	Note	that	the	negative	sign	is	caused	by	the	reverse	scaling	system	used	in	the	questionnaire.	
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Table	15	Results	of	stepwise	regression	method:	Significant	variables	to	tiredness	
Variable	of	interest	 Predictor	variable	 β	 p	
Tiredness	 Sleep	quality	 .290	 .001	
Adjusted	R	Square	=	.344;	
F4,155	=	21.808,	p=.000	
Sleep	amount	 .226	 .006	
Ship‐related	sleep	problems	 ‐.197	 .003	
Non‐ship	related	sleep	problems	 ‐.187	 .012	
	
Motion	 sickness	 correlated	 with	 pitch,	 r=‐0.405,	 p<.001	 and	 roll	 motion,	 r=‐0.400,	 p<.001.		
Stepwise	regression	with	the	four	motions	during	watch	as	the	independent	variables	indicated	
that	pitch	motion	was	 the	one	 significantly	 influencing	 stomach	awareness,	nausea	 leading	 to	
vomiting	 (Adjusted	R2	=	 .159;	F1,164=32.189,	β=‐.405,	p=.000).	There	was	a	very	significant	but	
rather	 low	correlation	between	 the	 stomach	awareness	 reported	by	 the	crew	 in	 this	 research	
and	the	predicted	MSI	index	calculated	for	8‐hour	exposure	(McCauley,	Royal,	Wylie,	O'Hanlon	
and	Mackie	1976;	Griffin	1990)	r=‐0.261,	p=.001.	The	fact	that	pitch	element	was	the	one	that	
was	 domineering	 instead	 of	 the	 vertical	 acceleration	 as	 modeled	 by	 McCauley	 et	 al.	 (1976)	
should	be	investigated	further.	
SHIP	MOTIONS,	SLEEP,	OVERALL	SYMPTOMS	AND	PERFORMANCE	
Correlation	 analysis	 showed	 that	 the	 crew	 member’s	 overall	 performance	 had	 a	 highly	
significant	relationship	with	sleep	amount,	r=0.423,	p<.001	and	sleep	quality,	r=0.379,	p<.001.	
Stepwise	 regression	 analysis	 on	 overall	 performance	was	 conducted	with	 ship	motion,	 sleep	
quality,	sleep	amount,	and	watch	problems	where	they	were	defined	as	predictors.	The	output	
suggested	 that	 performance	 can	 be	 predicted	 by	 sleep	 amount,	 vertical	 acceleration,	 overall	
symptoms	and	operational	 related	problems	(see	Figure	4,	Adjusted	R2	=	 .260;	F4,169	=	16.195,	
p=.000).	
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Figure	 4	 Results	 of	 stepwise	 regression	 analysis	 on	 the	 overall	 performance		
(β	***	p	<	.001;	**	p	<	.01;	*	p	<	.05;	ns	not	significant)	
STRUCTURAL	MODEL	
A	 more	 thorough	 and	 comprehensive	 model	 was	 then	 developed	 to	 demonstrate	 the	
relationships	between	variables	of	interest	in	this	research.	Structural	equation	modeling	(SEM)	
was	 utilized.	 Path	 analysis	 was	 chosen	 as	 one	 specific	 method	 due	 to	 a	 limited	 number	 of	
respondents.	The	analysis	was	run	in	Mplus	6.1	software.	The	final	model	is	presented	in	Figure	
5.	From	the	output,	it	can	be	inferred	that	the	model	fit	is	acceptable,	χ2=27.284,	df=15,	p=.027,	
CFI=.963,	TLI=.919,	RMSEA=.066[.022	.105],	SRMR=.044).	
Slightly	different	but	still	 in	 line	with	 the	result	 from	the	stepwise	regression	model,	 the	SEM	
showed	that	ship‐related	sleep	problem	was	highly	affected	by	pitch	motion.	Ship‐related	sleep	
problems	 such	 as	 motion,	 noise,	 vibration,	 slamming	 and	 indoor	 climate	 very	 significantly	
influenced	sleep	quality	as	well	as	sleep	amount.	Non‐ship	related	problems	had	also	an	effect	
on	sleep	quality	and	sleep	amount,	but	to	a	smaller	degree.	Subsequently,	sleep	amount	showed	
a	 very	 significant	 effect	 to	 the	 personnel’s	 overall	 conditions	 and	 also	 to	 their	 overall	
performance	at	 the	 same	 time.	People	with	 sufficient	 amount	of	 sleep	 tended	 to	be	 fit	 and	 in	
shape	with	fewer	symptoms,	hence	better	performance.	On	the	other	hand,	sleep	quality	did	not	
have	 any	 significant	 effect	 to	 overall	 performance,	 but	 a	 marginally	 significant	 influence	 to	
overall	symptoms.	Work	shift	had	significant	impact	to	non‐ship	related	sleep	problems	and	to	
overall	 performance.	 People	who	worked	 in	 long	 shifts	 tended	 to	 have	 less	 non‐ship	 related	
sleep	problems	and	better	performance	than	those	who	worked	in	normal	shifts.	Performance	
was	also	negatively	affected	by	RMS	roll	motion	during	watch.	
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Figure	5	Path	analysis	on	human	factors	of	OSV	operations	(***	p<.001;	**	p<.01;	*	p<.05;	#	p<.10;	ns	not	
significant)	
Other	 variables	 of	 interests:	 watch	 time,	 OSV	 design	 and	 season	 were	 eliminated	 from	 the	
model.	 Watch	 time	 showed	 no	 significant	 effect	 for	 the	 whole	 model,	 while	 different	 OSV	
designs	and	seasons	were	basically	inclusive	in	the	motions	(pitch	and	roll)	as	initial	predictors.	
DISCUSSIONS	
Working	at	sea	is	tiring.	Surveys	were	conducted	to	investigate	factors	that	influence	seafarers’	
condition	and	performance	on	OSVs.	Most	of	our	findings	are	in	parallel	with	previous	studies	
and	publications	(Stevens	and	Parsons	2002;	Smith,	Allen	and	Wadsworth	2006;	Haward	et	al.	
2009).	Seafarers’	wellbeing	was	influenced	by	sleep	amount,	sleep	quality,	noise,	vibration	and	
motion.	 In	 this	 study,	 the	precise	 interconnectivity	between	 these	 factors	was	 revealed	and	a	
model	 was	 established.	 Ship	 design,	 sleep	 quantity	 and	 sleep	 quality	 were	 identified	 as	
important	moderating	variables	between	environmental	exposures	and	the	personnel	on	board.		
In	 reality,	working	 at	 sea	 is	 a	dynamic	 endeavor.	The	environmental	 condition	 fluctuates,	 the	
operations	vary,	the	ship	may	deviate	and	the	crews	must	adapt	all	the	time.	According	to	the	
survey,	 seafarers	 reported	 more	 technical	 and	 operational	 problems	 in	 the	 winter.	 The	
following	 cases	 may	 illustrate	 the	 risk	 situation:	 one	 vessel	 had	 a	 problem	 with	 the	 azipull	
propeller	 that	 could	 not	 be	 aligned	 properly	 under	 harsh	winter	 conditions.	We	 observed	 an	
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officer	 on	 the	 bridge	 burnout2	 during	 an	 ambiguous	 loading/unloading	 operation	 beside	 an	
offshore	 installation.	 In	 the	 same	 trip,	 we	 also	witnessed	 an	 officer	 outraged	 because	 all	 the	
deckhands	were	still	asleep	when	loading	and	unloading	was	about	to	start.	
From	the	results,	strong	and	highly	significant	correlations	between	estimated	weather	and	ship	
motions	were	 confirmed.	 It	 means	 that	 the	 behavior	 of	 the	 vessel	 can	 be	 estimated	 prior	 to	
departure.	 Then,	 the	 subsequent	 variables:	 ship‐related	 sleep	 problem,	 sleep	 quality,	 sleep	
amount,	 seafarers’	 conditions	 and	 performance	 can	 also	 be	 predicted.	 This	 information	 is	
valuable	and	has	been	considered	in	voyage	planning	to	minimize	risk	and	to	ensure	safety.	The	
next	 conceivable	 step	 should	 be	 to	 use	 the	 information	 to	maximize	 comfort.	 In	 practice,	 the	
crews	sometimes	chose	an	alternative	route	to	reach	the	area	of	destination	during	heavy	seas.	
This	route	was	a	little	bit	further	but	more	protected	from	the	exposure	of	strong	wind	and	high	
waves.	
It	 was	 confirmed	 that	 performance	 was	 significantly	 influenced	 by	 sleep	 amount,	 overall	
symptoms	and	ship	motions	during	the	watch.	In	winter	one	became	even	more	vulnerable	to	
the	 worse	 environmental	 conditions,	 greater	 motions,	 less	 sleep	 and	 poorer	 conditions	 in	
general.	Under	such	conditions,	operational	problems	may	be	a	triggering	factor	that	leads	to	a	
serious	 incident.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 when	 awareness	 was	 declining	 and	 response	 time	 was	
decreasing,	the	chance	for	the	crew	to	anticipate	a	hazard	became	lower,	hence	the	risk	became	
higher.	
Some	seafarers	did	exercise	in	the	gym	on	the	vessel	and	some	of	them	went	jogging	whenever	
the	vessel	was	 in	port,	 to	keep	 them	 fit.	However,	when	 the	 seafarers	were	exhausted	at	 sea,	
they	took	the	initiative	asking	their	colleague(s)	to	replace	them	on	their	watch	while	they	took	
a	rest.	As	illustrated	above,	when	the	deckhands	were	all	tired,	they	went	to	sleep	until	the	time	
to	 perform	 their	 job.	 The	 seafarers	 who	 work	 on	 OSVs	 during	 normal	 operations	 are	 more	
fortunate	 because	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 work	 gives	 them	 the	 opportunity	 to	 plan	 and	 run	 their	
activities	according	 to	 their	 judgment.	There	 is	always	room	to	postpone	or	even	cancel	a	 job	
that	they	consider	unsafe,	therefore	disaster	can	be	avoided.	Nevertheless,	fewer	activities	with	
more	relax	schedules	are	recommended	to	be	planned	in	the	winter.	
LIMITATIONS	OF	THE	STUDY	
Only	two	offshore	supply	vessels	were	observed	in	this	study	and	the	length	of	the	observation	
time	 on	 the	 vessels	 were	 relatively	 short.	 Unlike	 experiments	 in	 the	 lab	 or	 computer	
simulations,	 we	 could	 not	 control	 the	 environmental	 conditions.	 The	 data	 collected	 on	 both	
OSVs	were	not	directly	comparable.	 It	was	therefore	not	possible	to	draw	general	conclusions	
although	 the	main	 findings	 indicate	 important	 lessons.	However	we	should	also	bear	 in	mind	
that	both	vessels	were	relatively	new	and	among	the	top	of	the	line	in	their	fleet.	Ship‐related	
problems	 identified	on	 these	vessels	most	 likely	will	be	 found	on	other	older	vessels	and	 less	
likely	in	the	older	vessels	have	a	better	condition.	
Accommodation	facilities,	indoor	climate	and	high	frequency	vibration	were	not	covered	in	this	
research	 due	 to	 satisfactory	 conditions	 were	 found	 on	 the	 previous	 survey	 (Rumawas	 and	
Asbjørnslett	2013).	
																																																													
2	Fatigue,	frustration	or	apathy	resulting	from	prolonged	stress,	overwork,	or	intense	activity	
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CONCLUSIONS	
Field	 surveys	 of	 human	 factors	 in	 ship	 design	 were	 performed	 where	 collected	 data	 from	
physical	measurements	were	 associated	with	 the	 crews’	 evaluations	 and	 reports.	 Descriptive	
statistics	and	multivariate	quantitative	analyses	were	applied.	A	structural	model	describing	the	
relationship	 of	 relevant	 variables	 relative	 to	 human	 factors	 was	 developed	 and	 numerically	
estimated.	 These	 figures	 can	 be	 utilized	 to	 estimate	 how	much	 a	 variable	 of	 interest	 can	 be	
influenced	by	manipulating	other	variables.		
Some	of	the	results	worth	highlighted	and	some	conclusions	can	be	derived	as	follows:	
 A	strong	correlation	 index	between	estimated	weather	and	ship	motions	 is	confirmed.	
From	49%	to	69%	of	the	motions	variance	can	be	explained	by	the	predicted	significant	
wave	height.	
 Most	of	the	crews	who	watch	during	the	night	do	not	sleep	before	duty.	
 Slamming,	noise	and	ship	motion	are	the	most	named	problems	disturbing	sleep.		On	the	
other	hand,	ship	motion,	 slamming	and	bad	weather	are	 the	most	 frequently	reported	
problems	disturbing	watch.	
 OSV	design3	and	season	are	significant	predictors	for	sleeping	problems.	
 OSV	design3	has	a	significant	effect	on	sleep	quality	as	well	as	sleep	quantity.	
 Seasonal	 changes	contribute	 to	a	 substantial	difference	 for	 the	people	on	board	 to	 fall	
asleep.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 the	 season	 also	 brings	 a	 significant	 influence	 on	 sleep‐
interrupted	 problems	 experienced	 by	 the	 crews.	 In	 winter,	 people	 experience	 more	
difficult	to	fall	asleep	and	experience	sleep	interruption	more	often.	Some	measures	to	
minimize	these	problems	are	recommended:	always	consult	the	weather	forecast	for	the	
most	recent	update,	check	an	alternative	route	for	better	riding	comfort	and	spare	more	
relax	schedule	in	the	winter.	
 The	 crews	 reported	 more	 ship‐related	 problems	 compared	 to	 non‐ship	 related	
problems	disturbing	sleep.	To	increase	sleep	quality	and	sleep	quantity,	efforts	must	be	
performed	definitely	from	the	design	stage.	
 The	 MII	 reported	 by	 the	 crews	 is	 more	 sensitive	 compared	 to	 the	 calculated	 MII	
(Graham	1990).	The	MII	index	reported	by	the	crew	is	significantly	affected	by	vertical	
acceleration.	The	MII	operability	criteria	must	be	adjusted	before	they	can	be	utilized	in	
the	design	stage.		
 The	MSI	index	developed	by	McCauley	et	al	(1976)	shows	a	rather	low	correlation	but	
high	 significance	 with	 the	 stomach	 awareness	 reported	 by	 the	 crew.	 The	 MSI	 index	
reported	by	the	crew	has	strong	correlation	with	pitch	and	roll	motion.	
																																																													
3	In	this	case,	different	locations	of	the	accommodations	(at	the	bow	vs	at	the	aft)	
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 In	 general	 OSV	 operations,	 pitch	 motion	 is	 the	 significant	 predictor	 for	 ship‐related	
sleeps	 problems	 while	 roll	 motion	 is	 more	 important	 for	 people	 performance	 during	
watch.	
 Ship	 design	 does	 affect	 comfort.	 It	 has	 the	 potential	 to	 reduce	 noise,	 motion	 and	
slamming,	hence	sleep	disruptions,	MII	and	MSI.	Good	design	will	increase	comfort	and	
thus	seafarers’	condition	and	performance.	Having	the	accommodations	at	the	aft	is	one	
example	that	has	been	evidenced	as	a	good	design	for	the	crews.	
 Relationships	 between	 variables	 involved	 in	 this	 study:	 ship	motions,	 sleep	problems,	
sleep	quality,	sleep	amount,	overall	symptoms	of	 the	seafarers’	and	performance	were	
evaluated	using	path	analysis	and	a	robust	model	was	presented.	
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Date / /
Watch time to
After‐watch Questionnaires
Dear Sir / Madame,
Please, fill in this questionnaire after every watch.
You can tick (v) or cross (x) the box that corresponds to your answer.
v
x
The questionnaire is fully anonymous.
We guarantee the confidentiality of the responds and the privacy of the respondents.
Please, insert the questionnaire that has been completed into the box that is available in the mess room.
You are free to give additional comments or explanation when necessary.
Your participation is highly appreciated and hopefully will benefit to improve working and living conditions
at sea. Thank you very much.
Sincerely,
Vincentius Rumawas
Researcher/PhD student Visiting address: Otto Nielsen v. 10, Trondheim
Department of Marine Technology, NTNU Phone: + 47 73595589, 41455268
NO‐7491 Trondheim email: vincentius.rumawas@ntnu.no
Please, answer the following questions:
1. SLEEPING / RESTING CONDITION BEFORE THIS WATCH
NO a little YES
a. Did you sleep before this watch?
How do you rate your sleeping / resting condition before this watch:
very poor poor fair good very good
b. Quality of your sleep / rest
too little a little fair enough more than enough
c. Amount of time of your sleep / rest
YES a little NO
d. If you slept, did you experience sleeping problems?
e. If you tried to sleep, did you experience: YES a little NO
Difficult to fall asleep
Sleep interrupted
Other:  .........................................................
f. Sleep / rest problem(s) caused by (you can tick more than one):
Ship motions Just habitual
Noise, caused by ........................................... Personal conditions (health related)
Wave impact, slamming Personal problems (family related, etc.)
Vibration Too much coffee / tea / smoking
Job‐related problems Entertainment, games, music, movies
Sun light, too bright (light) Friends, colleagues (social activities)
Time or schedule related Nightmares
Mattress, bedroom/accommodation facility Toilet visit(s)
Temperature, indoor climate Other: ..........................................................
2. SYMPTOMS EXPERIENCED DURING THIS WATCH
severe considerable somewhat a little not at all
a. Tired (physical)
b. Fatigue (mental)
c. Sleepy
d. Headache, dizzy
e. Low motivation
f. Tension, anxiety, stress
g. Motion‐induced interruption, loss of balance
h. Stomach awareness, nausea, vomit
i. Ill, sick (describe: ....................................................)
j. Other: ......................................................................
very bad bad fair good very good
k. How do you feel during this watch?
3. PERFORMANCE DURING THIS WATCH
very bad bad fair good very good not apply
a. How do you rate your performance on this watch
b. Concentration, awareness
c. Decision making
d. Communication
e. Motoric activities
f. Accuracy
g. Reaction time
h. Speed to complete the tasks
i. Amount of tasks completed
4. PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED DURING THIS WATCH
Ship motions (substanstial) Bad smell
Disturbing noise, caused by ................................... Inconvenient temperature , indoor climate
Significant wave impact, slamming  Technical (hardware) problem 
Disturbing vibration Operational problem
Bad weather: ................................................. Other: ..............................................................
Bad / distracted visibility
Additional comments / notes (for this shift):
Thank you very much for your kind participation
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HUMAN FACTORS IN SHIP DESIGN AND OPERATION: A PRELIMINARY SURVEY 
OF THE THEORETICAL CONSTRUCT 
(DOI No: 10.3940/rina.ijme.20xx.a?.???) 
 
V Rumawas, Norwegian University of Science and Technology, Trondheim, Norway 
BE Asbjørnslett, Norwegian University of Science and Technology, Trondheim, Norway 
 
SUMMARY 
 
This technical note presents an analysis of the underlying factors of human factors in ship design based on 
questionnaires distributed on two offshore supply vessels operating in the Norwegian Sea. The concept of human factors 
in ship design is still evolving. The purpose of this paper is to present a preliminary model of the human factors 
construct by using a factor analysis method. The results confirm the existence of controllability, workability and 
habitability as the principal factors of human factors in ship design. Three other factors that emerged are cargo facilities, 
reliability, automation and maintainability (RAM) and interfacing complexity. Bridging variables found between these 
factors include elements such as safety, manoeuvring, engine room and bridge design. A preliminary model of how the 
components or parts relate to human factors in ship design and operation is developed. The model also indicates the 
parties who are responsible for the various aspects of ship design from a human factors perspective. 
 
 
NOMENCLATURE 
Abbreviations 
DP Dynamic positioning 
ECR Engine control room 
ER Engine room 
HF Human factors 
HSE Health, Safety and Environment 
KMO Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin 
LR Lloyd’s Register 
MECE Mutually exclusive and collectively  
 exhaustive 
OHS Occupational health and safety 
OSV Offshore supply vessel 
PAF Principal axis factoring 
RAM Reliability, automation and maintainability 
SPSS Statistical Package for the Social Sciences 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
A quantitative survey using questionnaires to examine 
the implementation of human factors (HF) in ship design 
was conducted [1], using the Lloyd’s Register’s (LR) [2, 
3] eight dimensions HF framework.  
 
The framework did not perfectly satisfy the mutually 
exclusive and collectively exhaustive (MECE) principle. 
This principle is essential for developing a good 
theoretical construct1 such as human factors in ship 
design. The MECE principle states that a list, such as HF 
framework should have no overlaps and no gaps or holes. 
Some problems of overlap were found in the 
development of the coding sheet for the literature study 
[4, 5] and questionnaires [1], therefore, a theoretical 
examination of the human factors concept was 
undertaken. 
 
                                                 
1 A construct can be defined as a complex idea or a 
conceptual theory 
This paper presents a preliminary verification of the 
human factors concept using factor analysis. This is the 
logical continuation of a quantitative survey of human 
factors which was conducted on two offshore supply 
vessels in summer 2011 and also reported in this 
publication [1].  The same questionnaires and data are 
used in this paper. 
 
2. FACTOR ANALYSIS 
 
Factor analysis has been applied in psychological 
research for more than 100 years, since it was developed 
by Spearman [6]. It is a statistical approach used to 
reveal relationships between a number of observable 
variables and looking for common unobservable (latent) 
factors that can explain variations measurements; in this 
case, in human factors implementation, which are 
measured by items in questionnaires. It is customary to 
use factor analysis for data reduction or structure 
detection and to identify collinearity of variables.  
 
Factor analysis was used in this study to: 
• Identify the underlying factors of human factors 
implementation in marine design. 
• Verify the existing human factors framework.  
• Reduce the number of human factors 
dimensions to manage. 
• Provide a firm theoretical construct of human 
factors in marine design. 
 
42 respondents completed the questionnaires [1]. This 
number of respondents is too low for a proper factor 
analysis, but the investigation was performed with 
caution and the assumptions required for the analysis 
were always checked. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) 
measure of sampling adequacy examines whether the 
partial correlations among items are small. If the 
variables share common factor(s) the partial correlations 
will be small and the KMO will be close to 1.0. The 
KMO is expected to be higher than 0.5 to be 
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“acceptable”. Bartlett’s test of sphericity determines 
whether the correlation matrix is an identity matrix. The 
test should be significant (<.05). 
 
The questionnaire consisted of 107 valid items, in four 
sections, to which the factor analysis was applied: 
• A: Human factors direct evaluation (26 items) 
• B: Personal symptoms and person-related 
incidents (8 items) 
• C: Vessel-related incidents (8 items) 
• D: Human factors Likert-scale questionnaires 
(65 items). 
 
A detail description of the questionnaires is presented in 
the first paper [1].  
 
2.1.  HUMAN FACTORS DIRECT EVALUATION 
 
A KMO measure of sampling adequacy and Bartlett’s 
test of sphericity confirm that the twenty-six-items in 
Section A are suitable for factor analysis. The Statistical 
Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) software version 
14.1 [7] was used to perform factor analysis. The 
principal axis factoring (PAF) extraction method was 
utilized. The programme first explored the strongest 
correlation between the items and a latent factor, called 
Factor 1, then, continued to look for the second latent 
factor, Factor 2 and so forth. Finally, five factors were 
revealed. Rotational methods were explored to clear the 
results. Table 1 shows the results of the factors after 
being rotated using the Oblimin rotation method with 
Kaiser normalisation. Each row of the table shows a 
regression equation where the item is expressed as a 
function of the factors. Coefficients smaller than 0.3 
were suppressed because they are negligible. Several 
bridging variables were identified: “overall safety”, 
“manoeuvring”, “accommodation”, “engine room” 
“bridge design” and “alarm”. Bridging variables are 
items which contain more than one dominant coefficient 
or contain several less dominant coefficients, showing 
overlap. Typically in factor analysis this type of variable 
will be omitted, however, in this research, bridging 
variables seem to have a different and meaningful 
interpretation. They are discussed in Section 3. 
 
The results presented in Table 1 are not completely clean 
because some variables still contain loadings in more 
than one factor, namely: “DP system”, “general 
arrangement/layout”, “equipment”, “overall working 
condition”, “space” and “ECR”. The first rotated factor, 
Factor 1 was most highly correlated with “autopilot”, 
“navigation system” and “DP system”. The second factor 
was most highly correlated with “system procedure”, 
“general arrangement and layout”, “storage”, 
“equipment”, “overall working condition” and “space”.  
The third factor was closely linked with “vibration”, 
“sound/noise”, “motion”, and “ECR”. The fourth factor 
was associated with “cargo deck” and “cargo tanks”. The 
fifth factor was highly correlated with “overall 
reliability”, “control & maintenance” and “automation”.  
According to LR’s HF framework, Factor 1 can be 
identified as “Controllability”, Factor 2 as “Workability”, 
and Factor 3 as “Habitability”. Factor 4 “Cargo 
Facilities” and Factor 5 “Reliability, Automation and 
Maintainability” are not specifically contained in the 
framework, but are common terms found in the industry. 
 
Table 1 Pattern Matrix of Human Factors Direct 
Evaluation Scale (Section A) 
Item 
Factor 
1 2 3 4 5 
Autopilot 0.873         
Navigation system 0.767         
DP system 0.482       0.301
System procedure   0.771       
General arrangement/ 
layout   0.724   0.332   
Storage   0.671       
Equipment 0.337 0.604       
Overall working 
condition   0.573   0.386   
Space   0.508   0.305   
Communication system 
and equipment   0.364       
Vibration     0.826     
Sound, noise     0.786     
Motion     0.696     
ECR -0.306   0.664   0.358
Overall comfort     0.440     
Accommodation     0.359     
Cargo deck       0.926   
Cargo tanks       0.711   
Overall reliability         0.777
Control & maintenance         0.713
Automation         0.671
Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring 
Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser Normalisation 
 
2.2.  PERSONNEL INCIDENTS 
 
The KMO test shows a sampling adequacy of 0.574 and 
Bartlett’s test of sphericity shows significance of 0.000, 
confirming that Section B is suitable for factor analysis. 
Three components were extracted from the eight-item 
personnel incidents data in Section B using principal 
component analysis (PCA). The Oblimin rotation method 
with Kaiser normalisation was applied. Table 2 shows 
that the first factor has an essential correlation with the 
following items: “confused by the system”, “misoperate 
a switch or control” and “fail to follow the 
system/procedure”. The factor can be labeled as 
“Operational Incidents”. The second factor covers: “sleep 
disturbance and sleep interruption”, “seasickness” and 
“fatigue/tiredness”. These are related to “Discomfort” on 
the vessel. The third factor is most highly correlated to 
following items: “stumble or hit an object by accident” 
and “slip, fall or loss of balance”. The third factor can be 
labeled “Occupational Incidents”. It can be seen that 
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“fatigue and tiredness”, even though it lies under 
“Discomfort” (Factor 2), also correlates with 
“Occupational Incidents” (Factor 3). This is quite 
reasonable, as it involves the logic that people get tired 
because of being uncomfortable on board  ship which 
then leads to incidents while working. 
Table 2 Pattern Matrix of Personnel Incidents  
(Section B) 
Item Factor 
1 2 3 
Confused by the system 0.88 
Misoperate a switch/control 0.77 
Failed to follow the system / procedure 0.73 
Sleep disturbance or sleep interrupted 0.89
Seasickness 0.78
Fatigue/tired 0.71 0.48
Stumble or hit an object 0.85
Slip, fall or loss of balance 0.77
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis 
Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser Normalisation 
 
Table 3 Pattern Matrix on Vessel's Incidents  
(Section C) 
 
Factor 
1 2 3 4 
Contact/collision 0.87   
Fire or explosions 0.84   
Water on deck  0.77  
Moving cargo on deck  0.72  
Loss of power/blackout   0.80 
Loss of navigation/control   0.74 
Falling objects    0.90
Bulk cargo spill     0.79
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis 
Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser Normalisation
 
2.3.  VESSEL INCIDENTS 
 
Assumption testing is not completely fulfilled for the 
eight-item vessel incidence data in Table 3. The KMO 
measure of sampling adequacy is lower than 0.5, at 
0.460, but the Bartlett’s test of sphericity reaches a 
significant level of 0.000. Factor analysis was thus 
performed with extra caution. Four components are 
extracted from the eight-item vessel’s incidence data in 
Section C using the PCA extraction method. The 
Oblimin rotation method with Kaiser normalisation was 
also applied. The first factor covers these items: 
“contact/collision” and “fire/explosions” (see Table 3). 
This factor can be categorised as “Major Incident”. The 
second factor has high correlation with the following 
items: “water on deck”, “moving cargo on deck”. It can 
be called “Deck Incidents”. The third factor consists of 
two items: “loss of power/black out” and “loss of 
navigation/control”. This factor can be labeled as “Ship 
Operation Incidents”. The fourth factor have high 
relationships with: “falling objects” and “bulk cargo 
spill”. This factor can be named “Cargo Operation 
Incidents”. 
 
2.4.  HUMAN FACTORS LIKERT-SCALE 
 
Section D, which consists of sixty-five items, is 
obviously not suitable for factor analysis given “only” 
the forty-two responses available, however, an 
experimental attempt to pursue the analysis was 
performed. As many as eighteen factors were extracted 
when factor analysis was run the first time using the 
principal component extraction method. The eigenvalue 
criterion of greater than 1 was used. An eigenvalue 
shows how much a factor explains the variance of the 
items. Vague items, items with no significant loadings, 
and items with several cross-loadings were eliminated. 
After several iterations, seven components were found 
(see Pattern Matrix in Table 4). The Oblimin rotation 
method with Kaiser normalisation was applied.  
 
The first factor consists of items related to maintenance, 
equipment, bridge design, layout of the vessel and 
systems reliability. It is quite similar to Factor 5 in the 
human factors direct evaluation (Section 2.1.) 
“Reliability, Automation and Maintainability”, but here it 
is broader. The factor revealed here can be called 
“Reliability, Operability and Maintainability”. The 
second factor consists of items reflecting difficulties and 
problems encountered by the crews on board, such as too 
many alarms, too much automation and overly 
complicated systems. This factor is therefore called 
“Interfacing Complexity”. The third factor consists of 
items involved with manoeuvring, the DP system and 
autopilot. It can be called “Ship Handling and 
Manoeuvrability”. The fourth factor consists of forms, 
checklists and procedures. It is then labelled “Systems 
and Procedures”. The fifth factor is related to noise and 
cargo deck, and thus, it is referred to as “Deck Working 
Condition”. The sixth factor consists of items related to 
the engine control room and engine room; therefore it is 
named “ER and ECR”. The seventh factor is related to 
sleep and ship motion. It is identified as “Habitability”. 
 
The factors revealed from the human factors Likert-scale 
questionnaires can be summarised: 
1. Reliability, operability and maintainability 
2. Interfacing complexity 
3. Ship handling and manoeuvrability 
4. Systems and procedures 
5. Deck working condition 
6. Engine room and engine control room 
7. Habitability 
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Table 4 Pattern Matrix on Human Factors Likert-scale (Section D).  
 Factor 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
It is easy to do maintenance of the vessel 0,91   
It is easy to operate the equipment on board 0,76   
The system on the bridge is quite informative 0,73   
The vessel has a good layout 0,71   
Most systems have good reliability 0,69   
We have too many alarms on board 0,92 0,31   
We have too much automation on board 0,79   
The computer menu system is too complicated 0,77   
Sometimes the alarm system is confusing 0,71   
It's not easy to manoeuvre the vessel -0,91   
The vessel has a good manoeuvring capability -0,85   
The vessel has a good and reliable DP system -0,79   
It is easy to manoeuvre the vessel -0,74   
Sometimes we cannot rely on the autopilot -0,65   
There are so many forms & checklists to fill in 0,89   
We have too many procedures to follow 0,77   
Some areas of the vessel are very noisy -0,82   
The cargo deck is well designed 0,80   
The ECR is designed so it can be monitored and operated easily 0,81  
The ER can be maintained without any trouble 0,77  
Sometimes I can't sleep well on the vessel  -0,93 
Sometimes we can feel that the vessel is moving too much  -0,84 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis 
Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser Normalisation 
 
3.  DISCUSSION 
 
Factor analysis was performed to examine human factors 
construct in ship design. Some factors defined in the 
framework remain and some dissipate during the process. 
The two different human factors scales that were 
analysed, Section A (direct evaluation) and Section D 
(Likert-scale), provide similar results. Both outcomes 
look reasonable and valid. The grouping presented in 
Table 1 (from Section A) involves similar components or 
parts of the ship approach with each other that eventually 
merge into one factor. These terms are familiar to naval 
architects and marine engineers, and thus obviously in 
the scope of the work of designers and engineers. The 
grouping presented in Table 4 shows more complex 
constructs. They represent the characteristics or traits of 
the components presented in Table 1, and are 
consequently following the components being positioned 
or applied on board. These complex constructs were 
revealed as bridging components such as 
manoeuvrability, accommodation, general arrangement, 
overall working conditions and safety. They disappeared 
during factor analysis in Section A. These types of 
constructs then appeared in Section D and called 
“Reliability, Operability and Maintainability”, 
“Interfacing Complexity”, and “Deck Working 
Conditions”. Those terms are slightly distant from the 
perspective of designers and engineers but are the 
realities of daily life for the seafarers.  
 
An attempt to establish a theoretical construct of the 
human factors was performed based on results of the 
factor analyses of Section A and Section D. A model was 
developed (Figure 1) to describe the relationships 
between components or parts the ship and the factors of 
interest. The basic components from Table 1 were 
positioned and connected to the corresponding HF 
dimensions such as autopilot, navigation system and DP 
system related to controllability. Parts of the ship design, 
related to the components, were then identified, such as 
hull, bridge, engine room and engine control room. The 
complex factors obtained in Table 2 were inserted into 
the model by considering their relationships with other 
factors. Obviously, those bridging variables came later in 
the model, on the right hand side of the model in Figure 1 
- which also represents the consequence or the product of 
the proceeding factors and processes. Hull design affects 
a ship’s motion which in turn will influence the 
habitability of the vessel. Habitability is also affected by 
noise and vibration, which originate from the engine 
room. In the end, habitability will have an impact on 
safety and performance.  
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Vibration
Sound, noise
Motion
Habitability
Equipment
System & 
procedure
Storage
Communication 
system
General 
arrangement
Layout
Workability
Cargo deck
Cargo tanks
Cargo facilities
Autopilot
Navigation 
system
DP system
Controllability
Engine room
Hull design
Engine control 
room
Bridge
Ship Handling & 
Maneuverability
Reliability 
Operability
Maintainability
Interfacing 
Complexity
Safety & 
Performance
Space
Naval architect and 
marine engineer’s 
scope of works
Human factors 
engineers 
perspective
System engineer’s 
scope of works
HSE and 
Management’s 
interests
Legend: Influencing line
Partly influencing line
Interrelated 
 
Figure 1 Inter-connectivity of human factors on ship design and operation 
 
Hull design also makes a significant contribution to ship 
handling and the manoeuvrability of the vessel. It can be 
seen that the model is not yet complete. Ship handling 
and manoeuvrability are influenced by thrusters (and the 
rudder), which however were excluded from this process 
of data analysis. The items related to manoeuvrability 
were eliminated in the process due to weak loadings. 
 
The model is still at its preliminary stage. The number of 
respondents was too small for anything except a tentative 
analysis. More data is obviously required. However, at 
this point it is safe to show that the ultimate objectives of 
the model are “Safety and Performance”. Some of the 
factors may change their attributes (names) should more 
data and respondents be involved. Some relationships 
between parts and factors may also alter. It seems that 
some relationships still need to be explored, such as 
“Controllability and “Interfacing Complexity”, 
hypothetically should be related.  
 
An effort was made to identify the parties responsible for 
the different aspects. Naval architects and marine 
engineers are responsible for hull design, the engine 
room, engine control room and general arrangement of 
the vessel. They are familiar with the terms of motion, 
vibration, noise, autopilot, navigation system, etc. The 
human factors engineers are acquainted with terms such 
as habitability, controllability and workability, while the 
HSE personnel is familiar with safety. 
 
We can confidently argue that safety is inherent in all 
other components, parts, dimensions or constructs. 
Figure 1 shows a preliminary model of how these 
components, parts, and dimensions are connected to 
safety. Addressing safety as a separate entity, whether at 
the last stage of designing a ship or even only at the 
operational stage is therefore considered insufficient.  
 
4.  CONCLUSIONS 
 
Factor analysis was used to analyse the human factors 
framework. The dominance of some factors is similar to 
the dimensions defined by the theoretical construct [2, 3]: 
(1) controllability, (2) workability and (3) habitability. 
Ship handling and manoeuvrability emerged as one 
factor, and three “new” factors appeared: (4) cargo 
facilities, (5) reliability, operability and maintainability 
and then (6) interfacing complexity. Several dimensions 
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such as OHS and maintainability faded and merged into 
the other factors. Survivability and system safety were 
too weak to emerge, however, it was discovered that 
weak factors should not be excluded from the analysis. 
They should be re-arranged and have the potential to 
show interconnectivity between components, parts, 
dimensions and constructs of human factors on ship 
design and operation. It is expected that this can help us 
address human factors issues effectively, including who 
should consider what issue and when.  
 
A preliminary model of human factors considerations in 
ship design and operations has been presented.  
 
Personnel incidents onboard are summarised into three 
factors: (1) operational incidents, (2) discomfort, and (3) 
occupational incidents. Vessel incidents are divided into: 
(1) major incidents, (2) deck incidents, (3) ship operation 
incidents and (4) cargo incidents. More data is required 
for this effort to be meaningful, and therefore, it is 
recommended that the study be expanded to include 
more respondents. 
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A	Survey	of	Human	Factors	on	Ships	
 
Introduction		
 
This is a survey on ship design with respect to human considerations. 
 
We would like to find out if the existing ship design has sufficiently considered human factors. By 
considering human factors, we can hopefully increase performance and assure safety. 
 
We need your feedback, based on your subjective opinion and experience regarding the vessel’s 
conditions. We need to know the problems that occur during the operations, so that they can be 
evaluated and therefore improved. 
 
All given information and data are treated anonymously and with high confidentiality. 
 
 
  Regards, 
 
  Vincentius Rumawas 
  Researcher  
  Department of Marine Technology 
  Norwegian University of Science and Technology (NTNU) 
  NO‐7491 
 
Instructions		
 
We realize that the scope of this research is quite broad. Some questions may not be relevant to 
you. Therefore you are free to skip any question that is irrelevant. 
 
 Tick ( ✔ ) or cross ( ✗ ) one of the cell that represents your answer. 
 Tick ( ✔ ) or cross ( ✗ ) “no answer” if you don’t know the answer or you cannot answer the 
question.  
 You can elaborate your answer by adding more information in the blank page overleaf. 
 
Your input is very valuable and may affect improvements in ship design in the future. 
 
Should there any questions regarding this questionnaire, you can contact us directly, or via: 
  
  email   vincentius.rumawas@ntnu.no 
  phone  +47 735 95589;   +47 414 55268 
   
 
A  How would you rate the following characteristics of the vessel: 
very 
poor  poor  neither  good 
very 
good 
no 
answer 
1  The overall comfort             
2  Accommodation facilities             
3  Bridge design             
4  Vessel’s motion             
5  Vessel’s vibration             
6  Sound, noise, acoustic             
7  Equipment on board (in general)             
8  System and procedure             
9  Available space and room size             
10  Overall working conditions             
11  Vessel’s general arrangement and layout             
12  Cargo deck design and arrangement             
13  Cargo tanks design and arrangement             
14  Communication system and equipment             
15  The overall safety             
16  Alarm system and monitoring             
17  Dynamic positioning (DP) system              
18  Navigation system              
19  Autopilot system             
20  Engine room design and arrangement             
21  Engine control room design             
22  Control and maintenance system             
23  System’s automation             
24  Overall system reliability             
25  Available space for storage             
26  Vessel’s manoeuvring capability             
 
 
B  How often do the people on board experience the following: 
very 
often 
quite 
often 
some 
times  seldom  never 
no 
answer 
27  Get seasick             
28  Fatigue, tired             
29  Stumble, hit an object by accident, hit by an object             
30  Slip, motion‐induced interrupted, loss of balance, fall             
31  Miss operate the switch or control             
32  Confused with the system             
33  Fail to follow the system / procedure             
34  Sleep disturbance, sleep interrupted             
   
C  How often does the vessel experience the following:  very often  quite often  some times  seldom  never  no answer
35  Loss of power, black out             
36  Loss of navigation control             
37  Contact, collide, collision with platform or other objects             
38  Water on deck             
39  Moving containers on deck, loosing pipes, etc             
40  Falling objects             
41  Fire or explosion             
42  Bulk cargo spill, pollution             
 
D  Please indicate whether you agree with the following statements: 
strongly 
disagree disagree  neutral  agree 
strongly 
agree 
43  The vessel is comfortable           
44  The vessel is quite stable           
45  It is easy to operate the equipment on board           
46  The vessel has a good layout           
47  Most systems on board have good reliability           
48  The vessel is quiet           
49  The system on the bridge is quite informative. The crew can detect any 
deviation during operations           
50  It is easy to do maintenance of the vessel           
51  The vessel is a good place to work           
52  It is safe to work on this vessel           
53  The vessel is designed by considering the human operator's perspective           
54  It is not comfortable to live on this vessel           
55  Most systems on board are ready for use from day 1.           
56  There are so many forms and checklists to fill in           
57  The cargo deck is well designed, the crane operator has a clear 
visibility through the whole area           
58  Some switches / controls are not easy to operate           
59  The vessel has good and reliable DP system           
60  It is easy to operate the vessel using this computerized system           
61  Some equipment is located hard to reach areas           
62  It is easy to control and maneuver the vessel           
63  We need a system that can automatically prevent vessel to collide with 
platforms or other objects           
64  I am proud to be a part of this ship           
65  Sometimes I cannot sleep well on the vessel           
66  Sometimes we can feel that the vessel is moving too much           
67  We have too many procedures to follow           
68  I think they need to improve the general arrangement of the vessel          
69  We have too many communication channels to monitor           
70  We have too much information presented on the screen           
71  We have too many alarms on board           
72  The engine control room has been designed so it can be monitored and 
operated easily           
73  The automation on board can be a trouble           
D  Please indicate whether you agree with the following statements: 
strongly 
disagree disagree  neutral  agree 
strongly 
agree 
74  Sometimes it is hard to do maintenance because of limited space           
75  We need a faster ship           
76  I like to work on this ship           
77  The color of the vessel is sometimes disturbing           
78  Sometimes I am disturbed by the vessel's slamming           
79  Some procedures are too complicated to follow           
80  I don't like the layout of the vessel           
81  We need a better system for transferring bulk cargoes           
82  Sometimes the crew is annoyed by the alarm           
83  This computer menu system is too complicated           
84  We need more space to put supplies, parts and tools           
85  Working in a vessel like this, is not good for our health           
86  Sometimes I feel that the crew is less considered in the vessel design           
87  The vessel is noisy           
88  It is not easy to find crew for this type of vessel           
89  Some people have very limited space for working           
90  Working on deck at sea is quite dangerous           
91  Sometimes the crew are confused with all the communication 
systems on board           
92  Sometimes it is hard to operate the vessel due to limited view           
93  Some displays cannot be dimmed, and it disturbs our visibility at night           
94  Sometimes the alarm system is confusing           
95  Sometimes we cannot rely on the autopilot           
96  Most systems on board are user‐friendly           
97  The vessel is too complicated to maintain           
98  Some doors are difficult to open           
99  The vessel has a good maneuvering capability           
100  The vessel is designed by considering that something might go wrong           
101  Some areas of the vessel are very noisy           
102  The process of loading unloading cargo can be done without any 
significant problems           
103  Connecting hose at sea is not a difficult task           
104  The displays are visible in all conditions           
105  Sometimes it is hard to read the displays due to glare           
106  Some alarms are irrelevant           
107  We never have any problem with the DP system           
108  The engine room can be maintained without any trouble           
119  We have too much automation on board           
110  Some ladders / stairs are too steep           
111  It is not easy to maneuver the vessel, especially in restricted waters           
112  It is 'safe' to make mistakes because the system has been design with 
sufficient redundancies           
 
Thank you for your kind participation! 
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Previous PhD theses published at the Department of Marine Technology (earlier: Faculty of Marine Technology) 
NORWEGIAN UNIVERSITY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY  
Report No. Author Title  Kavlie, Dag Optimization of Plane Elastic Grillages, 1967  Hansen, Hans R. Man-Machine Communication and Data-Storage Methods in Ship Structural Design, 1971  Gisvold, Kaare M. A Method for non-linear mixed -integer programming and its Application to Design Problems, 1971  Lund, Sverre Tanker Frame Optimalization by means of SUMT-Transformation and Behaviour Models, 1971  Vinje, Tor On Vibration of Spherical Shells Interacting with Fluid, 1972  Lorentz, Jan D. Tank Arrangement for Crude Oil Carriers in Accordance with the new Anti-Pollution Regulations, 1975  Carlsen, Carl A. Computer-Aided Design of Tanker Structures, 1975  Larsen, Carl M. Static and Dynamic Analysis of Offshore Pipelines during Installation, 1976 UR-79-01 Brigt Hatlestad, MK The finite element method used in a fatigue evaluation of fixed offshore platforms. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) UR-79-02 Erik Pettersen, MK Analysis and design of cellular structures. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) UR-79-03 Sverre Valsgård, MK Finite difference and finite element methods applied to nonlinear analysis of plated structures. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) UR-79-04 Nils T. Nordsve, MK Finite element collapse analysis of structural members considering imperfections and stresses due to fabrication. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) UR-79-05 Ivar J. Fylling, MK Analysis of towline forces in ocean towing systems. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) UR-80-06 Nils Sandsmark, MM Analysis of Stationary and Transient Heat Conduction by the Use of the Finite Element Method. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) UR-80-09 Sverre Haver, MK Analysis of uncertainties related to the stochastic modeling of ocean waves. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) UR-81-15 Odland, Jonas On the Strength of welded Ring stiffened cylindrical Shells primarily subjected to axial Compression UR-82-17 Engesvik, Knut Analysis of Uncertainties in the fatigue Capacity of Welded Joints UR-82-18 Rye, Henrik Ocean wave groups UR-83-30 Eide, Oddvar Inge On Cumulative Fatigue Damage in Steel Welded Joints UR-83-33 Mo, Olav Stochastic Time Domain Analysis of Slender Offshore Structures UR-83-34 Amdahl, Jørgen Energy absorption in Ship-platform impacts UR-84-37 Mørch, Morten Motions and mooring forces of semi submersibles as determined by full-scale measurements and theoretical analysis UR-84-38 Soares, C. Guedes Probabilistic models for load effects in ship structures UR-84-39 Aarsnes, Jan V. Current forces on ships UR-84-40 Czujko, Jerzy Collapse Analysis of Plates subjected to Biaxial Compression and Lateral Load UR-85-46 Alf G. Engseth, MK Finite element collapse analysis of tubular steel offshore structures. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) UR-86-47 Dengody Sheshappa, MP A Computer Design Model for Optimizing Fishing Vessel Designs Based on Techno-Economic Analysis. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) UR-86-48 Vidar Aanesland, MH A Theoretical and Numerical Study of Ship Wave Resistance. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) UR-86-49 Heinz-Joachim Wessel, MK Fracture Mechanics Analysis of Crack Growth in Plate Girders. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) UR-86-50 Jon Taby, MK Ultimate and Post-ultimate Strength of Dented Tubular Members. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) UR-86-51 Walter Lian, MH A Numerical Study of Two-Dimensional Separated Flow Past Bluff Bodies at Moderate KC-Numbers. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) UR-86-52 Bjørn Sortland, MH Force Measurements in Oscillating Flow on Ship Sections and Circular Cylinders in a U-Tube Water Tank. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) UR-86-53 Kurt Strand, MM A System Dynamic Approach to One-dimensional Fluid Flow. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) UR-86-54 Arne Edvin Løken, MH Three Dimensional Second Order Hydrodynamic Effects on Ocean Structures in Waves. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) UR-86-55 Sigurd Falch, MH A Numerical Study of Slamming of Two-Dimensional Bodies. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) 
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Report No. Author Title UR-87-56 Arne Braathen, MH Application of a Vortex Tracking Method to the Prediction of Roll Damping of a Two-Dimension Floating Body. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) UR-87-57 Bernt Leira, MK Gaussian Vector Processes for Reliability Analysis involving Wave-Induced Load Effects. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) UR-87-58 Magnus Småvik, MM Thermal Load and Process Characteristics in a Two-Stroke Diesel Engine with Thermal Barriers (in Norwegian). (Dr.Ing. Thesis) MTA-88-59 Bernt Arild Bremdal, MP An Investigation of Marine Installation Processes – A Knowledge - Based Planning Approach. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) MTA-88-60 Xu Jun, MK Non-linear Dynamic Analysis of Space-framed Offshore Structures. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) MTA-89-61 Gang Miao, MH Hydrodynamic Forces and Dynamic Responses of Circular Cylinders in Wave Zones. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) MTA-89-62 Martin Greenhow, MH Linear and Non-Linear Studies of Waves and Floating Bodies. Part I and Part II. (Dr.Techn. Thesis) MTA-89-63 Chang Li, MH Force Coefficients of Spheres and Cubes in Oscillatory Flow with and without Current. (Dr.Ing. Thesis MTA-89-64 Hu Ying, MP A Study of Marketing and Design in Development of Marine Transport Systems. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) MTA-89-65 Arild Jæger, MH Seakeeping, Dynamic Stability and Performance of a Wedge Shaped Planing Hull. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) MTA-89-66 Chan Siu Hung, MM The dynamic characteristics of tilting-pad bearings MTA-89-67 Kim Wikstrøm, MP Analysis av projekteringen for ett offshore projekt. (Licenciat-avhandling) MTA-89-68 Jiao Guoyang, MK Reliability Analysis of Crack Growth under Random Loading, considering Model Updating. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) MTA-89-69 Arnt Olufsen, MK Uncertainty and Reliability Analysis of Fixed Offshore Structures. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) MTA-89-70 Wu Yu-Lin, MR System Reliability Analyses of Offshore Structures using improved Truss and Beam Models. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) MTA-90-71 Jan Roger Hoff, MH Three-dimensional Green function of a vessel with forward speed in waves. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) MTA-90-72 Rong Zhao, MH Slow-Drift Motions of a Moored Two-Dimensional Body in Irregular Waves. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) MTA-90-73 Atle Minsaas, MP Economical Risk Analysis. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) MTA-90-74 Knut-Aril Farnes, MK Long-term Statistics of Response in Non-linear Marine Structures. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) MTA-90-75 Torbjørn Sotberg, MK Application of Reliability Methods for Safety Assessment of Submarine Pipelines. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) MTA-90-76 Zeuthen, Steffen, MP SEAMAID. A computational model of the design process in a constraint-based logic programming environment. An example from the offshore domain. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) MTA-91-77 Haagensen, Sven, MM Fuel Dependant Cyclic Variability in a Spark Ignition Engine - An Optical Approach. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) MTA-91-78 Løland, Geir, MH Current forces on and flow through fish farms. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) MTA-91-79 Hoen, Christopher, MK System Identification of Structures Excited by Stochastic Load Processes. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) MTA-91-80 Haugen, Stein, MK Probabilistic Evaluation of Frequency of Collision between Ships and Offshore Platforms. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) MTA-91-81 Sødahl, Nils, MK Methods for Design and Analysis of Flexible Risers. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) MTA-91-82 Ormberg, Harald, MK Non-linear Response Analysis of Floating Fish Farm Systems. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) MTA-91-83 Marley, Mark J., MK Time Variant Reliability under Fatigue Degradation. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) MTA-91-84 Krokstad, Jørgen R., MH Second-order Loads in Multidirectional Seas. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) MTA-91-85 Molteberg, Gunnar A., MM The Application of System Identification Techniques to Performance Monitoring of Four Stroke Turbocharged Diesel Engines. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) MTA-92-86 Mørch, Hans Jørgen Bjelke, MH Aspects of Hydrofoil Design: with Emphasis on Hydrofoil Interaction in Calm Water. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) MTA-92-87 Chan Siu Hung, MM Nonlinear Analysis of Rotordynamic Instabilities in Highspeed Turbomachinery. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) MTA-92-88 Bessason, Bjarni, MK Assessment of Earthquake Loading and Response of Seismically Isolated Bridges. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) MTA-92-89 Langli, Geir, MP Improving Operational Safety through exploitation of Design Knowledge - an investigation of offshore platform safety. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) 
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Report No. Author Title MTA-92-90 Sævik, Svein, MK On Stresses and Fatigue in Flexible Pipes. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) MTA-92-91 Ask, Tor Ø., MM Ignition and Flame Growth in Lean Gas-Air Mixtures. An Experimental Study with a Schlieren System. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) MTA-86-92 Hessen, Gunnar, MK Fracture Mechanics Analysis of Stiffened Tubular Members. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) MTA-93-93 Steinebach, Christian, MM Knowledge Based Systems for Diagnosis of Rotating Machinery. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) MTA-93-94 Dalane, Jan Inge, MK System Reliability in Design and Maintenance of Fixed Offshore Structures. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) MTA-93-95 Steen, Sverre, MH Cobblestone Effect on SES. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) MTA-93-96 Karunakaran, Daniel, MK Nonlinear Dynamic Response and Reliability Analysis of Drag-dominated Offshore Platforms. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) MTA-93-97 Hagen, Arnulf, MP The Framework of a Design Process Language. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) MTA-93-98 Nordrik, Rune, MM Investigation of Spark Ignition and Autoignition in Methane and Air Using Computational Fluid Dynamics and Chemical Reaction Kinetics. A Numerical Study of Ignition Processes in Internal Combustion Engines. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) MTA-94-99 Passano, Elizabeth, MK Efficient Analysis of Nonlinear Slender Marine Structures. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) MTA-94-100 Kvålsvold, Jan, MH Hydroelastic Modelling of Wetdeck Slamming on Multihull Vessels. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) MTA-94-102 Bech, Sidsel M., MK Experimental and Numerical Determination of Stiffness and Strength of GRP/PVC Sandwich Structures. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) MTA-95-103 Paulsen, Hallvard, MM A Study of Transient Jet and Spray using a Schlieren Method and Digital Image Processing. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) MTA-95-104 Hovde, Geir Olav, MK Fatigue and Overload Reliability of Offshore Structural Systems, Considering the Effect of Inspection and Repair. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) MTA-95-105 Wang, Xiaozhi, MK Reliability Analysis of Production Ships with Emphasis on Load Combination and Ultimate Strength. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) MTA-95-106 Ulstein, Tore, MH Nonlinear Effects of a Flexible Stern Seal Bag on Cobblestone Oscillations of an SES. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) MTA-95-107 Solaas, Frøydis, MH Analytical and Numerical Studies of Sloshing in Tanks. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) MTA-95-108 Hellan, Øyvind, MK Nonlinear Pushover and Cyclic Analyses in Ultimate Limit State Design and Reassessment of Tubular Steel Offshore Structures. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) MTA-95-109 Hermundstad, Ole A., MK Theoretical and Experimental Hydroelastic Analysis of High Speed Vessels. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) MTA-96-110 Bratland, Anne K., MH Wave-Current Interaction Effects on Large-Volume Bodies in Water of Finite Depth. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) MTA-96-111 Herfjord, Kjell, MH A Study of Two-dimensional Separated Flow by a Combination of the Finite Element Method and Navier-Stokes Equations. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) MTA-96-112 Æsøy, Vilmar, MM Hot Surface Assisted Compression Ignition in a Direct Injection Natural Gas Engine. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) MTA-96-113 Eknes, Monika L., MK Escalation Scenarios Initiated by Gas Explosions on Offshore Installations. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) MTA-96-114 Erikstad, Stein O., MP A Decision Support Model for Preliminary Ship Design. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) MTA-96-115 Pedersen, Egil, MH A Nautical Study of Towed Marine Seismic Streamer Cable Configurations. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) MTA-97-116 Moksnes, Paul O., MM Modelling Two-Phase Thermo-Fluid Systems Using Bond Graphs. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) MTA-97-117 Halse, Karl H., MK On Vortex Shedding and Prediction of Vortex-Induced Vibrations of Circular Cylinders. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) MTA-97-118 Igland, Ragnar T., MK Reliability Analysis of Pipelines during Laying, considering Ultimate Strength under Combined Loads. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) MTA-97-119 Pedersen, Hans-P., MP Levendefiskteknologi for fiskefartøy. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) MTA-98-120 Vikestad, Kyrre, MK Multi-Frequency Response of a Cylinder Subjected to Vortex Shedding and Support Motions. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) MTA-98-121 Azadi, Mohammad R. E., MK Analysis of Static and Dynamic Pile-Soil-Jacket Behaviour. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) MTA-98-122 Ulltang, Terje, MP A Communication Model for Product Information. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) MTA-98-123 Torbergsen, Erik, MM Impeller/Diffuser Interaction Forces in Centrifugal Pumps. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) MTA-98-124 Hansen, Edmond, MH A Discrete Element Model to Study Marginal Ice Zone Dynamics and the Behaviour of Vessels Moored in Broken Ice. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) MTA-98-125 Videiro, Paulo M., MK Reliability Based Design of Marine Structures. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
4  
Report No. Author Title MTA-99-126 Mainçon, Philippe, MK Fatigue Reliability of Long Welds Application to Titanium Risers. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) MTA-99-127 Haugen, Elin M., MH Hydroelastic Analysis of Slamming on Stiffened Plates with Application to Catamaran Wetdecks. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) MTA-99-128 Langhelle, Nina K., MK Experimental Validation and Calibration of Nonlinear Finite Element Models for Use in Design of Aluminium Structures Exposed to Fire. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) MTA-99-129 Berstad, Are J., MK Calculation of Fatigue Damage in Ship Structures. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) MTA-99-130 Andersen, Trond M., MM Short Term Maintenance Planning. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) MTA-99-131 Tveiten, Bård Wathne, MK Fatigue Assessment of Welded Aluminium Ship Details. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) MTA-99-132 Søreide, Fredrik, MP Applications of underwater technology in deep water archaeology. Principles and practice. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) MTA-99-133 Tønnessen, Rune, MH A Finite Element Method Applied to Unsteady Viscous Flow Around 2D Blunt Bodies With Sharp Corners. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) MTA-99-134 Elvekrok, Dag R., MP Engineering Integration in Field Development Projects in the Norwegian Oil and Gas Industry. The Supplier Management of Norne. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) MTA-99-135 Fagerholt, Kjetil, MP Optimeringsbaserte Metoder for Ruteplanlegging innen skipsfart. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) MTA-99-136 Bysveen, Marie, MM Visualization in Two Directions on a Dynamic Combustion Rig for Studies of Fuel Quality. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) MTA-2000-137 Storteig, Eskild, MM Dynamic characteristics and leakage performance of liquid annular seals in centrifugal pumps. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) MTA-2000-138 Sagli, Gro, MK Model uncertainty and simplified estimates of long term extremes of hull girder loads in ships. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) MTA-2000-139 Tronstad, Harald, MK Nonlinear analysis and design of cable net structures like fishing gear based on the finite element method. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) MTA-2000-140 Kroneberg, André, MP Innovation in shipping by using scenarios. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) MTA-2000-141 Haslum, Herbjørn Alf, MH Simplified methods applied to nonlinear motion of spar platforms. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) MTA-2001-142 Samdal, Ole Johan, MM Modelling of Degradation Mechanisms and Stressor Interaction on Static Mechanical Equipment Residual Lifetime. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) MTA-2001-143 Baarholm, Rolf Jarle, MH Theoretical and experimental studies of wave impact underneath decks of offshore platforms. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) MTA-2001-144 Wang, Lihua, MK Probabilistic Analysis of Nonlinear Wave-induced Loads on Ships. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) MTA-2001-145 Kristensen, Odd H. Holt, MK Ultimate Capacity of Aluminium Plates under Multiple Loads, Considering HAZ Properties. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) MTA-2001-146 Greco, Marilena, MH A Two-Dimensional Study of Green-Water Loading. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) MTA-2001-147 Heggelund, Svein E., MK Calculation of Global Design Loads and Load Effects in Large High Speed Catamarans. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) MTA-2001-148 Babalola, Olusegun T., MK Fatigue Strength of Titanium Risers – Defect Sensitivity. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) MTA-2001-149 Mohammed, Abuu K., MK Nonlinear Shell Finite Elements for Ultimate Strength and Collapse Analysis of Ship Structures. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) MTA-2002-150 Holmedal, Lars E., MH Wave-current interactions in the vicinity of the sea bed. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) MTA-2002-151 Rognebakke, Olav F., MH Sloshing in rectangular tanks and interaction with ship motions. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) MTA-2002-152 Lader, Pål Furset, MH Geometry and Kinematics of Breaking Waves. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) MTA-2002-153 Yang, Qinzheng, MH Wash and wave resistance of ships in finite water depth. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) MTA-2002-154 Melhus, Øyvin, MM Utilization of VOC in Diesel Engines. Ignition and combustion of VOC released by crude oil tankers. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) MTA-2002-155 Ronæss, Marit, MH Wave Induced Motions of Two Ships Advancing on Parallel Course. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) MTA-2002-156 Økland, Ole D., MK Numerical and experimental investigation of whipping in twin hull vessels exposed to severe wet deck slamming. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) MTA-2002-157 Ge, Chunhua, MK Global Hydroelastic Response of Catamarans due to Wet Deck Slamming. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) MTA-2002-158 Byklum, Eirik, MK Nonlinear Shell Finite Elements for Ultimate Strength and Collapse Analysis of Ship Structures. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) IMT-2003-1 Chen, Haibo, MK Probabilistic Evaluation of FPSO-Tanker Collision in Tandem Offloading Operation. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) IMT-2003-2 Skaugset, Kjetil Bjørn, MK On the Suppression of Vortex Induced Vibrations of Circular Cylinders by Radial Water Jets. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) 
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Report No. Author Title IMT-2003-3 Chezhian, Muthu Three-Dimensional Analysis of Slamming. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) IMT-2003-4 Buhaug, Øyvind Deposit Formation on Cylinder Liner Surfaces in Medium Speed Engines. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) IMT-2003-5 Tregde, Vidar Aspects of Ship Design: Optimization of Aft Hull with Inverse Geometry Design. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) IMT-2003-6 Wist, Hanne Therese Statistical Properties of Successive Ocean Wave Parameters. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) IMT-2004-7 Ransau, Samuel Numerical Methods for Flows with Evolving Interfaces. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) IMT-2004-8 Soma, Torkel Blue-Chip or Sub-Standard. A data interrogation approach of identity safety characteristics of shipping organization. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) IMT-2004-9 Ersdal, Svein An experimental study of hydrodynamic forces on cylinders and cables in near axial flow. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) IMT-2005-10 Brodtkorb, Per Andreas The Probability of Occurrence of Dangerous Wave Situations at Sea. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) IMT-2005-11 Yttervik, Rune Ocean current variability in relation to offshore engineering. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) IMT-2005-12 Fredheim, Arne Current Forces on Net-Structures. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) IMT-2005-13 Heggernes, Kjetil Flow around marine structures. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) IMT-2005-14 Fouques, Sebastien Lagrangian Modelling of Ocean Surface Waves and Synthetic Aperture Radar Wave Measurements. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) IMT-2006-15 Holm, Håvard Numerical calculation of viscous free surface flow around marine structures. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) IMT-2006-16 Bjørheim, Lars G. Failure Assessment of Long Through Thickness Fatigue Cracks in Ship Hulls. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) IMT-2006-17 Hansson, Lisbeth Safety Management for Prevention of Occupational Accidents. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) IMT-2006-18 Zhu, Xinying Application of the CIP Method to Strongly Nonlinear Wave-Body Interaction Problems. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) IMT-2006-19 Reite, Karl Johan Modelling and Control of Trawl Systems. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) IMT-2006-20 Smogeli, Øyvind Notland Control of Marine Propellers. From Normal to Extreme Conditions. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) IMT-2007-21 Storhaug, Gaute Experimental Investigation of Wave Induced Vibrations and Their Effect on the Fatigue Loading of Ships. (Dr.Ing. Thesis) IMT-2007-22 Sun, Hui A Boundary Element Method Applied to Strongly Nonlinear Wave-Body Interaction Problems. (PhD Thesis, CeSOS) IMT-2007-23 Rustad, Anne Marthine Modelling and Control of Top Tensioned Risers. (PhD Thesis, CeSOS) IMT-2007-24 Johansen, Vegar Modelling flexible slender system for real-time simulations and control applications IMT-2007-25 Wroldsen, Anders Sunde Modelling and control of tensegrity structures. (PhD Thesis, CeSOS) IMT-2007-26 Aronsen, Kristoffer Høye An experimental investigation of in-line and combined inline and cross flow vortex induced vibrations. (Dr. avhandling, IMT) IMT-2007-27 Gao, Zhen Stochastic Response Analysis of Mooring Systems with Emphasis on Frequency-domain Analysis of Fatigue due to Wide-band Response Processes (PhD Thesis, CeSOS) IMT-2007-28 Thorstensen, Tom Anders Lifetime Profit Modelling of Ageing Systems Utilizing Information about Technical Condition. (Dr.ing. thesis, IMT) IMT-2008-29 Refsnes, Jon Erling Gorset Nonlinear Model-Based Control of Slender Body AUVs (PhD Thesis, IMT) IMT-2008-30 Berntsen, Per Ivar B. Structural Reliability Based Position Mooring. (PhD-Thesis, IMT) IMT-2008-31 Ye, Naiquan Fatigue Assessment of Aluminium Welded Box-stiffener Joints in Ships (Dr.ing. thesis, IMT) IMT-2008-32 Radan, Damir Integrated Control of Marine Electrical Power Systems. (PhD-Thesis, IMT) IMT-2008-33 Thomassen, Paul Methods for Dynamic Response Analysis and Fatigue Life Estimation of Floating Fish Cages. (Dr.ing. thesis, IMT) IMT-2008-34 Pákozdi, Csaba A Smoothed Particle Hydrodynamics Study of Two-dimensional Nonlinear Sloshing in Rectangular Tanks. (Dr.ing.thesis, IMT/ CeSOS) IMT-2007-35 Grytøyr, Guttorm A Higher-Order Boundary Element Method and Applications to Marine Hydrodynamics. (Dr.ing.thesis, IMT) IMT-2008-36 Drummen, Ingo Experimental and Numerical Investigation of Nonlinear Wave-Induced Load Effects in Containerships considering Hydroelasticity. (PhD thesis, CeSOS) IMT-2008-37 Skejic, Renato Maneuvering and Seakeeping of a Singel Ship and of Two Ships in Interaction. (PhD-Thesis, CeSOS) 
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Report No. Author Title IMT-2008-38 Harlem, Alf An Age-Based Replacement Model for Repairable Systems with Attention to High-Speed Marine Diesel Engines. (PhD-Thesis, IMT) IMT-2008-39 Alsos, Hagbart S. Ship Grounding. Analysis of Ductile Fracture, Bottom Damage and Hull Girder Response. (PhD-thesis, IMT) IMT-2008-40 Graczyk, Mateusz Experimental Investigation of Sloshing Loading and Load Effects in Membrane LNG Tanks Subjected to Random Excitation. (PhD-thesis, CeSOS) IMT-2008-41 Taghipour, Reza Efficient Prediction of Dynamic Response for Flexible amd Multi-body Marine Structures. (PhD-thesis, CeSOS) IMT-2008-42 Ruth, Eivind Propulsion control and thrust allocation on marine vessels. (PhD thesis, CeSOS) IMT-2008-43 Nystad, Bent Helge Technical Condition Indexes and Remaining Useful Life of Aggregated Systems. PhD thesis, IMT IMT-2008-44 Soni, Prashant Kumar Hydrodynamic Coefficients for Vortex Induced  Vibrations of Flexible Beams,  PhD thesis, CeSOS IMT-2009-45 Amlashi, Hadi K.K. Ultimate Strength and Reliability-based Design of Ship Hulls with Emphasis on Combined Global and Local Loads. PhD Thesis, IMT IMT-2009-46 Pedersen, Tom Arne Bond Graph Modelling of Marine Power Systems. PhD Thesis, IMT IMT-2009-47 Kristiansen, Trygve Two-Dimensional Numerical and Experimental Studies of Piston-Mode Resonance. PhD-Thesis, CeSOS IMT-2009-48 Ong, Muk Chen Applications of a Standard High Reynolds Number   Model and a Stochastic Scour Prediction Model for Marine Structures. PhD-thesis, IMT IMT-2009-49 Hong, Lin Simplified Analysis and Design of Ships subjected to Collision and Grounding. PhD-thesis, IMT IMT-2009-50 Koushan, Kamran Vortex Induced Vibrations of Free Span Pipelines, PhD Thesis, IMT IMT-2009-51 Korsvik, Jarl Eirik Heuristic Methods for Ship Routing and Scheduling. PhD Thesis, IMT IMT-2009-52 Lee, Jihoon Experimental Investigation and Numerical in Analyzing the Ocean Current Displacement of Longlines. PhD Thesis, IMT. IMT-2009-53 Vestbøstad, Tone Gran A Numerical Study of Wave-in-Deck Impact usin a Two-Dimensional Constrained Interpolation Profile Method, PhD Thesis, CeSOS. IMT-2009-54 Bruun, Kristine Bond Graph Modelling of Fuel Cells for Marine Power Plants. PhD Thesis, IMT IMT 2009-55 Holstad, Anders Numerical Investigation of Turbulence in a Sekwed Three-Dimensional Channel Flow, PhD Thesis, IMT. IMT 2009-56 Ayala-Uraga, Efren Reliability-Based Assessment of Deteriorating Ship-shaped Offshore Structures, PhD Thesis, IMT IMT-2009-57 Kong, Xiangjun A Numerical Study of a Damaged Ship in Beam Sea Waves. PhD Thesis, IMT/CeSOS. IMT 2010-58 Kristiansen, David Wave Induced Effects on Floaters of Aquaculture Plants, PhD Thesis, CeSOS. IMT 2010-59 Ludvigsen, Martin An ROV-Toolbox for Optical and Acoustic Scientific Seabed Investigation. PhD Thesis IMT. IMT-2010-60 Hals, Jørgen Modelling and Phase Control of Wave-Energy Converters. PhD Thesis, CeSOS. IMT-2010-61 Shu, Zhi Uncertainty Assessment of Wave Loads and Ultimate Strength of Tankers and Bulk Carriers in a Reliability Framework. PhD Thesis, IMT/ CeSOS IMT-2010-62 Shao, Yanlin Numerical Potential-Flow Studies on Weakly-Nonlinear Wave-Body Interactions with/without Small Forward Speed, PhD Thesis, CeSOS.  IMT-2010-63 Califano, Andrea Dynamic Loads on Marine Propellers due to Intermittent Ventilation. PhD Thesis, IMT. IMT-2010-64 El Khoury, George Numerical Simulations of Massively Separated Turbulent Flows, PhD Thesis, IMT IMT-2010-65 Seim, Knut Sponheim Mixing Process in Dense Overflows with Emphasis on the Faroe Bank Channel Overflow. PhD Thesis, IMT IMT-2010-66 Jia, Huirong Structural Analysis of Intect and Damaged Ships in a Collission Risk Analysis Perspective. PhD Thesis CeSoS. IMT-2010-67 Jiao, Linlin Wave-Induced Effects on a Pontoon-type Very Large Floating Structures (VLFS). PhD Thesis, CeSOS. IMT-2010-68 Abrahamsen, Bjørn Christian Sloshing Induced Tank Roof with Entrapped Air Pocket. PhD Thesis, CeSOS. IMT-2011-69 Karimirad, Madjid Stochastic Dynamic Response Analysis of Spar-Type Wind Turbines with Catenary or Taut Mooring Systems. PhD Thesis, CeSOS. IMT-2011-70 Erlend Meland Condition Monitoring of Safety Critical Valves. PhD Thesis, IMT. 
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Report No. Author Title IMT-2011-71 Yang, Limin Stochastic Dynamic System Analysis of Wave Energy Converter with Hydraulic Power Take-Off, with Particular Reference to Wear Damage Analysis, PhD Thesis, CeSOS. IMT-2011-72 Visscher, Jan Application of Particla Image Velocimetry on Turbulent Marine Flows, PhD Thesis, IMT. IMT-2011-73 Su, Biao Numerical Predictions of Global and Local Ice Loads on Ships. PhD Thesis, CeSOS. IMT-2011-74 Liu, Zhenhui Analytical and Numerical Analysis of Iceberg Collision with Ship Structures. PhD Thesis, IMT. IMT-2011-75 Aarsæther, Karl Gunnar Modeling and Analysis of Ship Traffic by Observation and Numerical Simulation. PhD Thesis, IMT. IMT-2011-76 Wu, Jie Hydrodynamic Force Identification from Stochastic Vortex Induced Vibration Experiments with Slender Beams. PhD Thesis, IMT. IMT-2011-77 Amini, Hamid Azimuth Propulsors in Off-design Conditions. PhD Thesis, IMT. IMT-2011-78 Nguyen, Tan-Hoi Toward a System of Real-Time Prediction and Monitoring of Bottom Damage Conditions During Ship Grounding. PhD Thesis, IMT. IMT-2011-79 Tavakoli, Mohammad T. Assessment of Oil Spill in Ship Collision and Grounding, PhD Thesis, IMT. IMT-2011-80 Guo, Bingjie Numerical and Experimental Investigation of Added Resistance in Waves. PhD Thesis, IMT. IMT-2011-81 Chen, Qiaofeng Ultimate Strength of Aluminium Panels, considering HAZ Effects, IMT IMT-2012-82 Kota, Ravikiran S. Wave Loads on Decks of Offshore Structures in Random Seas, CeSOS. IMT-2012-83 Sten, Ronny Dynamic Simulation of Deep Water Drilling Risers with Heave Compensating System, IMT. IMT-2012-84 Berle, Øyvind Risk and resilience in global maritime supply chains, IMT. IMT-2012-85 Fang, Shaoji Fault Tolerant Position Mooring Control Based on Structural Reliability, CeSOS. IMT-2012-86 You, Jikun Numerical studies on wave forces and moored ship motions in intermediate and shallow water, CeSOS. IMT-2012-87 Xiang ,Xu Maneuvering of two interacting ships in waves, CeSOS IMT-2012-88 Dong, Wenbin Time-domain fatigue response and reliability analysis of offshore wind turbines with emphasis on welded tubular joints and gear components, CeSOS IMT-2012-89 Zhu, Suji Investigation of Wave-Induced Nonlinear Load Effects in Open Ships considering Hull Girder Vibrations in Bending and Torsion, CeSOS IMT-2012-90 Zhou, Li Numerical and Experimental Investigation of Station-keeping in Level Ice, CeSOS IMT-2012-91 Ushakov, Sergey Particulate matter emission characteristics from diesel engines operating on conventional and alternative marine fuels, IMT IMT-2013-1 Yin, Decao Experimental and Numerical Analysis of Combined In-line and Cross-flow Vortex Induced Vibrations, CeSOS IMT-2013-2 Kurniawan, Adi Modelling and geometry optimisation of wave energy converters, CeSOS IMT-2013-3 Al Ryati, Nabil Technical condition indexes doe auxiliary marine diesel engines, IMT IMT-2013-4 Firoozkoohi, Reza Experimental, numerical and analytical investigation of the effect of screens on sloshing, CeSOS IMT-2013-5 Ommani, Babak Potential-Flow Predictions of a Semi-Displacement Vessel Including Applications to Calm Water Broaching, CeSOS IMT-2013-6 Xing, Yihan Modelling and analysis of the gearbox in a floating spar-type wind turbine, CeSOS IMT-7-2013 Balland, Océane Optimization models for reducing air emissions from ships, IMT IMT-8-2013 Yang, Dan Transitional wake flow behind an inclined flat plate-Computation and analysis,  IMT IMT-9-2013 Abdillah, Suyuthi Prediction of Extreme Loads and Fatigue Damage for a Ship Hull due to Ice Action, IMT IMT-10-2013 Ramìrez, Pedro Agustìn Pèrez Ageing management and life extension of technical systems-Concepts and methods applied to oil and gas facilities, IMT IMT-11-2013 Chuang, Zhenju Experimental and Numerical Investigation of Speed Loss due to Seakeeping and Maneuvering. IMT IMT-12-2013 Etemaddar, Mahmoud Load and Response Analysis of Wind Turbines under Atmospheric Icing and Controller System Faults with Emphasis on Spar Type Floating Wind Turbines, IMT IMT-13-2013 Lindstad, Haakon Strategies and measures for reducing maritime CO2 emissons, IMT IMT-14-2013 Haris, Sabril Damage interaction analysis of ship collisions, IMT 
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Report No. Author Title IMT-15-2013 Shainee, Mohamed Conceptual Design, Numerical and Experimental Investigation of a SPM Cage Concept for Offshore Mariculture, IMT IMT-16-2013 Gansel, Lars Flow past porous cylinders and effects of biofouling and fish behavior on the flow in and around Atlantic salmon net cages, IMT IMT-17-2013 Gaspar, Henrique Handling Aspects of Complexity in Conceptual Ship Design, IMT IMT-18-2013 Thys, Maxime Theoretical and Experimental Investigation of a Free Running Fishing Vessel at Small Frequency of Encounter, CeSOS IMT-19-2013 Aglen, Ida VIV in Free Spanning Pipelines, CeSOS IMT-1-2014 Song, An Theoretical and experimental studies of wave diffraction and radiation loads on a horizontally submerged perforated plate, CeSOS IMT-2-2014 Rogne, Øyvind Ygre Numerical and Experimental Investigation of a Hinged 5-body Wave Energy Converter, CeSOS IMT-3-2014 Dai, Lijuan  Safe and efficient operation and maintenance of offshore wind farms, IMT IMT-4-2014 Bachynski, Erin Elizabeth Design and Dynamic Analysis of Tension Leg Platform Wind Turbines, CeSOS IMT-5-2014 Wang, Jingbo Water Entry of Freefall Wedged – Wedge motions and Cavity Dynamics, CeSOS IMT-6-2014 Kim, Ekaterina Experimental and numerical studies related to the coupled behavior of ice mass and steel structures during accidental collisions, IMT IMT-7-2014 Tan, Xiang Numerical investigation of ship’s continuous- mode icebreaking in leverl ice, CeSOS IMT-8-2014 Muliawan, Made Jaya Design and Analysis of Combined Floating Wave and Wind Power Facilities, with Emphasis on Extreme Load Effects of the Mooring System, CeSOS IMT-9-2014 Jiang, Zhiyu Long-term response analysis of wind turbines with an emphasis on fault and shutdown conditions, IMT IMT-10-2014 Dukan, Fredrik ROV Motion Control Systems, IMT IMT-11-2014 Grimsmo, Nils I. Dynamic simulations of hydraulic cylinder for heave compensation of deep water drilling risers, IMT IMT-12-2014 Kvittem, Marit I. Modelling and response analysis for fatigue design of a semisubmersible wind turbine, CeSOS IMT-13-2014 Akhtar, Juned The Effects of Human Fatigue on Risk at Sea, IMT IMT-14-2014 Syahroni, Nur Fatigue Assessment of Welded Joints Taking into Account Effects of Residual Stress, IMT IMT-1-2015 Bøckmann, Eirik Wave Propulsion of ships, IMT IMT-2-2015 Wang, Kai Modelling and dynamic analysis of a semi-submersible floating vertical axis wind turbine, CeSOS IMT-3-2015 Fredriksen, Arnt Gunvald A numerical and experimental study of a two-dimensional body with moonpool in waves and current, CeSOS IMT-4-2015 Jose Patricio Gallardo Canabes Numerical studies of viscous flow around bluff bodies, IMT IMT-5-2015 Vegard Longva Formulation and application of finite element techniques for slender marine structures subjected to contact interactions, IMT IMT-6-2015 Jacobus De Vaal Aerodynamic modelling of floating wind turbines, CeSOS IMT-7-2015 Fachri Nasution Fatigue Performance of Copper Power Conductors, IMT IMT-8-2015 Oleh I Karpa Development of bivariate extreme value distributions for applications in marine technology,CeSOS IMT-9-2015 Daniel de Almeida Fernandes An output feedback motion control system for ROVs, AMOS IMT-10-2015 Bo Zhao Particle Filter for Fault Diagnosis: Application to Dynamic Positioning Vessel and Underwater Robotics, CeSOS IMT-11-2015 Wenting Zhu Impact of emission allocation in maritime transportation, IMT IMT-12-2015 Amir Rasekhi Nejad Dynamic Analysis and Design of Gearboxes in Offshore Wind Turbines in a Structural Reliability Perspective, CeSOS IMT-13-2015 Arturo Jesùs Ortega Malca Dynamic Response of Flexibles Risers due to Unsteady Slug Flow, CeSOS IMT-14-2015 Dagfinn Husjord Guidance and decision-support system for safe navigation of ships operating in close proximity, IMT IMT-15-2015 Anirban Bhattacharyya Ducted Propellers: Behaviour in Waves and Scale Effects, IMT IMT-16-2015 Qin Zhang Image Processing for Ice Parameter Identification in Ice Management, IMT IMT-1-2016 Vincentius Rumawas Human Factors in Ship Design and Operation: Experiential Learning, IMT  
